2023-07-16 08:00:00
Russians polled trust Putin more than others – 76%, which is not a surprise.
It is not surprising that the Minister of Foreign Affairs Lavrov with 68% is ahead of his formal boss, the head of the government Mishustin (he has 56%) – in today’s Russia, the prime minister performs rather technical functions and, by and large, politics in its classical sense. unlike the head of the foreign policy department, does not engage. Therefore, even Kadyrov’s rating is higher than that of the prime minister (62%). The level of trust in Prigozhin is 22%.
But Lavrov, and Mishustin, and Kadyrov, and Prigozhin, and all the others, besides Putin, give way to another figure.
This is Lukashenko. 70% of respondents trust him.
Thus, right behind the current president of the Russian Federation, Putin. And by 14% more than that of the prime minister – the second, according to the Russian Constitution, person in the state.
By the way, the last time sociologists asked Russians about their trust in Lukashenka (it was in 2016), the result was 3–4%.
It is also noticeable here that Lukashenka is the only foreign politician included in the survey.
One can, of course, express doubts about the legality of the appearance of Lukashenka’s surname in the list of Russian politicians, and even see an element of provocation in it.
But, on the other hand, it can be an indicator of certain processes both in the political elite of Russia and in Russian society.
I mean the statements that Lukashenka can enter the Russian political field no longer as a mediator in negotiations, but in the guise of a real player. Some consider the prospects of his participation in the struggle for the position of the president of the Russian Federation.
For example, the other day in an interview with Dozhd television channel, retired FSB general Yevgeny Savastianov expressed the opinion that the mutiny of the Wagnerites could lead Lukashenka to think that “there may be further mutinies in Russia and he (Lukashenka) may have a chance” and even linked with this the desire to have nuclear weapons on the territory of Belarus.
The reason for the appearance of such considerations can be understood: during the days of the rebellion, Putin showed weakness, and, importantly, he did not prove himself to be a guarantor of the security of the Kremlin elite. Outwardly, of course, everything is happening as before – speeches, awarding of awards in the Kremlin and the like, but some compare the current trust of the elite in Putin with what happened in 1998-1999 with Yeltsin. Then, let’s recall, with the complete preservation of the external entourage, the search for a successor went on feverishly.
We learned about what happened in the Kremlin almost a quarter of a century ago. Today, too, very little reaches the public space and even the expert community from the top of the Russian government, forcing analysts to make predictions based on a minimum of information. However, when was it different in Russia?
“For Lukashenka, the main goal was the Kremlin, and it was Putin who blocked it”
Talks about the possibility for Lukashenka to wear the “Manomakh hat” have a history and started almost immediately after the first presidential elections.
Publication in Svaboda newspaper, 1995.
In 1995, the author of these lines published the article “The Goal” (in Russian) in the independent newspaper Svaboda, where he tried to justify the seriousness of Lukashenka’s intentions to replace Boris Yeltsin as the president of the Russian Federation. The analysis of some of Lukashenka’s political and personal qualities, as well as the situation in the Russian Federation, allowed, in the author’s opinion, to see him as a real contender compared to the then leaders of rating polls in Russia – Zyuganov, Lebed and Zhirinovsky. In that case, of course, if the unification of Belarus and Russia into one state took place.
That publication was received ambiguously in the expert environment. And it is not surprising: the author did not have the opportunity to refer to specific persons, including Lukashenka’s entourage, who directly spoke about the intention of the head of Belarus to enter the struggle for the Kremlin – but spoke on condition of anonymity.
Later, some began to declare it publicly. Here is a fragment of the interview of former Minister of Agriculture Vasyl Lyavonov with Vitaly Tsygankov.
«Leonov: …The head of the Administration, Leonid Sinitsyn, called me to speak. And the meaning of the conversation was as follows: we have a young Alexander Ryhorovich, in Moscow there is an old and cold Yeltsin. Join the team, we don’t need sovereignty, let’s work to conquer the Kremlin. I replied that I am not participating in this adventure.
Gypsies: Was the conquest of the Kremlin the main goal of all this “integration”, or was the main goal “milking” Russia? And the Kremlin is secondary, if it succeeds?
Leonov: No, it was the Kremlin that was the main target. Yeltsin played his game, he had to justify himself to the people for the Białowieża Agreements, to take the integration card from the communists.
Gypsies: And when did the turning point occur? In 1998, when Chubais saw the draft treaty, which gave Lukashenka enormous alliance powers, and wrapped it up?
Leonov: No, Lukashenka realized that everything was over only when Putin became the president of Russia.
Gypsies: So, Lukashenka has every reason, to put it mildly, to dislike Putin?
Leonov: Yes, and this confirms my opinion that for Lukashenka the main goal was the Kremlin, and it was Putin who blocked it.”
It must be admitted that Lukashenka’s steps in 1994-1999 were fully in line with this intention. And if a series of agreements with Russia, which reduced the military and economic sovereignty of Belarus, could be explained by the desire to get economic preferences from Moscow in order to retain power, then the creation of the so-called “union state” was not explained by any reasonable economic and political arguments.
Finally, during the first years of his presidency, Lukashenka visited Russian regions almost every month (especially the “red belt”, where the communists ruled), and invariably received a warm welcome from the local population. At some stage, these voyages began to bother the Kremlin, and he ordered them to stop.
Let’s note that at one time, in an interview with the Belarusian service of Radio Svaboda, Barys Berozovsky said that at a certain stage, Lukashenka’s candidacy in the Kremlin was considered as Yeltsin’s successor. However, the nomination of Vladimir Putin, who was not known to many recently, put an end to Lukashenka’s encroachments on Monomakh’s cap.
