“The relationship between Russia and Iran is the worst threat to the West”

2023-09-25 20:51:47

L’Russian offensive on Ukraine has drastically changed many aspects of our daily lives. But above all, it has revolutionized the international scene. Russia it has been isolated, although not completely. Other countries like Iran or the china they have given him a helping hand. The researchers Ellie Geranmayeh i Nicole Grajewski, of the program for the Middle East and North Africa of l’European Council on Foreign Relations, address how close these last two powers have become. In their report ‘Both alone: ​​How the war in Ukraine conditions Russian-Iranian relations’, they also expose the new risks to West it is exposed due to the deepening of this union.

How has the war in Ukraine changed the relationship between Russia and Iran?

Nicole Grajewski [N.G.]: The war in Ukraine was a catalyst for this relationship in many ways. There was already a foundational magnitude of this in terms of common discontent toward the international order, toward certain domestic political events, but the war in Ukraine has really accelerated that relationship. We see this both in the political and economic spheres. Partly because of their international situation, Russia and Iran have begun to cooperate more in areas that were previously quite weak in this relationship. One thing that worries Europe and the United States is the military dimension of the relationship, which has undergone a marked transformation. Before the war in Ukraine, Russia was the one supplying Iran with weapons and armaments. And now we see Iran supplying Russia with more advanced drones, equipment and technology than before.

What has been the change in the economic field?

NG: Russia and Iran are cooperating more closely in areas such as cooperation on de-dollarization and international currency trade. Moreover, both within Russia and Iran, there are internal events that appear to be paralleling the rise of hard-line figures and individuals who are more antagonistic toward the West.

In terms of your military relationship, where is the relationship going?

NG: Historically, Russia has been quite reluctant to call this relationship a ‘strategic partnership’, partly because it does not want to antagonize countries like Israel or the Persian Gulf states, but also because it does not want to be bound in terms of ‘a mutual relationship with a defense package, for example. But it is a flexible collaboration. There are many key points of commonality regarding their visions or their kind of aspirations for the broader processes of the international order, but there is also a deep-seated sense of mistrust. Especially, as shown in our report, Iranian elites still do not fully trust Russia, as there are still many legacies from the past and they are not really open to some of Russia’s intentions. So the relationship is and probably will be flexible. But it works this way by design: Russia and Iran can work in areas where there are common interests, but also avoid areas of tension and work more towards where they actually have synergies.

How does the Kremlin see this relationship?

NG: Delving into Russian decision-making is difficult and there are many inconsistencies. There is a fear in Russia that Iran could potentially swing towards the West because this would reduce Tehran’s influence. One of the areas where it has had the most ascendancy is nuclear. Thus, when we delve into much of the Russian elite’s thinking on the nuclear issue, it becomes clear that there are certain divisions. It’s quite fascinating because there used to be a lot more skepticism towards the potential militarization of Iran’s program, but that has changed since the war in Ukraine. For some of these elite thinking heads, especially the hardliners, a nuclear-capable Iran would be less dangerous than an Iran close to the West. So there is sort of a patchwork of opinions in Russia when it comes to Iran, but it reflects many times the internal divisions within the country.

Should Europe and the United States be concerned about the nature of this evolving relationship?

Ellie Geranmayeh [E.G.]: Now, many European policymakers have put relations between Russia and Iran at the top of their agendas, whereas two years ago they would hardly even have been a priority issue. This deepening relationship between Russia and Iran is the worst threat to Western interests. In our report, we recommend that the Europeans work with the United States to curb this relationship and understand that they will not be able to stop it entirely, but that there are ways to reduce the partnership in strategic areas of interest to the West.

What are these ways?

EG: There are three main forms. The first is to reduce transfers of the most sophisticated Iranian weapons to Russia, which will likely be used in Ukraine. The second thing that should really concern the West is that Iran is advancing its nuclear program with Russia’s tacit approval and, in some cases, actual encouragement. The third area is that this military partnership extends to places like Syria and gives rise to further military escalation, particularly with the United States.

The use of diplomacy with Russia seems to be out of the question at the moment for Europeans and Americans. Are there more chances to talk with Iran?

EG: Now there is an opportunity to do so given the detente gestures between Iran and the West in recent weeks [com l’alliberament de cinc ciutadans dels EUA després del desbloqueig de fons iranians a Corea del Sud]. In the past we used to see Russia as the weak link in this Russia-Iran relationship to negotiate. At the moment, the West is in a position where it cannot close deals with the Kremlin on Iran, but with Tehran there is an opening and also a debate at the highest level of leaders within the country, who might be able to to influence To curb Iranian partnership with Russia, the West could anticipate economic compensation in exchange for security measures by Iran. The West can offer immediate economic relief, more tangible than what its Eastern partners, such as China and Russia, have been able to offer. Those relationships are falling short in key areas of economic trade that Iran is seeking right now after years of crippling sanctions.

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But with these efforts, the debate about human rights in Iran is re-emerging.

EG: Yes, this focus on the diplomatic front carries several risks, including the human rights component. All this comes at a time when Iranian authority is exercising an incredibly repressive hand on the domestic front, but we believe there are ways for the West to continue pointing out human rights abuses and holding Iranian authorities accountable, as well as promoting tangible support for activists on the ground as it seeks to influence Russian-Iranian cooperation in areas that represent a strategic threat to the security of Europe and the United States. Our article concludes by projecting the notion that the time to influence the Russians is now because the longer this continues, particularly the conflict in Ukraine, the more likely it is that the hardline-driven security alliance in the two countries will develop a relationship of codependence and is consolidated in all areas.