Lack of military expertise, such as approval for the delivery of CCTV for border operations with Chinese malware installed
The Defense Acquisition Program Administration (DADA) is an organization established by the participatory government in 2006 by removing some functions from the Ministry of National Defense under the pretext of preventing military payment corruption and improving defense project efficiency. Before that, the weapons procurement project was handled by the Ministry of Defense’s procurement headquarters and each military headquarters. In accordance with the perception that civilianization equals advancement, with the launch of the DAPA, decision-making authority and key positions regarding the introduction of weapons were transferred to civilian government officials. However, looking at the DAPA’s recent actions, it is the author’s opinion that there are many aspects that are pushing back on the elite and modernization of the Republic of Korea’s Armed Forces.
About 1,300 military CCTVs containing Chinese parts removed
Recently, it was reported that Chinese-made parts were discovered in the Korean military’s closed-circuit (CC) TVs used in security operations, and about 1,300 units were urgently removed. The CCTV’s control program contained code that transmitted video data in real time to a Chinese domain address. This is because the CCTV is equipped with components with malicious code. This is not the first time that such malware or Chinese parts have been discovered in CCTV used in military security operations. As military resources became scarce in the 2010s, the military began to introduce a large number of CCTVs for border operations in the front barbed wire area and the rear coastal and riverine areas. However, every year, CCTV malfunctions and defects continued to occur in various places, both front and back. In some CCTVs, as in a recent case, several parts or codes were found that transmit shooting data to a specific Internet Protocol (IP) address in China. In other words, there is a serious problem with the Korean military’s scientific alert system as a whole.
Experts who attended a seminar on ‘Development of AI-based manned and unmanned complex border operation system’ hosted by the Ministry of National Defense in July of last year criticized the government. This pointed out the complacency of decision-makers and the DAPA regarding security operations using CCTV. In particular, criticism from mechanical security experts was harsh. An unmanned perimeter system consists of three components: a detection system that detects heat sources or movements and catches intruders, a surveillance system that confirms and identifies detected movements through CCTV, and a control system that controls the overall system and takes necessary measures. . Mechanical security experts point out that “military authorities do not understand the difference between a detection system and a surveillance system and are overlooking the importance of the detection system.” For this reason, detection systems are omitted in unmanned border system construction projects, or even if included, the cheapest products are introduced. It is pointed out that this is also the cause of frequent false alarms from unmanned security systems.
Test evaluation for the introduction of military equipment requires expertise to thoroughly verify not only hardware but also software. It is questionable whether the DAPA currently has enough experts for this verification process. Currently, in the introduction of military equipment, if it is determined that it meets the minimum operational requirements (ROC), the company offering the lowest price is selected. In some projects, the highest score is given to price among all evaluation items. For this reason, much of the equipment supplied to the Korean military is selected as the ‘lowest bidder.’ This is also the case with the CCTV in question this time.
Even military equipment software must be thoroughly verified…
In fact, security issues surrounding Chinese-made CCTV are emerging not only in Korea but also around the world. Therefore, the DAPA should have carefully inspected all aspects of hardware and software when introducing CCTV for security operations. Even if it looks like a domestic product at first glance, it is basic to check whether it is a Chinese product imported through expedient methods such as ‘replacing boxes’. However, as has been known through various media reports in recent years, there was no proper verification work or it was carried out poorly. In a situation where the ‘lowest price’ is the most important factor in winning a bid, each company has no choice but to find the cheapest parts possible to match the price. It is easy to fall into the temptation of low-priced Chinese parts with high security risks. In this way, even if a company changes its boxes or labels to domestically produced ones, the DAPA must catch this with professionalism and a sense of duty. However, many of the decision-makers and practitioners at the DAPA seem to lack military experience or expertise. For this reason, there are many cases where people do not properly understand why the weapons introduction project they are in charge of is being promoted. Even if they are from the military, there are many who have limited expertise only in their branch of service or branch.
