Mihail Kogălniceanu Military Base
Romania is arming at a frantic pace. The government in Bucharest recently announced that it will soon modernize its military with a one billion dollar American loan. As part of the investment, the only factory in Europe that will produce ammunition for Abrams tanks will be created for 220 million dollars. However, the loan of one billion dollars does not seem like a lot if we take into account that our eastern neighbor bought tanks from the USA for 2.53 billion dollars a year earlier, while they want 2.7 billion dollars for the development of the Mihail Kogălniceanu military base in Constanța County in the coming years to spend.
Regarding the air base, it should be known that if the plans are realized, the largest American military base in Europe (which is even bigger than Ramstein) will be created, not incidentally on the coast of the Black Sea. A mini-city equipped with schools, kindergartens, shops, and a hospital is being built on an area of more than 3,000 hectares, serving the 10,000 soldiers stationed at the base and their family members. In addition, one of the Hungarian-related elements of the developments will be dwarfed, as part of which the construction of an 800-bed NATO apartment building in Marosvásárhely, which will also accommodate military families, will be dwarfed.
American military transport vehicles at the entrance to Mihail Kogălniceanu military base
According to experts, the industrialization of our eastern neighbor is partly stimulated by the success of the Hungarian military development, because Bucharest is gripped by anxiety when the Hungarians sharpen their military skills. This is the case even if the two countries are NATO allies, and Romanian-Hungarian relations have been excellent for years. The collective guilt felt due to the annexation of Transylvania and the XX. However, the experiences of the 20th century probably suggest caution to the Romanians.
However, according to Zsolt Pászkán, an expert at the Hungarian Institute of Foreign Affairs, there are many valid reasons for spending astronomical sums. First of all, the Romanian military is extremely outdated, and the fulfillment of NATO obligations requires that at least two percent of GDP be spent on development. At the same time, the USA also expects more and more participation from its European partners, so it is increasingly difficult to enjoy the security of the NATO protective umbrella as a passenger. Taking advantage of the war in Ukraine, the Romanian government started buying weapons. The right moment has come when public opinion is not opposed to this type of use of resources, and the opposition does not hold the government accountable for spending on military equipment instead of pensions or fixing hospitals. However, according to Zsolt Pászkán, so-called interstate corruption can never be ruled out either. This means that Romania orders weapons from the USA in order to gain its goodwill.
This may also be the explanation for the fact that they sometimes order devices that they don’t really need. For example, F-35s, which is difficult to explain with professional arguments. Romania’s strategic importance and unconditional partnership are still an excellent letter of recommendation for the Pentagon. Behind the development of infrastructure in Romania, for example, is the goal of drawing NATO’s rapid reaction forces closer to potential conflict zones. In this context, it is not incidental that the factory built with an American loan does not necessarily cover Romania’s needs. The plant specifically specializes in 120-155 millimeter artillery ammunition, and Ukraine also uses a lot of 155 in the war. In the future, Romania can play the role of an important bridgehead in keeping Russia in check. Zsolt Pászkán also recalls that Romania recently paid for seven Patriot systems to the USA, of which they received three, and they had to hand over one to Ukraine immediately.
– Of the military equipment purchased, it is impossible to know which and how many will end up with the Patriot – adds Zsolt Pászkán.
The expert points out that the combat vehicles purchased by Romania end up in Ukraine in many cases, as the real needs of the country are in no way in line with what they purchase. Zsolt Pászkán’s words are confirmed by opinions according to which Romania will supply Ukraine with weapons through its own military orders even if the new leadership in Washington does not want to spend a single penny on financing the war. In practice, before the elections, support for the war was outsourced to European proxies. According to many, there is also a plan B for maintaining the war, in which Romania can also play a key role. It is possible that the Ukrainian front will collapse in the foreseeable future. However, the deep state controlling Washington decided that no matter what happens, they would first ensure the supply of weapons to Ukraine, and in case of failure, they would keep Russia at war with a new armed conflict.
