The balloon war is a wake-up call for the West

by time news

Researchers of the Cold War era often correct the public regarding incorrect comparisons between the Sputnik crisis that occurred in the late 1950s of the last century, and some of the current challenges in the world of foreign policy. Obviously, there are no perfect metaphors, but the shock reactions following the affair of the Chinese spy balloon that crossed the skies of the USA suggest that this is indeed a geopolitical event of great significance. If it were not a real crisis, we probably wouldn’t get to see fighter jets almost every day leaped to intercept an object hovering in the sky.

At noon last Sunday, a fighter jet intercepted an unidentified object that was hovering six kilometers above Lake Huron near Michigan. While the authorities did not elaborate on the question of what exactly that object was, “it has an octagonal structure and wires hanging from it but without a charge attached to them”, it was stated Because it posed a threat to civilian aircraft. According to a source in the administration, security officials provided the public with some rationale for destroying the balloon, but even though interceptions of this kind have already become a disturbing routine, it seems that the exact nature of the threat still remains a mystery.

On Saturday about two weeks ago, US Air Force planes destroyed another object over the skies of Canada. This time it was described as “small” and “having the structure of a cylinder”, and according to sources in Canada it was hovering at a height of about 12 km and “posed a significant threat”. The day before, the Pentagon spokesman described it as “about the size of a car Small”, was destroyed over the coast of Alaska by two F-22 planes.

As North American waters become airspace, it’s hard to avoid wild speculation. This is more or less what is left for the public to do, in light of the continued refusal on the part of the White House to reveal details about the latest series of incidents. It is possible that silence is the best option for the administration. The New York Times reporters who tried to talk behind the scenes with everyone who was willing to talk, were unable to find a consensus about the nature of the objects, where they came from and what their purpose was.

But the early interception policy is a fairly fundamental change from the initial reaction in Washington to that infamous balloon, which crossed most of the continent before the president ordered it destroyed over the Carolina coast on February 4. In the days that have passed since then, security officials have stated that the intrusion of foreign objects into American airspace is not a unique event, and admitted in retrospect that many of these had been detected in the past. The US-Canada Joint Air Defense Command announced that it is expanding its radar activity, and revealed that “the number of detected objects has increased sharply,” according to The Times. Meanwhile in China, the government in Beijing is eager to demonstrate its capabilities in the field, and it too Shoot for objects in the sky that can be blown up As far as we know now, two superpowers are shooting at each other’s objects, for reasons that are still rather vague.

As part of the initial reaction to the appearance of the first balloon, many scoffed at the concern expressed by geopolitical commentators. Some of those critics claimed that the demand for a stronger American response or the warning against a military gap with the Chinese are nothing more than nostalgia for the days of the Cold War. But as time passes it becomes clear that there are parallel lines connecting the present and the past competition between the West and the USSR, including the so-called “Sputnik moment”.

Unlike the display of purpose in 1957, in which the USSR demonstrated its ability to launch into space a satellite that would circle the Earth, the balloon wars do not raise questions about the technological inferiority of the West. The similarities between then and now relate mainly to the psychological and paradigmatic processes that the Soviet achievement imposed on the Americans.

According to most reports, the Soviets themselves were surprised by the dramatic reaction in the United States to the launch of the satellite, which all in all proved that the Russians had a technological capability equal to the American one. The West in the space race and in the race to obtain reliable ballistic missiles. In practice, Washington had very little incentive to do so. The sense of anxiety promoted the interests of those in the West who supported a policy of confrontation with the Soviets, from a position of material superiority.

The insecurity crisis created by Sputnik finally led to advanced research programs and the launch of technological ventures, along with an overall upgrade of the American education system with the goal of producing more scientists and engineers. The crisis was also used to justify some dangerous gambles, such as the establishment of a secret intelligence facility in Pakistan and the launching of spy planes over Soviet territory, one of which was even intercepted along with its pilot Francis Gary Powers in 1960.

At the moment we do not have enough information about the last flying objects that were intercepted to determine what the level of threat was from them, and just as importantly – who was the threat that sent them. But the reaction in the West to the balloons nevertheless teaches something. American security policy was reversed almost overnight and now includes a more determined defense of the airspace.

When compared to the initial paralysis in the face of the first balloon that was discovered, it now appears that the US has no qualms about intercepting foreign objects in its skies before they get a chance to complete their mission, whatever that may be. Chinese poses a potential existential threat to the existing world order.

The Cold War broke out long before the Soviets were able to achieve the escape velocity needed to break free from Earth’s gravitational field. The threat posed by the communist bloc was obvious to anyone with eyes in his head already a decade earlier, but the Sputnik crisis helped to focus American thought. It was now clear that the competition with the USSR would not be limited to distant battlefields where secret agents and military emissaries of all kinds clashed. Now the homeland was in danger.

Similarly, the threat to core US strategic interests from rising powers should have been clear as early as 2014, when Russia invaded and annexed sovereign European territory for the first time since 1945. The naive could still hope then that this was another distant conflict, which would remain distant. While A rain of fragments of foreign intelligence tools is falling on North America today, those innocent people should have realized the mistake of excessive optimism.


The column was first published on the ‘Commentary’ website.

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