As is known, Lukashenka’s Kremlin ambitions of the second half of the 1990s did not materialize, but on the way to them Belarusian sovereignty suffered greatly.
And now – Lukashenka’s 70% rating and the statements of some political observers about his chances to replace Putin in the seat of the Kremlin’s owner.
Opportunities and conditions
Implementation of this option is possible if at least three but mandatory conditions are met.
The first is legal grounds, the second is Putin’s departure, the third is the desire of the ruling elite, which in today’s Russia consists mainly of former employees of the special services.
Despite the fact that many commentators note the weakening of Putin’s position after the Wagner rebellion (indeed, the master of the Kremlin has shown himself not only to be helpless, but also comical at times), Putin remains – in any case, in the eyes of the majority of the population – the legitimate president of Russia. However, the elite got serious reasons to doubt that Putin can guarantee them the preservation of both positions and capital in the future.
What if Kadyrov’s army, which is considered to be much better organized and technically equipped, suddenly goes to Moscow? Therefore, as he said, different things can happen to Putin. And not necessarily the worst.
People of mature age remember how, on the morning of August 19, 1991, they were informed that “due to health reasons, Mikhail Gorbachev was unable to fulfill his duties as President of the USSR.” In August 1991, hundreds of thousands of supporters of democracy took to the streets of Moscow – in June 23, no one came to the square of the Russian capital. In a certain sense, among other things, this is an indicator of the readiness of ordinary people to protect Putin “in the event of something”, and those who think or prepare such a “case” certainly take this into account.
The second condition is that Lukashenka must have legal grounds to run for the post of president of the Russian Federation. He can get them only if he becomes a citizen of the Russian Federation.
It is obvious that the way for this (as in the mid-90s) lies only through the inclusion of Belarus in the Russian Federation either by one or several entities. This may require a referendum. Its results, based on the experience of previous referendums, are not difficult to predict, as there are no illusions about freedom of expression in such a “plebiscite”. However, compliance with international standards has long ceased to be of interest to either the Kremlin or official Minsk.
But another form can be used – for example, the so-called union state of Belarus and Russia, which, by making changes in the Constitution of the two states, can be given a much more real content than it currently exists.
A number of political commentators claim that this is exactly the form that Putin proposed to Lukashenka at the end of 2019, when the current Russian president faced the problem of a third consecutive term. According to them, Lukashenka was offered the position of either the deputy head of the “union state”, or the prime minister or head of the Federation Council (in the event that Belarus and Russia would be fully united).
Apparently, Lukashenka was not satisfied with position No. 2, and the problem was solved by changing the Constitution, when Valyantina Tereshkova proposed to remove the limit on the number of presidential terms.
However, since 2019, the positions of Putin and Lukashenka have changed.
If four years ago, in the eyes of the Russian establishment, Lukashenka was perceived as a “younger brother” who sucks from the Russian gas pipe, and in 2020 – as a vassal who owes his political (and perhaps not only) existence to Putin, then after the attack of Russia the image of Ukraine underwent a significant correction.
Today, in the perception of those who support the “greatness of Russia”, Lukashenka is Putin’s savior (the fact that the negotiations with Prigozhin could not have gone exactly as Lukashenka himself told about them is of interest to a very small part of the population: his positive role was confirmed by the master of the Kremlin himself) . Yes, in 2020 he stayed in power thanks to Russia, but he has been holding his country in his fist for several years now. No democracy, no dissent, no “European values” for you – nothing that a “deep” Russian person does not like.
The factor of February 24, 2022, by the way, is also very significant in the perception of supporters of “one and indivisible”. Lukashenka allowed Russian troops to attack Ukraine from the territory of Belarus, and then agreed to the introduction of Russian nuclear weapons – what else could be a better indication of devotion to the “combat brotherhood”?
But what is much more important is that, having a unique opportunity, if not to “reset”, then to significantly reduce the tension in his relations with the West, and then, it is possible, to receive certain preferences – Lukashenka did not refuse to support Russia in the war with Ukraine. He actually showed that he is truly devoted to the “Russian world”. What a contrast with Takaev’s behavior – he instantly forgot all the good things Moscow did in the days of the crisis at the beginning of 2022.
And another important factor, which in the eyes of the Russian security forces at the highest level works in Lukashenka’s favor – from the very beginning of his political career, he relied on the support of the special services, which he himself repeatedly stated in the 90s. However, it is unlikely that in Russia today there will be at least one high-ranking official, starting with governors, whose path to big politics was not approved by the special services.
And incredible scenarios come true
All this (and not only this) makes Alexander Lukashenko an acceptable candidate both for those who stand in the “second echelon” behind Putin, and for the majority of the Russian population (70% of the rating is confirmation of this).
Of course, in the case of Lukashenka’s arrival, the Russian establishment will experience certain disturbances – but they are guaranteed to be smaller than if the head of the “Wagner” PEC ascends to the top of power.
And the fact that Belarus will cease to exist as an independent state when the plan “Lukashenka is the master of the Kremlin” is implemented is just a big plus for the Russian elite: the annexation of Belarus will be presented to the Russian people as a victory, even if it is not as large-scale as the victory over Ukraine would look like. But it is bloodless: every public protest in Belarus is suppressed.
Such a consolation prize instead of “Kiev in three days”.
The consequences of Lukashenka’s rule over the territory with a nuclear arsenal is a separate topic. Belarusians who have lived under his rule for almost three decades can share their assessments and forecasts.
Of course, all these considerations can be classified as abstract — but recent events show that nothing is impossible in political life, and the most incredible (and not the best) scenarios are often realized.
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