In addition, there are quite a few weapons introduction projects that have been in difficulties since the launch of the DAPA. For example, let’s look at the 3rd FX (next-generation fighter) project, which ended with the introduction of 40 F-35As. This project, which started in 2007 right after the launch of the DAPA, was based on purchasing 60 new fighter jets with a budget of 8.3 trillion won. However, looking at the project implementation process, it is suspected that the DAPA could not even figure out how much the fighter jets it was purchasing would cost. In 2013, when the project was in full swing, the cost of introducing 60 units calculated by the DAPA was 5.95 trillion won. At the same time, the Korea Institute for Defense Analyzes (KIDA) estimated that it would cost 7.78 trillion won. The project budget increased to 8.3 trillion won, and was ultimately decided to introduce 40 units at 7.4 trillion won.
At the time, the F-35 was in the low-rate initial production (LRIP) stage, so the prices for each LRIP were different. Moreover, prices were falling every year. Like other fighter jet acquisition projects, if a contract was made with a ‘variable price’, the difference in price drop could be refunded or additional fighter jets could be received equal to the difference. In the past, when the F-16PB was introduced, the Korean military signed a contract at a variable price and received more aircraft equal to the difference. In the case of the F-35A, the difference was 20 billion won per unit, or about 800 billion won in total. If we had signed a contract at a variable price, we could have received 6 to 8 more F-35As or received that much money back. However, the DAPA pushed for a ‘fixed price’. As a result, Korea became the only country among the F-35 adopters to sign a fixed price contract. I think this is the result of DAPA officials being ignorant of the price change information for the F-35 and trying to show off their ‘achievement’ of obtaining a military communication satellite through a compromise trade through good negotiation.
Domestic shipbuilding industry boycotts DAPA business briefing session
The confusion over weapons introduction has also caused problems recently. The August Ulsan-class frigate Batch-IV 1st and 2nd construction project briefing session was canceled due to a boycott by shipbuilders. Even though the briefing session was held again after being re-announced after being canceled once, none of the domestic shipbuilding companies participated. This is because the price proposed by the DAPA was absurd. The Ulsan-class batch-III, which has already been built, is the first ship, Chungnam, and was contracted for 400 billion won in 2020. The contract for the 5th and 6th ships, signed last year, was worth 791.7 billion won, or about 400 billion won per ship. However, the DAPA proposed 757.5 billion won for the price of the two expanded and improved batch-IV ships. The price is less than 400 billion won per ship. Considering the size and performance of the combat ship in question and the price of similar ships overseas, this is a ridiculous level.
In the previous Batch-Ⅲ project, a company that had entered the warship construction business for the first time adopted a strategy of accepting orders at a loss, possibly in order to achieve first results. At the time, the DAPA praised itself as an example of ‘budget reduction’. Although the DAPA was aware of the company’s deficit in orders at the time, it used this as a standard to lower the budget for follow-up projects. The idea is to deliver two warships for 370 billion won, which would be a loss even if they received 400 billion won per ship. The shipbuilding industry has no capacity to respond to these business conditions.
Weapon systems are incomparably more expensive than ordinary industrial products. Additionally, depending on how the weapon is used, it has a significant impact on the lives of frontline soldiers and national security. Therefore, decision-making to introduce a weapon system requires a high level of expertise. Here, expertise refers to △insight into recent changes in the pattern of war, △high understanding and insight into the weapon system in question, and △the ability to quantify the opinions of users performing actual missions with the weapon and turn it into evaluation data. I would like to ask how many civilian officials in the DAPA today, especially high-ranking officials with decision-making authority, have all of these abilities.
We need real experts instead of ‘those with excellent qualifications’
It is the author’s opinion that reform at the level of dissolution of the DAPA is now inevitable. The personnel needed by the DAPA are true experts who are well-versed in military strategy and weapons systems. Instead of having ‘excellent qualifications’ from prestigious universities or study abroad schools who only memorize theories, we need to deploy soldiers who will remain in the military for more than a dozen years. If the DAPA is left as is without major reform, irrational decision-making will continue in the weapons acquisition project, which costs an astronomical amount of taxpayer money worth tens of trillions of won every year.
[이기사는[이기사는[이기사는[이기사는주간동아 1459호에 실렸습니다]
Shin In-gyun, CEO of Independent Defense Network
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2024-10-06 04:33:50