[단독]Police, 8 months since ‘counterintelligence investigation authority’ dedicated, but ‘0’ spy arrests

The National Intelligence Service transferred hundreds of cases, but
Police don’t hand over a single case to prosecutors

Among the exaggerated ‘security’ investigations, the average is only 1 year
Limits to information sharing between the National Intelligence Service and the police

The number of personnel protecting North Korean defectors is decreasing.
“Take out the lower stone and put the upper stone on top”

News 1

“Give the task to the Jinsajang to build good personal connections and collect valuable data including internal trends of political forces…” (September 2)

“Actively encourage the groups that control and lead the Jinsajang area to participate in the candlelight vigil for the resignation of the traitorous gang…” (November 3)

The authorities revealed in the indictment of Mr. Seong and others that this was the content of an order received by Mr. Seong, a member of the People’s Vanguard for Autonomous Reunification (Jatong), also known as the “Changwon Spy Group,” from an agent of North Korea’s Cultural Exchange Bureau in 2022. The National Intelligence Service and the police obtained this encrypted document during a search and seizure of the homes of four key members of Jatong, including Mr. Seong, last year.

The person named “CEO Jin” was mentioned a total of 22 times in the indictment of the Jatong organization members. The Jatong organization members are accused of reporting to the North Korean Cultural Exchange Bureau under the title “CEO Jin Report” to summarize various controversies surrounding President Yoon Seok-yeol and criticism within the ruling party. A report stating that “CEO Jin” regularly studies subversive materials with some local figures was also attached to the Jatong organization members’ indictment.

The case of Mr. A, who the National Intelligence Service and the police had assumed to be ‘CEO Jin’ and had launched a forced investigation, was transferred from the National Intelligence Service to the police on January 1st. However, Mr. A has not been sent to the prosecution even after nearly 1 year and 3 months since the authorities began the search and seizure. It has been reported that the situation is the same for many suspects whom the National Intelligence Service had launched a forced investigation of as a ‘subnetwork of self-infiltration’.

●Hundreds of cases received, but ‘0’ spies arrested

It has been reported that the National Police Agency’s Security Investigation Bureau has been reviewing hundreds of cases transferred from the National Intelligence Service (NIS) since January 1, when it was assigned to specialize in ‘spy investigations’ due to the abolition of the NIS’s counterespionage investigation authority, for nearly eight months until the 20th of this month. However, in the past eight months, the police have not transferred a single suspect related to the hundreds of cases transferred from the NIS to the prosecution on charges of violating the National Security Act.

From January of this year to the 20th of this month, the police did not arrest a single suspect for the nearly eight months on charges of espionage or violation of the National Security Act, which are applicable to espionage suspects. This is what the Dong-A Ilbo confirmed through data such as the ‘Status and Summary of Arrests of Spies and Security Criminals’ obtained from the National Police Agency through the office of People Power Party lawmaker Cho Eun-hee.

From January to the end of June, there were no cases in which the police executed an arrest warrant for a suspect suspected of violating the National Security Act. There were only three cases in which communication restriction measures (wiretapping) were taken on suspects’ mail or telecommunications. An official from the investigative authorities who is well-versed in espionage investigations said, “Considering the number of communication restriction measures and arrest warrants, it appears that the investigation has not reached the stage of collecting evidence after identifying the suspect.”

It was found that the National Police Agency’s Security Investigation Bureau arrested and investigated without detention a total of 14 people on charges of violating the National Security Act, including praising and encouraging, communicating through meetings, and preparing to escape from January to the end of June. Of these, eight suspects were charged with distributing or possessing materials worshiping North Korea’s Kim Il-sung family (praising and encouraging through violation of the National Security Act), and four were charged with communicating with North Korean agents online and offline for various reasons (communication through meetings). Two North Korean defectors were arrested on charges of attempting to secretly re-enter North Korea (preparing to escape).

After the law was revised in December 2020 to abolish the NIS’s counterespionage investigation authority, the police conducted a joint investigation with the NIS over a three-year grace period, arresting 10 people in 2021, 4 people in 2022, and 3 people in 2023 on charges of violating the National Security Act. In total, 27 people were arrested in 2021 during the Moon Jae-in administration, 30 people in 2022 after the Yoon Seok-yeol administration took office, and 48 people in 2023 on charges of violating the National Security Act.

However, since the police began their independent investigation in January, there have been no arrests of spies so far this year, which is already two-thirds of the way through. An official from the investigative authorities said, “Since arresting spy suspects requires a long-term investigation, there are many cases where not even one person is arrested in a year,” but added, “Considering that the police have already had a three-year grace period and have only transferred hundreds of cases, it is questionable whether the investigation is being conducted properly.”

● “Absence of ‘veteran police officers’ with long experience in security investigations”

As for the reason for the poor performance of the police’s ‘espionage investigation’ even after a three-year grace period, it is pointed out that the problem is that even within the police, there are few ‘veteran police officers’ with experience in espionage investigations. The average investigative experience of the section chief and captain of the Security Investigation Bureau of the National Police Agency, the control tower that directs the nationwide espionage investigation, was 11 to 20 years, but the average ‘security’ investigation experience was only 1 year and 1 year and 6 months for the section chief and captain, respectively. Among the 108 executive-level security police officers nationwide, including the section chief or higher of the Security Investigation Bureau of the National Police Agency and the section chief and captain of the security investigation unit of each provincial police agency, only 32 people, or 29%, had experience in security investigations.

