Author: Somnath Mukherjee
Looking at the ongoing movements on TV screens and social media, it seems that India is under constant geopolitical siege. In Bangladesh, there has been a forced change of government on the street and the pro-India Prime Minister has been removed and Sri Lanka has surprised everyone by electing a leftist President. The border standoff with China continues, although there have been recent signs of some reconciliation. The cherry on the cake is the very public feud with Canada. The rise of new powers has always been a messy affair. American scholar John Mearsheimer argues, ‘The system is anarchic, great powers have few offensive capabilities, no state can be certain of the intentions of others, survival is primary. The goal is there, and the characters are logical. Therefore, great powers fear each other and try to increase their security by competing aggressively to maximize their share of power and influence.
The principles are well embedded in the popular consciousness even outside arcane academic theories. In 2014 The New York Times published a cartoon depicting India’s first Mars mission, which showed a dhoti-clad man with a cow knocking on the door of a room called the elite Space Club, where men wearing bow ties Two men were reading a report on the mission. On one level, it was simply a culturally offensive meme. But at a deeper level, it reflects the hostility of the current establishment (the West) towards a rising power.
China’s rise, facilitated by the West since Nixon’s famous visit to Beijing in 1972 (and generally unopposed by the USSR), has been virtually peaceful until recently. But this is an extraordinary exception, never seen before. It is the result of a series of fortunate coincidences in world politics.
Every time an apparently unfriendly government in the neighborhood comes to power, the common refrain is that ‘India has lost the country.’ As if India could have worked harder to retain Sheikh Hasina in power or arrange a peaceful transition to a ‘friendly’ alternative. In the last six years, Maldives ‘lost’ and ‘won’ almost three times. As Bill Clinton’s campaign said, ‘It’s the economy, stupid!’
It is fashionable to draw comparisons with China’s trade and investment in the subcontinent. Bangladesh is a good example of this. China accounts for more than 20% of the country’s trade, dwarfing India’s 12% share, yet India’s influence is huge. Geographically it’s hard to beat. Bangladesh is dependent on India for essential commodities – food grains, refined petroleum and in recent times electricity. Its famous readymade garment export industry is heavily dependent on India in terms of raw material supply (Bangladesh imports almost all the cotton it needs) and technical-managerial talent. Kolkata is the destination of choice for Bangladeshis looking for advanced medical treatment. This is true for most countries in the subcontinent, except Pakistan.
China could finance a power plant in Nepal, but without a purchase agreement with an Indian distribution company, it is a white elephant. Recently, a minor controversy on social media has led to a sharp decline in the number of Indian tourists to the Maldives – a significant issue for a country where tourism is the primary business. In recent times, Sri Lanka and Maldives have required Indian assistance to deal with serious sovereign debt issues. It is no surprise that within a few months, Muizzu’s slogan of ‘India Out’ has changed to ‘India is our closest ally’.
India’s GDP is 20% of China’s GDP. As a market, China offers 5-10 times the size of India in terms of products and services. India’s current manufacturing architecture – in labor and infrastructure – struggles to match Vietnam’s and is not always the default option for any China +1 initiative. Unlike Russia, India is not a commodity station for the world.
In short, India does not matter as much to the West as it does to shape events at all times. not yet. Meanwhile, pushbacks will become more drastic, as legacy powers with declining growth profiles (plus China) react aggressively toward a newcomer with great power pretensions that does not have all the muscle.
Since the beginning of its economic reforms in 1978, China achieved an average of 9% GDP growth rate for 40 years. The strength of national power is based on resources, we have been slow to collect them. Just as growing relative difference in the subcontinent has made India’s interventions more effective, faster growth will enable it to do the same in other disputed areas. There will be less opposition, less criticism. The only foreign policy that makes sense is rapid economic growth. Everything else will take care of itself.
(The author is CIO of an asset and wealth management firm)
Interview Between Time.news Editor and Geopolitical Expert Dr. Riya Mehta
Time.news Editor: Good morning, Dr. Mehta. Thank you for joining us today. As someone who specializes in South Asian geopolitics, your insights will be invaluable as we navigate the complexities of the current geopolitical landscape in the region.
Dr. Riya Mehta: Good morning! I’m excited to be here and discuss these critical issues with you.
Editor: Let’s dive right in. The recent political upheavals in Bangladesh, the election of a leftist President in Sri Lanka, and the ongoing tensions with China — it almost feels like India is continuously under siege. What are your thoughts on this perception?
Dr. Mehta: It certainly does seem that way. These events reflect not only the volatile nature of politics in South Asia but also indicate a shift in power dynamics. The removal of a pro-India Prime Minister in Bangladesh is particularly concerning for New Delhi. It raises questions about India’s influence and its strategic approaches in the region.
Editor: You mentioned India’s influence. Even with China’s growing economic clout in Bangladesh, your article emphasizes that India remains significant in terms of dependency, especially in key sectors. How does that play into this narrative?
Dr. Mehta: That’s a crucial point. While China has made significant economic inroads — about 20% of Bangladesh’s trade — India retains substantial influence through essential supplies like food, fuel, and electricity. This interdependence is foundational; despite the political changes, economic ties often underpin relations. Countries in South Asia may shift politically, but geographic and economic realities tend to bind them to India.
Editor: Speaking of geopolitical dynamics, you referenced John Mearsheimer’s thesis on great powers competing for security and influence. Do you see India adopting a more aggressive posture in response to these developments?
Dr. Mehta: Absolutely. The anarchic nature of international relations highlighted by Mearsheimer suggests that India might feel pressured to bolster its own influence aggressively. This is evident in how India has been adjusting its foreign policy to secure strategic partnerships, invest in defense, and enhance its soft power across the region. The challenge will be maintaining this balance without alienating its neighbors.
Editor: There’s also the matter of public perception that you touched on—like the cultural insensitivity evident in media portrayals of India. How does this affect India’s image abroad, especially in the context of its rising power?
Dr. Mehta: Public perception is immensely important. While these cultural representations can be dismissive or offensive, they also reveal underlying anxieties about India’s rise—especially within Western narratives. Such depictions can influence diplomatic relations and how India is perceived by its neighbors. It’s essential for India to project a more nuanced self-image that communicates its aspirations while also fostering constructive relationships.
Editor: With reconciliatory gestures from China amid the border standoff, do you believe there’s an opportunity for India to reframe its relationship with China while managing its regional interests?
Dr. Mehta: Indeed, diplomatic engagements, even with longstanding adversaries, can open doors for dialogue and potential resolutions. However, it needs to be approached cautiously. India should advocate for its interests firmly, but there is room for negotiations that could lead to a more stable relationship with China while still addressing security concerns in its immediate neighborhood.
Editor: And how about the social media controversies impacting tourism, like the recent decline in Indian tourists to the Maldives? How do these micro-events fit into the larger geopolitical picture?
Dr. Mehta: They are significant on multiple levels. Tourism involves economic interdependence and reflects the subtleties of public sentiment. A decline in Indian tourists not only affects the Maldivian economy but also highlights the intricacies of diplomatic relations, as popular perception can lead to real economic consequences. Such micro-events can inform broader geopolitical strategies and must be navigated wisely by both India and its neighbors.
Editor: Thank you, Dr. Mehta, for your insights today. It’s clear that the geopolitical future of South Asia is complex and interplay among nations will continuously evolve.
Dr. Mehta: Thank you for having me! It’s been a pleasure discussing these pressing issues. The coming months will certainly be pivotal for all involved.