2024-07-12 09:53:24
The surprise triumph of reformist candidate Masoud Pezeshkian in Iran’s recent presidential election has exposed deep internal divisions among conservatives that are making it difficult for them to resist the growing demand for change.
Orientalist Nikita Smagin spoke about this in his article for the Carnegie Politika project.
These changes include not only domestic reforms, but also a possible turn in the country’s foreign policy – normalization of relations with the West, which could mean distancing itself from Russia. However, such sentiments are still mostly characteristic of Iranian voters, not the ruling elite, so the change of president does not pose an immediate threat to Russian-Iranian relations. However, as orientalist Nikita Smagin writes in his article for the Carnegie Politika project, Pezeshkian’s victory is an alarming signal for the Kremlin: in the future, cooperation with Iran may become much more difficult.
The Effect of Competitive Elections
Conservative dominance in all branches of Iran’s government lasted only three years, ending with the surprise victory of Masoud Pezeshkian. In 2021, when Ebrahim Raisi became president, it seemed that the conservatives had finally seized power, and that Iranian elections would follow the same pattern: strong reformers do not pass the electoral filter, and conservatives win almost all the seats. The Majlis elections in March only reinforced these expectations, when conservatives won 233 of 290 seats.
But the snap presidential election held in early July after Raisi’s death in a plane crash showed that the Iranian system can still surprise. Iran’s electoral processes remain competitive enough to maintain intrigue and an element of unpredictability.
Of course, Iran’s elections are hardly “fair” or “free.” However, they remain competitive enough to maintain intrigue and the element of surprise.
This time, the conservatives’ failure was due to their inability to overcome their internal differences and nominate a single candidate. As a result, in the first round, the votes were split between Said Jalili and Mohammad-Bagher Ghalibaf, who received 40% and 14.5% of the votes, respectively. If the conservatives had had a single candidate, they could have won in the first round. But that did not happen.
Moreover, in the second round, some of Ghalibaf’s supporters, disappointed by Jalili’s unwillingness to compromise, supported Pezeshkian. This split shows that the conservative camp is experiencing a leadership crisis and is increasingly divided into warring factions, each with its own understanding of the ideals of the Islamic Republic.
These disagreements could have been stopped by the spiritual leader Ali Khamenei, but he did not do so. Apparently, he was satisfied with the victory of the reformer. Even during the protests in the spring of 2022, the authorities began to consider the possibility of returning the reformers to the forefront in order to alleviate the crisis of legitimacy and restore trust in the political system. As a result, Pezeshkian’s victory was the people’s choice, which the authorities did not interfere with.
The Ethnic Factor and the Demand for Change
Pezeshkian also benefited from the ethnic factor. Despite the low turnout (less than 50% in both rounds), he was actively supported in the provinces where Azerbaijanis and Kurds predominate. Pezeshkian does not hide his Kurdish-Azerbaijani origin and speaks both languages. In East and West Azerbaijan, as well as in Kurdistan, he received four to six times more votes than Jalili.
The main reason for his victory was the massive demand for change in Iranian society. Judging by the results, this time even the military, officials and other groups loyal to the government, who usually support the conservatives, actively voted for the reformist candidate.
Prospects to the West
Iran’s demand for change also has a foreign policy dimension: the desire to emerge from isolation. Pezeshkian has openly called for improving relations with Europe and avoiding tensions with the United States. Many Iranians support such slogans.
However, “normalization with the West” remains more of a beautiful slogan than a real program. In the current circumstances, it is unclear how such a turn could take place, even if Iran sincerely wanted to move in this direction. The main problem remains the sanctions, which have only increased in recent years. Restoring the nuclear deal looks utopian. It is also unclear to what extent the American and European bureaucracies are capable of lifting sanctions, rather than introducing new ones.
It is therefore not surprising that after all the pre-election promises about normalizing relations with the West, Pezeshkian had a telephone conversation with Vladimir Putin immediately after the elections. The Iranian Westerner has already promised that in October the parties will finally sign a long-term agreement on strategic cooperation, which has been discussed for many years.
Small maneuver and long-term risks
Pezeshkian and Iran as a whole have too little room to maneuver to think about reconsidering relations with Russia. No matter how strong the demand for normalization with the West, Tehran will most likely have to deepen relations with Moscow and Beijing.
But the long-term outlook for Russia is less rosy. Many voters of Iranian reformers, as well as reformist media, perceive Moscow as the heir to the Russian and Soviet empires, just waiting for an opportunity to get its hands on Iranian resources. Among opponents of the government, there is a popular view that the Islamic Republic’s regime would have collapsed long ago if it were not for the Kremlin’s support.
In the near future, the rapprochement between Russia and Iran is unlikely to be threatened: the understanding that the parties need each other is too strong. At the same time, Iranian society is increasingly projecting its dissatisfaction with the domestic situation onto foreign policy. Russia, albeit not entirely deservedly, is perceived by critics of the Iranian authorities as one of the culprits of Iran’s dire situation.
Pezeshkian’s victory only confirms this trend. With the slightest fluctuations in the exchange rate, which are inevitable during the transition of power in the country, Iranian politicians can use anti-Russian sentiments for their own purposes. Therefore, Pezeshkian represents a potential threat for Moscow in the future. He was brought to power by Iran, which accused Israel of preparing a threat to the Middle East
Iran’s new president has issued an anti-Israeli statement demanding change, which, among other things, contains anti-Russian overtones.
Earlier, “Cursor” reported that Iran accused Israel of preparing a threat to the Middle East. The new president of Iran made an anti-Israeli statement.