March 5 marks the three-year anniversary of the appointment of the former Czech Defense Minister and former NATO ambassador, Jiří Šedivý (Czech Republic, 1963), as director of the European Defense Agency (EDA, in its acronym in English), a body created in 2004 to coordinate the defense priorities of the Member States – all participate except Denmark – and their investments and whose role has gained relevance with Russia’s war in Ukraine. During an interview with EL PERIODICO, Šedivý warns that it is necessary to promote more joint projects and advances that the EDA has proposed the launch of three joint purchase programs at the European level: ammunition, protection equipment for soldiers and individual protection equipment chemical and biological.
What state is the European defense industry in? Is there enough cooperation?
It is much better than it was five years ago, when there were no instruments to coordinate joint projects, such as permanent structured cooperation (called PESCO) or the European Defense Fund, but we would still like to see much more coordination and, above all, many more large-scale joint projects, bringing together Member States and their industry and resulting in better capabilities for European defense.
Why do governments resist?
For many reasons. The first is that individual national interests continue to prevail. Also in those Member States with a more robust defense industry, largely due to the preference to produce at home. In second place, the reference point in defense cooperation is NATO and only in third place comes the EU. It is important to note that the EU was not established and designed as a defense alliance and that in all strategic documents they consider NATO as the basis of Europe’s collective defense. But at the same time the EU needs to develop a greater military capacity to act more autonomously in situations where NATO or the US are not involved.
What situations are you thinking of?
In the critical challenges that we face and that will continue to increase in the Middle East, North Africa and the Sahel area, where we see a very explosive mix due to the effects of climate change, problems with resources, survival of people , weak or failed states, various types of terrorism, extremism and the potential for mass immigration. It’s the main backyard of the EU, where the Americans tell us we have to be prepared for situations where they don’t provide strategic transportation, intelligence surveillance, reconnaissance. That is why we have to cooperate more and the main obstacle remains the high level of fragmentation in Europe and fragmentation means duplication and waste of resources.
Has this fragmentation gone further?
After the war (launched by Russia) started and Member States started supplying Ukraine with weapons and military equipment, we realized something that we could hardly even imagine before: the rapid consumption of equipment. The first reaction of the Member States was to hire on an individual level. Now we are trying to organize the replenishment through joint purchases.
Would you say that, given the shortcomings, the European strategy has been a failure?
I would not use the term failure. We have all been surprised by the intensity of the war in Ukraine. We all face the problem of depleting reserves and also the challenge of increasing production. In Europe, in the last 30 years, since the end of the Cold War, the general assumption was that there would not be this kind of large-scale war. The war was still present in the Balkans or in Afghanistan, but for Europe it was not a sign to invest more in defense. And the 2008 financial crisis deepened the investment gap that we are now trying to bridge. We did not reach the level of investment of the year before the crisis until 2021. So there have been hundreds of billions of euros that were not invested in capacities. It is something that we are currently facing with the Russian aggression against Ukraine, which was a very strong wake-up call.
We have heard the NATO Secretary General say that the 2% of GDP defense spending target for 2024 should be a floor, not a ceiling.
In view of the major changes in the strategic environment, NATO allies are discussing the possibility of increasing this commitment and will probably do so at the Vilnius summit. But 2% is just a figure. What is extremely important is the result and how it is invested. If the expense in personnel is very high, it can devour a large part of the budget, so the higher the part of the investment in skills, the better. The recommended proportion is 20%. Most Member States are above, even 30%, and the trend began to change before the war in Ukraine.
Given the threat from Russia and pressure from China, what military capabilities should be invested in?
We always say that repairing the shortcomings of the past and present should not be detrimental to the future. The ambition is to establish the deployment capacity of 5,000 military soldiers, jointly deployable on land, sea and in the air with all the necessary logistics, transport, command, communication, planning capacity, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, etc. These are the areas in which we must invest in the medium and long term. But we must also look 360 degrees. We are all focused on Ukraine, and rightly so, but in the long term the main challenges will come from elsewhere. And for the European Union it will be the instability belt that surrounds the north of the Middle East and, above all, the Sahel region.
He has said that Russia’s war in Ukraine has been a wake-up call.
The impact has been enormous. First of all, because of the unity that the Member States have forged in the application of sanctions against Russia. Second, an unprecedented step has been taken by redirecting the European Peace Fund towards arms reimbursement for Ukraine. In addition, the EU Heads of State and Government commissioned the Commission, together with the EDA, to identify investment gaps and propose ways to mitigate them. We have done it and we have grouped them into seven categories.
Which are?
First, medical equipment and supplies. Second, individual protection equipment against weapons or chemical, biological and radiological materials. The third signaling systems and missiles. The fourth, soldiers’ equipment and protective measures such as helmets or bulletproof vests. Fifth, all kinds of ammunition, explosives, mortars. Sixth, defensive missiles, bombs, portable air defense systems and the seventh light weapons. Now we are preparing the next step, which is to help Member States to make joint purchases. As EDA we have proposed to support them in three areas: purchase of various types of ammunition, protective equipment for soldiers and individual chemical and biological protection equipment.
In recent weeks the Ukrainians have raised the alarm for the lack of ammunition.
Apparently, the reserves are running low. That is why the immediate challenge is to fill the defense investment gaps. These are gaps that come from the past and 30 years of lack of investment that are now being further deepened by the very rapid consumption of military material in the war in Ukraine.
The problem is that delivery times can exceed two years.
It depends on the complexity. Some things may be easier and the deadlines short. Others are more difficult and require two or three years. It must also be taken into account that individual orders cover the industry portfolio for at least three or four years, so it is not easy to increase production. The industry needs to secure long-term contracts, it needs money to invest. Second, and we have experienced this during covid-19, there are problems in the supply chain and this affects all kinds of industries. There is a shortage of elemental raw materials, of components like chips. There are shortages of qualified personnel, a shortage of engineers, experts in electronics, labor and machinery. But I think there will be more money and that this will galvanize cooperation and strengthen the European defense industrial technological base to make it more resilient, also in terms of less reliance on supplies, especially from states and areas that are not exactly friendly to we.
What do you think of the shipment of Leopard tanks to Ukraine?
The challenge is the training of the crews and all the logistics, especially considering the wide spectrum of equipment types that are being shipped to Ukraine from Europe and North America. It is a logistical challenge, but it is the only way and the best way to support the Ukrainians in their self-defense against Russian aggression. (In the case of the Leopard) it will depend on how they are integrated into the war scheme. These tanks have high military technological standards and are therefore also more effective in battle.
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The EU will soon have a rapid reaction force with 5,000 soldiers. Taking into account the geopolitical scenario, wouldn’t it make sense to start talking about a European army?
It is not some kind of nucleus of a European army. This is something that has toxic political connotations in many Member States. The rapid reaction force is a very pragmatic plan to establish a capacity to be deployed and act in the stabilization operations that the EU carries out in our backyard, and especially in sub-Saharan Africa. We are focused on supporting Ukraine but the world around us does not stop there.