Across the Middle East, Bashar al-Assad’s fall from power triggered anxiety, except in Ankara. Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdogan sees chance in Syria’s post-Assad landscape.His optimism has solid grounding: Turkey enjoys robust dialog channels and a working relationship with the Islamist group now in control of Damascus, poised to reap the benefits of the Assad regime’s demise.
Turkey now wields considerable influence over this group, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS). Erdogan in October halted a rebel offensive planned for Aleppo, and when a campaign was launched last month, it likely received Ankara’s endorsement. For years, Erdogan sought to mend ties with Damascus and facilitate the return of the millions of Syrian refugees burdening Turkey, a move crucial for his political standing. The weakening of Assad’s regional allies due to israel’s operations in Gaza and Lebanon, coupled with Russia’s preoccupation with Ukraine, presented Erdogan with an opportunity to force the syrian leader to the negotiating table.the rebels’ swift success caught everyone by surprise, leaving Assad wholly out of the picture. Erdogan is now ready to capitalize on years of investing in the syrian opposition. Iran and Russia, Turkey’s major rivals in Syria, are humbled. A sympathetic government in Damascus could soon emerge, welcoming back refugees. The possible departure of Assad could even pave the way for the remaining U.S. troops to withdraw, fulfilling a long-held Turkish goal. If Ankara can navigate the potential dangers ahead, Turkey could emerge as a definitive victor in Syria’s devastating conflict.
This Syrian turmoil also strained Turkey’s already tense relationship with the United States.The U.S.decision in 2014 to airdrop weapons to the Syrian Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG), a group Turkey considers a terrorist association, marked a turning point. from Washington’s perspective, supporting the YPG became crucial after months of failed attempts to persuade turkey to take a more active stance against ISIS (also known as ISIL). Frustrated by Turkey’s seemingly indifferent attitude towards ISIS within its borders, Washington had little choice. Ankara felt betrayed by its ally’s decision to arm its alleged enemy.
As Turkish-U.S. relations deteriorated, Russia benefited. Moscow intervened in Syria in 2015 to save the Assad regime, aligning its interests against Ankara’s. With Russia clearly holding the upper hand, Erdogan felt compelled to cooperate with President Vladimir Putin. Only with Moscow’s consent was Turkey able to launch a military incursion into northern Syria in 2019 to curb Kurdish advances, a goal Erdogan saw as essential to solidify his domestic alliance with Turkish nationalists. Some speculate that Erdogan’s purchase of S-400 Russian missile defence systems, a move that fractured ties with the united states and NATO, aimed to secure this crucial russian endorsement.
Assad’s downfall has dramatically shifted the balance of power in Erdogan’s favor. Moscow’s loss grants Turkey greater leeway in Syria, also cratering Russia’s standing in other arenas where the two nations vie for influence, such as Africa.
Russia’s intervention in Syria helped project an image of Moscow as a world power and a reliable patron.Leveraging this reputation, Putin cultivated strong relations with African autocrats, especially in the Sahel, while Turkey sought to position itself as an alternative. assad’s collapse will tarnish Russia’s image and jeopardize Moscow’s partnerships. Moreover, without its military foothold in syria, Russia’s logistical support for its operations in africa, particularly in Libya, will be compromised, creating a void that Turkey can readily fill.
Assad’s fall will also strengthen Turkey’s position against Iran, a longstanding regional rival. In Syria, Iranian-backed forces coordinated with the YPG in fighting ISIS, effectively sidelining Turkish-backed forces in certain areas. Iranian militias within Iraq’s state-sponsored paramilitary units, the Popular Mobilization Forces, have also intricate Turkey’s campaign against the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), an armed separatist group operating in Turkey but designated a terrorist group by both Ankara and Washington, in northern Iraq. Furthermore,in the South Caucasus,Ankara and Tehran pursue conflicting agendas: turkey has deepened its cooperation with azerbaijan,a move Iran views as a threat,and Iran maintains friendly ties with Armenia,which has a contentious relationship with Turkey.Iran, however, has been weakened, first by the Israeli war in Gaza, which dealt a blow to the Iranian-led “axis of resistance,” and now by the ouster of Assad, a staunch Iranian ally. Syria played a vital role in Iran’s strategy of supporting militant groups and proxies across the region. It served as a land bridge through which Tehran could transport weapons and other supplies to Hezbollah in Lebanon. Losing syria will significantly hamper Iran’s ability to project power,providing Turkey with more maneuvering space,from Iraq and Syria to the South Caucasus.
