2024-09-29 07:40:00
An article by Andrea Spiri in «Ventesimo Secolo» examines the confidential papers of US diplomacy: sympathy towards the PSI, distrust towards the communists
It is a recurring opinion among some former party leaders and commentators that there was a hand from the United States behind the Mani Pulite judicial investigations which led Bettino Craxi to flee Italy in 1994. Supporters of this thesis maintain that our country’s main political and military ally would have favored the ouster of the secretary of the Socialist Party from roles of power due to a conflict in 1985, the dispute caused by his refusal to have the American Air Force deliver and then to the Delta Force in the Sigonella base the Palestinian terrorists who had seized the “Achille Lauro” ship.
It would be naive to consider the United States a one-piece block of stone. The presidents of the moment, political leaders, companies, the military, secret services and numerous components can determine the directions of action. Leafing through reports from American embassies and consulates from the late 1980s, however, it does not appear that the republican personalities sent to represent Washington in Rome were those who distrusted Craxi following the Sigonella crisis.
Confidentialconfidential, is the wording reported on the reports that Andrea Spiri, professor of contemporary history at Luiss, examined in one of his texts which appears in the magazine «Ventunesimo Secolo». It’s called The Americans and the start of the transformation process of the PCI: communist 1989 in the notes of US diplomacy. On one of the information sheets, Spiri reports that Ambassador Maxwell Rabb advised Washington to go easy on friendliness towards Achille Occhetto “so as not to weaken the position of those who – first and foremost Craxi” – could “really consider themselves our friends”.
Occhetto was the secretary of the Italian Communist Party which in November of the same year would make the turning point which would lead to the closure of the PCI and the birth of the Democratic Party of the Left. The person writing these lines has consulted the full versions of the reports cited in «Ventesimo Secolo». There is further confirmation of the Americans’ considerable consideration for the former socialist prime minister, starting with the recognition of its “clear alignment with the United States”.
Craxi is defined as one of those “who have truly passed the test of friendship”. And looking through the papers it would appear that the socialist secretary passed the authentic test having accepted the deployment of US armaments, planes and cruise missiles in Italy to counter the Soviet SS-20s aimed at Europe. Unlike the Socialist Party, the PCI was opposed. The fact that Rabb confirmed his friendship with Craxi is significant. A republican lawyer, former collaborator of President Dwight Eisenhower, Rabb had been sent to Via Veneto as ambassador in 1981 by Ronald Reagan and remained there until June 1989. How angry he was with the Craxi government in the days of the Achille Lauro case can be What is useful is what the then Minister of Justice and Justice, Mino Martinazzoli, a Christian Democrat, told the writer in 2003 in an interview with the «Corriere»: «Rabb gave me an invective. He said we had been criminals. He uttered phrases like: “We won’t buy Italian shoes anymore”.
Spiri on «Ventuesimo Secolo» focuses on Occhetto, observing that in the cablegrams “skepticism seems to prevail regarding the final outcome of the PCI’s evolutionary path”. Reading both his text and the complete documents, one notices that in 1989 American diplomacy meticulously measured the popularity that Mikhail Gorbachev obtained in the West, the secretary of the Soviet Communist Party committed to a reform of the system which had not yet resulted in the end of the USSR . Gorby fever«Gorby fever», is an expression that we find in the originals signed by Rabb’s successor, Ambassador Peter Secchia. Spiri quotes a paragraph from a briefing by the American ambassador to Moscow Jack Matlock on a visit by Occhetto to the Soviet Union. In interpreting its objectives, the document actually describes a competition between the main Italian parties to appear accredited by the reformist Kremlin: «A) Need to balance the mission carried out in October 1988 by the President of the Christian Democratic Council Ciriaco De Mita, who exploited the “Gorbachev factor” to gain political advantage. Occhetto believed he had to demonstrate that he too has solid relations with the head of the Kremlin. B) Killing the secretary of the Italian Socialist Party Bettino Craxi, who desperately wants to meet Gorbachev and is pressing Soviet diplomats to organize his coming to Moscow.”