A police officer confided, “Employees who know nothing about the National Student Council, the Korean Federation of Student Associations, or the National Alliance for Democracy and Reunification of Korea are being transferred to the Security Investigation Bureau,” and “They are more concerned with reorganization, education, and meetings than with the results of investigations, so at this point, the police alone can never solve major cases such as ‘directly dispatched spies. ’” The officer also said, “The head of the Security Investigation Bureau and other executives are replaced almost every year,” and “Most of them have never directly conducted security investigations.” He added, “Since they have not personally conducted investigations, it seems like they are conducting investigations theoretically,” and “It seems like they only care about public relations, including writing reports.”

There are also criticisms from inside and outside the police that there is a shortage of pure investigative personnel to conduct spy investigations. The total number of personnel in the Security Investigation Division 1 and 2, the Security Cyber ​​Investigation Division, and the Counterespionage Economic Security Investigation Division, which are in charge of actual investigations at the Police Security Investigation Bureau, is 168. The total number of security police officers in provincial police agencies and frontline police stations nationwide is 2,310, but it is known that many of them are engaged in non-investigative work, such as protecting North Korean defectors and dispatching them to airports.

The key to investigating espionage is the ‘source security’ of information, but there are also criticisms that there are fundamental limitations to the sharing of information between the National Intelligence Service and the police. An official with extensive experience in security investigations said, “If one agency were to handle a case, the investigators and the information collectors would figure out how to protect the source of the information,” and added, “However, in a situation like the current one, there is concern that the National Intelligence Service, which collects intelligence, could hastily hand over the information to the police and ruin the HUMINT itself that they have worked so hard to build.”

However, some argue that since the National Intelligence Service and the police jointly investigated a large-scale spy ring case last year, it is not easy for the police to investigate right away because the people suspected of being part of the lower-level organization of the spy ring have destroyed evidence necessary for the investigation. An official familiar with the situation at the National Security Investigation Bureau said, “As the large-scale spy ring investigation has been conducted over the past few years, many people, including the ‘lower-level organization,’ may not be active and are hiding.”

● “Putting the lower stone aside and putting the upper stone on top” ‘Manpower shortage’ even on the front lines

There are also criticisms that the police are facing a growing manpower shortage at frontline police stations that are in charge of tasks such as “protecting North Korean defectors” as they reorganized their organization early this year to expand the National Police Agency’s Security Investigation Bureau and drastically reduce the number of security officers at frontline police stations. There are even criticisms within the police that “they have eliminated the ‘frontline security surveillance network tentacles’ that are the police’s assets.”

Since the reorganization in January of this year, only 9 out of the 41 security departments in police stations nationwide have remained. It is also known that the security departments in the remaining frontline police stations are being operated with as few as 3 to 4 people.

The security division of a police station in the metropolitan area has been reduced from 8-9 people to 3 people since the reorganization at the beginning of this year. It has been reported that the three people, including the team leader, are in charge of the personal protection of North Korean defectors in the area, 113 security situation reports, and security vulnerability management. The three people are divided into groups of 30-40 people each and are in charge of the personal protection of North Korean defectors in the area, and when a North Korean garbage balloon falls in the area, the three people take turns going out.

A police officer at a local police station said, “Starting this year, the Foreign Affairs Division was abolished, so some local security divisions are now taking on foreign guest and terrorism intelligence work,” and “The number of personnel in the security division is so small that it is difficult to carry out the work.” A police officer from the security division of another local police station said, “It’s like removing the lower stone to fill the upper one,” and “If three team members overlap with ‘on-duty leave’ and ‘soldier leave,’ there are times when only one person is working.”

The number of security police officers responsible for the safety of North Korean defectors nationwide has reached 737 this year, the lowest number since 2015. The number of North Korean defectors under personal protection per security police officer has also increased by more than 12% year-on-year to 32.35 in June 2024.

Yoo Dong-yeol, director of the Liberty Democracy Research Institute, said, “In the short term, there is a need to reorganize the counterintelligence investigation team by forming a special team centered on veteran investigators with more than 10 years of counterintelligence investigation experience,” and “In the long term, there is a need to establish a separate National Security Investigation Headquarters, rather than the National Security Investigation Bureau under the National Police Agency, to secure expertise and independence in espionage investigations.” An intelligence source pointed out, “Espionage investigations require the will and persistence to steadily dig into a case for a year or two, even if there are no immediate results, but the problem is that the structure does not provide such motivation.”

Rep. Cho Eun-hee emphasized, “There is continued anxiety about the gap in the investigation of spies,” and “We must establish a close cooperative system with the National Intelligence Service to build a counterintelligence network that minimizes national security risks.”

Reporter Kodo Yea [email protected]
Reporter Shin Jin-woo [email protected]

2024-08-22 03:08:27