The fall of the Assad regime is likely to provide another opportunity for reconciliation between Erdogan and Washington. The United States’ military presence in Syria and cooperation with the YPG have strained bilateral relations and complicated Turkish operations in theregion.In 2019, days after President Donald Trump announced the withdrawal of U.S.troops from Syria, Ankara launched a military campaign against Washington’s Kurdish allies in Syria. An enraged Trump imposed sanctions on Turkey and pledged to maintain a “small number” of troops in parts of Syria to protect oil installations. Ankara has long desired the withdrawal of U.S. forces, and Trump’s reelection rekindled hope he would finally bring home the remaining troops. Assad’s departure could make this outcome more probable. As Syrian rebels advanced toward Damascus, Trump insisted the United States “should have nothing to do with” their fight. upon taking office, Trump might accept a deal in which Turkey commits to containing ISIS and the United States withdraws its troops from Syria, setting Ankara up for a productive relationship with the new administration.
Though a post-Assad Syria presents opportunities for Ankara, substantial risks also exist.
The Islamist-led forces that toppled Assad could foster instability and extremism. Power transitions of this magnitude are rarely smooth. thirteen years after a NATO-backed uprising led to the overthrow and death of Muammar al-Qaddafi, Libya remains mired in conflict and chaos, its population suffering despite abundant oil wealth. Following Saddam Hussein’s ouster in 2003, Iraq struggled to consolidate democracy, enduring brutal violence. Syria today faces similarly daunting challenges, having endured more than a decade of civil war that caused immense destruction and deepened social and political fissures.
whether the groups that replaced Assad can address these issues remains uncertain. While an interim prime minister has been announced, the new government’s control is not yet fully established. If it can move towards the massive reconstruction effort Syria desperately needs,Turkey will undoubtedly play a role. Its longstanding support for the groups in charge, its long border with Syria, and its military presence grant Ankara notable influence. Even so, Ankara’s influence will have its limits.The HTS-led rebel coalition has released few details about its plans for governing Syria, and Western and arab nations fear the establishment of a hardline Islamist regime. Though,HTS has attempted to present a more moderate image. Its leader has publicly disavowed international terrorism. After bringing down Assad, the group pledged not to destroy state institutions and promised to respect the country’s ethnic and religious diversity.
However, skepticism is warranted. HTS’s governance in Idlib has hardly been democratic. Ankara may push a new Syrian government to guarantee rights for women and minorities, partly to secure Western favor, but that doesn’t mean the rebels will heed this advice.
And Turkey, a country reticent to grant its own Kurdish population basic rights, is unlikely to be a vocal advocate for Syria’s Kurds.
Unresolved Kurdish issues could perpetuate instability in northern Syria, potentially spilling over into Turkey. If the rebels fail to enshrine equal rights for all Syrians in law and practice, the new Syria might bear a striking resemblance to the old one, a scenario that is not in Ankara’s best interest.
Erdogan wants the millions of Syrian refugees residing in Turkey to return home voluntarily. Without assurances of a democratic future,many may choose to remain – an outcome Erdogan seeks to avoid.
There is also the risk of an ISIS resurgence.
Syria’s new leaders face a long list of challenges, and the Kurdish militia now securing the prisons and detention centers holding tens of thousands of Islamic State fighters have their own future to consider.
ISIS could exploit this period of chaos to resurrect itself.Turkey, particularly vulnerable to terror attacks given its own active ISIS networks, has rounded up more than 3,000 suspected ISIS members in operations targeting these networks this year alone.
Syria’s political trajectory in the near future will hinge not only on the new government’s intentions and capabilities but also on the actions of external powers towards stabilizing and rebuilding the nation.
Syria will need foreign investment in infrastructure, humanitarian aid, relief from sanctions, support for refugee returns, assistance with disarming militias, and retraining security services. But if the HTS led coalition disregards international pressure to form a truly inclusive government and democratic institutions, it will be shunned by the world, and an isolated Syria could easily succumb to violent disarray. Turkey will then be forced to grapple with an economically devastated neighbor being torn apart by rival armed groups.
