Is the world on the verge of a new arms race that could bring nuclear weapons to many more countries in the coming years? This is one of the questions that will be at the heart of the conference examining the Convention on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) to be held in New York this week.
Looking back over the past five decades, that is, since the launch of the Convention in 1968, three main steps can be identified to how the world treats nuclear weapons possession.
The first phase, accompanied by a rise in anti-nuclear sentiment around the world, signaled hope that the NPT would pave the way for the final elimination of all nuclear weapons. Even people who believed that nuclear weapons and the doctrine of guaranteed mutual annihilation were the ones who prevented World War III, saw the Convention as an important step towards a final disarmament. But what actually happened was something completely different.
In the first years after the entry into force of the Convention, a number of nuclear forces arose around the world, including India and Pakistan. At least a dozen other countries, including Iran under the Shah, South Africa under the apartheid regime and Argentina under the military junta, have made great strides towards reaching the scientific, industrial and technical threshold sufficient to produce nuclear weapons first.
France, which initially refused to sign the treaty, later joined it, but still continued to develop and expand its nuclear arsenal. The French also gave Iraq under Saddam Hussein the first step on the ladder of climbing ahead of the bombing.
In the second phase of the treaty life process, the US and the USSR signed a series of agreements to reduce the nuclear pool, but these were offset by the big picture due to the Chinese decision to expand North Korea’s arsenal and rapid break into the heart of the exclusive nuclear club.
In the third phase, which ended with the end of the Cold War, hopes for the end of nuclear weapons rose again, while all five nuclear powers officially recognized by the treaty (US, Russia, Britain, China and France) continued to upgrade their stockpiles. Germany was also caught hot when it tried To build a “threshold capability,” while Japan’s ban on developing nuclear weapons faced growing opposition.
Nearly half a century after the launch of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, even its greatest followers find it difficult to describe it as a success story. The treaty, as its name implies, was supposed to stop the rise of new nuclear-armed states. But in practice the number of countries holding a nuclear arsenal has almost doubled since it was first signed.
In fact, two of the countries seemingly “recognized” under the treaty, France and China, are the ones that helped other countries advance on the path to the bomb. In the lower stages, North Korea and Pakistan helped Iran revive its dying nuclear project. The establishment of a “nuclear research facility” in Syria by North Korea was also a clear example of the failure of the treaty.
new Age?
Preventing the proliferation of new nuclear weapons is just one of the goals of the Convention. The second objective deals with the dismantling of existing weapons, but here too the treaty has completely failed. On paper, both the US and Russia have reduced the number of nuclear warheads they have and the number of missiles needed to carry them to the target. But in reality they have also developed several new generations of warheads and missiles, giving their countries much greater destructive power.
Those who today advocate for the “right to develop nuclear weapons” and support the allocation of greater resources to bomb-building projects, use precisely the argument that nowhere has a real process of disarmament and disarmament ever taken place.
The Convention also failed in other areas that were supposed to be within its jurisdiction or aspirations. It was to run “risk reduction” and “security promotion” programs for non-nuclear-weapon states. In addition, it ensures that countries that already possess such weapons will freely and systematically share the technological knowledge necessary for the use of nuclear power other than for military purposes. All of these clauses have never progressed beyond empty statements and some marginal gestures.
Another significant blow to the credibility of the treaty was borne by the Obama administration, which effectively undermined it and under the authority of the International Atomic Energy Commission (IAEA), which is the body that is supposed to oversee the implementation of the treaty on behalf of the United Nations. The Obama administration took the mandate on the nuclear issue out of the hands of the IAEA, and created a new and unofficial body of the “Five Powers” in order to create a dialogue with the ayatollahs in Tehran. Also above the pages of the “nuclear agreement” with Iran it is clearly stated that it was tailor-made for Iran and not for any other country, although as stated the body that created it lacks any formal legal status.
In another case, former President Donald Trump and his administration also undermined the treaty when they held nuclear talks with North Korea and its leader Kim Jong-un. In a sense, Trump even increased to do when unlike Obama did not include any other state in the wording of the debates.
If we do believe the founders of the Convention who held that nuclear weapons pose a serious threat to world peace, then the celebration of the Jubilee should provide us with an opportunity for a serious examination of failure, and for thinking of ways to redesign effective tools to achieve prevention and disarmament.
I will take the risk of being considered a sow of panic, and raise the speculation that we may be on the threshold of a new stage in the life of the Convention, a stage in which nuclear weapons in the hands of different and strange countries will be taken for granted. The next few weeks, when the world’s haters will gather in New York to celebrate and be photographed, it would have been better to devote serious thought to rewording a convention designed to address yesterday’s needs, and seem utterly incapable of dealing with tomorrow’s threats.
Amir Tehri was the editor of the Iranian newspaper Kaihan until 1979, and currently writes a regular column for the a-Sharq al-Awsat newspaper. A full version of the column was first published on the Gatesstone Institute website.
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