2024-02-15 14:36:28
The elections of November 19, 2023 were lavish in unleashing all kinds of unexpected political, economic and social events. The excess, inexperience and lack of patriotism of the LLA lead the country to the abyss, and force us to carefully analyze the lessons left by the defeat. One is what happened in the election for mayor of Rosario, where despite the adverse result, the opposition embarked on a different path, with the intention of seriously contesting power. Encouraged by the mismanagement of the current mayor, an alliance was created between the left (non-Trotskyist) and Peronism, which was 15,000 votes away from snatching the municipality from the radical Pablo Javkin.
In Rosario the same political alliance has ruled for 35 years: a front made up of socialists, radicals and minor groups of the local right. This coalition was built on the political drift of the best municipal administration since the advent of democracy: that of Héctor Cavallero. He was the first socialist mayor, who later broke with the party of his origin, founded his own and allied himself with the Menemist Peronism and later, with the Kirchnerist. In those mutations of a professional politician he left shreds of the prestige that he had legitimately earned in management.
The Rosario Stock Exchange (BCR) is a factor of local political power that must be taken into account in the analysis. An opaque world of financial businesses, born in the heat of the soybean process of our humid pampas that has an enormous influence on the city. Transnational cereal companies, private ports and shady businesses of various kinds are an omnipresent power that operates on local politics from the shadows. Drug violence is the other leading actor that completes the context. With this very complex scenario, in the midst of a devastating electoral performance by the right in Argentine Chicago (a nickname that fits very well with its history), an unprecedented coalition between the left and Peronism is an experience that must be valued in its entirety. dimension.
One of the salient characteristics of this Rosario electoral mastery is its strong local imprint. As in all of Argentina, the electoral structures built in Buenos Aires laboratories did not fit here. The challenge of this stage is to definitively abandon the unitary view of political construction. Nobody wants to know anything more about that chanta porteñismo that Alberto’s government expressed so clearly. The betrayal of the Buenos Aires bourgeoisie – intellectual, “progressive” and port-based – was what brought us Milei as a gift. This is the real measure of popular fatigue with our government.
Centralism has left very deep wounds. The governors express it out loud, whatever their ideological sign: Insfran, Torres, Llaryora or Weretilneck. There is a very strong demand throughout the deep interior of a popular federalism that deals with solving specific problems. It is about representing the demands of the territories before the central power: not about being its local representatives, reduced to the function of spokespersons for why things are not done.
The recent Rosario experience must be analyzed with greater substance in the national and popular field. The price is lowered with the clear objective of blocking a frontist political solution that rescues the best of the Kirchnerist legacy and unites it with the leftist tradition.
Another notable originality is the positive attitude of Rosario Peronism and its candidate Roberto Sukerman, willing to leave their comfort zone and bet on winning. The PJ formed the Frente Juntos Avancemos, with 10 more parties. In that internal Juan Monteverde (candidate from the left) competed against Sukerman. Tony Salinas, one of the intellectual authors of the movement, tells us: “The formation of a right-wing front (PRO, UCR, PS) forced us to think of a coalitionist scheme that would allow us to reach the general elections with a single candidate for mayor. Thus it was decided to form an attractive internal body within the Front. The electoral engineering that we put together was political. Then we adapt the legal aspects to the needs of the Front.” An example of originality and flexibility, within the framework of a very strong debate of ideas about the city we want.
This assembly made it possible to overcome the historical mistrust around the Fronts that Peronism created. What was the PJ doing? He said that he was putting together a front that only had its name in front, to maintain form. If there were five places to appear on the lists, the different sides of Peronism put the five together; and then the five who followed him, just in case someone resigned or died. From there the lists were opened to the allies, who could at most hope to be allowed to sit in the second row on the day the lists were presented. They didn’t even smell the stage to serve coffee.
Instead, this was a front-coalition as it should be. There was an internal one. Yeah! Peronism went to interns with the left, within its own space. This is key, unpublished and original data. A competition that was developed at a high level, with proposals and debate. And once it’s finished, everyone fights. The PJ candidates, Sukerman, De Ponti, Tognioli, Rico, bet on winning and not agreeing to defeat to keep some position.
Santa Fe Peronism is going through one of the worst moments in its history. Perotti left him in a state of total helplessness. While the provincial PJ was the government, for the first time in its history it did not present candidates in almost 100 locations. That compelling fact says it all. Despite this bleak outlook, in Rosario the disaster almost occurred. You have to dare to break the mold. Nothing is lost beforehand.
Juan Monteverde was the triumphant internal candidate; he also breaks the mold of the traditional left. The party that he built from a dairy farm has it in his DNA to show his own work as an example. Future City – his organization – not only distributed milk, cheese and sweets from the dairy he manages, but also founded a cultural center, primary and tertiary schools. Its councilors deposit a part of their salary in a common fund to finance their electoral campaigns. They do not do it as cheap demagoguery to defenestrate politics, but to make more and better politics. They always supported CFK strongly and with autonomy, although that support reached the Federal Capital in a distorted manner. It is easier to be a delegate than to build your own power. That ended, I hope, with the latest provincial election debacle.
Santa Fe had a historical precedent of a real Front, not a fake one. It was in 1973, when Juan Perón anointed Carlos Silvestre Begnis, an intransigent radical affiliated with the Integration and Development Movement (MID), as the FREJULI candidate for governor. Yesterday, like today, there were left-handed gorillas and Peronists with the peronometer who did not see it and did not see it. They are the ones who always end up playing for what they say they are fighting for. In Santa Fe the peronometer had the formula of Cap. (RE) Antonio Campos and Alberto Bonino, who ignored Peron’s directive and armed from the outside: they came out fourth. Their only success was being functional on the right and forcing a second round between FREJULI and the Popular Federalist Alliance, which led to the Natale-Verdú binomial. The UCR came third.
But history always leaves some lessons. That was the last time that Peronism won the mayor of Rosario. He has been losing for 50 years now. When he triumphed, he did so thanks to that Broad Front that Perón put together. Prof. Rodolfo Ruggieri, from the PJ, was the mayor; and the socialist Alberto U. Gabetta. councilor. Carlos Silvestre Begnis’s formula won in the province, in the second round.
It’s there, there’s no doubt!