“If the Russians reach Odessa, then Romania, with the support of its allies, must implement the unification of the two countries based on the German model,” declared Titus Corlățean, the former foreign minister of Romania, in February 2024, referring to Moldova.
Many declarations with similar content have been made in the past decades, and star positions play into the hands of the forces urging the unification of Moldova and Romania more than ever before.
– In connection with the war in Ukraine, the Atlanticist interests and the so-called ”Great Romanian” dreams are currently reinforcing each other
According to the diplomat, Washington has Romania completely under control, which is why they are not at all opposed to controlling a larger Romania, which is also expanding eastward. Gaining a foothold in the Atlantic as a goal coincides with Romania’s desire to acquire territory. In order to understand the complicated background of the events, however, it is necessary to know that Moldova, as one of the 15 Soviet member republics, is home to a significant number of people with “Moldovan”, Romanian, Russian, Gagauz and Bulgarian identity. Although approximately 30 percent of the population of the country, which is divided ethnically and linguistically like Ukraine, is pro-Romanian, the vast majority is in favor of independence, neutrality and independent statehood in Moldova. During the 2024 Moldovan census, for example, 53 percent of the population indicated “Moldovan” and 23 percent Romanian as their mother tongue. And the remaining one third – Russian, Ukrainian, Bulgarian, Gagauz speakers – also defined the official language of the state as Moldovan and declare themselves Moldovan. The vast majority of the population is culturally, professionally, and through family and friendship ties closely linked to the former Soviet member republics, especially to the Russian world, but the country is currently ruled by an elite with a Western-oriented Romanian identity.
According to available sources, the members of the Moldovan Constitutional Court, the President, the Speaker of the Parliament, the Prime Minister, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, most of the ministers, the head of the secret service, the government faction and the majority of the heads of the state authorities are also Romanian citizens. Bucharest – according to György Varga, in a non-judgmental way – is effectively taking advantage of the fact that the EU’s Moldova policy provides more room for Romania to gain ground in Moldova than any other EU member state. In light of this, the fact that Bucharest has never shown willingness to recognize the existing state borders in the Romanian-Moldovan basic contract, similar to the Hungarian-Romanian basic contract, can also be appreciated – no matter how much the Moldovan leadership requested this back in the 2000s.
– Since 2010, the European Union has been delegating so-called high-level experts to Moldovan government bodies. These advisers, delegated and paid by the EU, are now de facto present in all ministries, with the aim of supporting the tasks of the association agreement and the accession negotiations. Based on the decisions of the current Moldovan power elite, more than half of these experts come from Romania, explains György Varga.
On October 20, the first round of the presidential election and a referendum on a constitutional amendment aimed at EU membership took place in Moldova. The second round of the presidential election took place on November 3.
– The Western communication narrative forced Moldova to make a choice: they had to decide whether they wanted a “prosperous European future or a Putin satellite role”. György Varga adds that the possibility of the Moldovan path – balanced relations both in the eastern and western directions, with a neutral foreign policy in practice – could not even arise in the Western decision-making centers.
Photo: MTI/EPA/EFE/Dumitru Doru
Maia Sandu
At the same time, the West provided coordinated support for the referendum initiated by the incumbent president, Maia Sandu. Dozens of high-level visits from Europe took place, among them Ursula von der Leyen’s visit on October 9; the president of the commission promised 1.8 billion euros in financial support to Moldova. In parallel with all of this, on October 8, the European Parliament condemned the opposition, and on October 14, the Council of Foreign Ministers of the EU adopted sanctions against the opposition politicians – thus sending a message to Moldovan society that Brussels does not (not) support.
The opposition parties did not agree with the referendum being held at the same time as the presidential election, nor with the ruling party bypassing the rule requiring a two-thirds parliamentary majority to change the constitution with the referendum, as they do not have such a proportion of support. In the referendum, the question was not asked whether the citizens want the country to join the EU, but whether “do you support the change of the constitution by the parliament for the purpose of joining the EU?”.