«Ingraians». «Cossuttians». «Improvers». These are terms that appear untranslated in the reports to inform the Secretary of State, James Baker, about the moves of the followers of the PCI leaders Pietro Ingrao, Armando Cossutta, Giorgio Napolitano. Among many, one detail stands out: during the five-hour conversation between Gorbachev and Occhetto it was “the representative of the PCI” in the USSR who reported in detail to the American ambassador in Moscow. It doesn’t appear that the report was extorted from him or that it was espionage. It suggests that Occhetto’s party was interested in making itself understood by the United States. More available towards Washington than Rabb and Secchia were towards him.
September 29, 2024 (changed September 29, 2024 | 09:40)
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Interview between Time.news Editor and Andrea Spiri
Editor: Good morning, Andrea! Thank you for joining us today to discuss your recent findings on the complexities of U.S.-Italian relations during a pivotal moment in the 1980s and 90s. Your article in Ventesimo Secolo delves into the hidden dynamics behind the Mani Pulite investigations and the historical role of U.S. diplomacy. Can you start by providing a brief overview of the context?
Andrea Spiri: Good morning! Certainly. The article examines the confidential papers of U.S. diplomacy from the late 1980s, revealing how American interest in Italian politics was at a crossroads. The significant scrutiny of leaders like Bettino Craxi, particularly following the Achille Lauro crisis, shaped perceptions in Washington. While some believe that the U.S. had a hand in the judicial investigations that ultimately exiled Craxi in 1994, my research suggests that not all American officials shared that sentiment after the Sigonella incident.
Editor: That’s fascinating, Andrea. The Achille Lauro hijacking was indeed a pivotal event. Can you elaborate on Craxi’s actions during the crisis and the resulting tensions with U.S. leadership?
Andrea Spiri: Of course. During the Achille Lauro hijacking in 1985, Craxi faced immense pressure regarding how to handle the Palestinian terrorists. His refusal to allow the U.S. military to take charge and his insistence on negotiating created a significant rift. Many former leaders argue that this incident set off a spiral of distrust that later influenced U.S. attitudes toward him. However, what I found in the documents is that figures like Ambassador Maxwell Rabb actively advocated for maintaining a relationship with Craxi, recognizing his alignment with U.S. interests—especially in terms of military cooperation against the Soviet threat.
Editor: That’s a crucial point. You mention that bipartisan perceptions existed among American diplomats regarding Italian politics. How did U.S. officials balance their perspectives between Craxi and other political figures like Achille Occhetto?
Andrea Spiri: It’s an intriguing dichotomy. The U.S. had a vested interest in both maintaining a relationship with the Socialist Party and monitoring the rise of the Communist Party under Occhetto. Rabb’s advice to Washington was to “go easy on friendliness towards Occhetto” to protect Craxi’s position, reflecting a strategic choice to back the known entity rather than a potentially destabilizing shift toward the communists.
Editor: So it seems that the U.S. recognized the necessity of supporting a democratic force like Craxi, even amidst the controversies. How does this tie into the larger narrative of the PCI and its transformation?
Andrea Spiri: The transformation of the Italian Communist Party (PCI) in 1989 came at a time when the U.S. was cautiously observing events in Eastern Europe. The U.S. recognized that Occhetto’s move toward reform was crucial but approached it with skepticism, as their primary interest was stability and a pro-Western orientation in Italy. As seen in the cables, there was an awareness of Occhetto’s ambitions but an underlying doubt regarding the sustainability of these reforms, given the historical context of the PCI.
Editor: It appears your research challenges some long-standing assumptions about U.S. involvement in Italian political shifts. What do you hope readers take away from your article?
Andrea Spiri: I hope readers appreciate the nuanced nature of international diplomacy. The documents indicate that U.S. diplomats were not monolithic in their views but rather operated within a complex landscape of political loyalties, practical alignments, and the broader geopolitical climate. Understanding this complexity can help clarify why certain political outcomes occurred and how foreign powers interact with domestic forces.
Editor: Excellent insights, Andrea! Thank you for shedding light on this intricate period in history. Your work paves the way for deeper discussions about the interplay of international relations and domestic politics.
Andrea Spiri: Thank you for having me! It’s been a pleasure discussing these important historical dynamics.