In the presidential election, the majority of people living in the country voted for the opposition candidate Alexandr Stoianogló, the Socialist Party’s presidential candidate, instead of Maia Sandu, who promised a balanced foreign policy between East and West. In the referendum on EU accession, the majority of people living in the territory of the country, i.e. the population of 25 of Moldova’s 32 districts, also voted no. 69% of the population of the separatist area near Dniester with Moldovan citizenship, and 95% of the population of the Gagauz Autonomous Region said no to the referendum. The final result of the election was finally reversed by the voters living in Western Europe and North America, and both Sandu and the referendum won. In order to understand the situation, it is necessary to know that approximately one and a half million Moldovans work in Russia and the West. However, the government established only two polling stations for the former, both in Moscow, and provided them with ten thousand ballots, while more than 200 polling stations were opened for people living in Western countries, and 800,000 ballots were sent. With the votes cast in Western Europe and North America, it was finally possible to keep Maia Sandu in power and force the referendum. However, in the case of the referendum, even under these circumstances, the acceptance of validity became questionable, since only 24.8 percent of Moldova’s eligible citizens said yes, and therefore, according to the reasoning of two constitutional judges, it was a mistake to classify the referendum as valid.
According to György Varga, the forced and EU-supported referendum in Moldova has no real social legitimacy, as the people living in the country voted against the re-election of the incumbent head of state and did not support the question asked in the EU referendum initiated by him. In light of this, it is questionable what changes will be implemented in the constitution, and to what extent these changes will have a destabilizing effect on the country’s internal politics.
– The realities of Moldova’s geopolitical situation require a pragmatic foreign policy and government action in line with the interests of a neutral and sovereign state, especially in such a complicated geopolitical situation, when world political macro-players are in tension with each other in the post-Soviet region regarding strategic goals that far exceed the magnitude of the 3 million-strong Moldova – said György Varga.
In this struggle, the West was not interested in a neutral Moldova, as the Western narrative says “neutrality helps Putin’s Russia.” Thus, the forces supporting neutrality – who are also supporters of independent statehood in Moldova - appear as enemies of the West. The efforts of the global West, which is fighting against Russia, and Bucharest for Romanian-Moldovan unification – to gain ground in the post-Soviet region, to gain control over Moldova – thus coincide.
In the light of expert opinions, it seems that Moldova, which is connected to the Russian world by a thousand threads, could be an excellent ground for the outbreak of another conflict. Targeting the Russian-speaking minority would be enough to force Moscow to take action. The recipe has already worked once.
What are the key points of contention between the Moldovan population and the EU’s narrative regarding constitutional amendments for EU membership?
Ion of Maia Sandu and the constitutional amendment for EU membership. The outcome indicates a significant divide between the preferences of the Moldovan population and the Western narrative pushed by the EU and the Romanian government.
The situation in Moldova reflects broader geopolitical dynamics in Eastern Europe, particularly in the context of the ongoing conflict in Ukraine and the strategic interests of Western powers in countering Russian influence. The idea of unification with Romania, which has been floated by Romanian officials, taps into historical aspirations but overlooks the complex ethnic and national identity landscape within Moldova.
Despite the pro-Romanian sentiments of a segment of the population, a substantial part remains committed to maintaining Moldova’s independence and neutrality. The presence of EU experts in Moldovan ministries, predominantly from Romania, raises concerns about the extent of influence exerted by Bucharest on Chisinau’s policies. The dynamics surrounding the recent elections and the referendum demonstrate a clash between local desires and external pressures exerted by the EU and allied states.
The results of the elections and referendum, which appeared to favor pro-Russian elements and an independent course for Moldova, highlight the growing discontent among the populace regarding the direction being imposed from outside. Consequently, while the leadership and elite may pursue a pro-Western agenda, the broader sentiments among voters could challenge the sustainability of such policies, especially amid ongoing regional tensions.
As such, the future of Moldova remains uncertain, with potential implications for regional stability and relations with both the West and Russia. The situation necessitates careful navigation by policymakers both in Moldova and in the larger geopolitical landscape.