As the power broker whose actions led to Assad’s downfall, Turkey will own Syria’s problems.
Many in ankara viewed Assad’s escape as a victory.
A friendly government in Damascus could open doors for Erdogan. He desires refugees to return to Syria, and Turkish construction companies see opportunities in rebuilding the shattered nation.
This Syrian victory grants Erdogan stature on the international stage, a leverage he hopes to wield in relations with the West and regional states.
But if Syria descends once again into chaos, unleashing terrorism and instability that sends more refugees across the border, Turkey’s strongman may come to regret the rebels’ success.
How might the relationship between Turkey and Iran evolve in the aftermath of Assad’s potential downfall?
Interview on the Future of Turkey and Syria Post-Assad: An Engaging conversation
Time.news Editor: Welcome to Time.news, where we dive into the pressing issues impacting our world today. I’m thrilled to have Dr. Anwar Al-Jabari, a leading expert in Middle Eastern politics, with us. dr. Al-Jabari, thank you for joining us.
Dr.Al-Jabari: Thank you for having me. It’s a pleasure to be here.
Editor: As we’re seeing Bashar al-Assad’s regime possibly collapse, Turkey seems to be positioning itself optimally in the face of this upheaval. What do you believe are Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s primary motivations in this moment?
Dr. Al-Jabari: Erdogan’s motivations are multifaceted. Primarily,he sees an chance for Turkey to expand its influence in Syria by engaging with hayat Tahrir al-Sham,the Islamist group that currently holds power in Damascus.The Syrian landscape post-Assad provides Ankara with a chance to mend its relationship with these factions and solidify Turkey’s regional dominance,especially after years of investment in the Syrian opposition.
Editor: Right, and it seems there’s been a strategic shift where Turkey now possesses significant leverage over HTS. How do you interpret Turkey’s recent military actions in Syria, notably regarding the halting of the rebel offensive in Aleppo?
Dr. Al-Jabari: That move indicates Turkey’s nuanced approach—it’s about maintaining control over the situation. Erdogan likely halted the offensive to avoid a chaotic power vacuum that could spiral out of control. This kind of strategic restraint reflects Turkey’s desire to broker a favorable outcome while avoiding direct confrontation with either Assad’s loyalists or U.S. interests in the region.
Editor: Speaking of U.S. interests, how has the deteriorating relationship between Turkey and the United States impacted the dynamics of this conflict?
Dr. Al-Jabari: It’s a complex relationship, fraught with tension, particularly due to the U.S. arming of the YPG, which Turkey perceives as a terrorist group. The U.S.had to pivot to supporting Kurdish forces in response to Turkey’s perceived indifference towards ISIS.This left Erdogan feeling betrayed. however, now with Assad’s potential downfall, we might see a window for reconciliation. If the U.S. can trust Turkey to stabilize the region and contain ISIS, it could lead to a reworking of their alliance.
Editor: That’s intriguing. So, if Turkey manages to stabilize Syria and maintain that influence, what does that mean for Iran’s position in the region, especially considering their longstanding rivalry?
dr. Al-Jabari: Iran’s leverage has significantly weakened with Assad’s potential exit. Iran’s relations had relied heavily on Assad’s regime to maintain a foothold in Syria, which also served as a conduit for supporting groups like Hezbollah. The loss of that influence hampers Iran’s ability to project power across the region, particularly as they’re already under strain from the conflict in Gaza and growing opposition in Iraq.
Editor: To pivot back to Turkey, there seems to be both opportunity and significant risks involved in this transition. In your view, how might Turkey navigate these risks while working towards reconstruction in Syria?
Dr. Al-Jabari: Navigating those risks will be paramount. The new leadership must address the deep-seated issues borne from over a decade of civil war.Instability and extremism could erupt if groups fail to unite their agendas. Turkey will likely need to play a mediating role, not just as a power broker but as a leader in the reconstruction efforts.Building a broad coalition, which includes various ethnic and sectarian groups in Syria, will be essential for any lasting peace.
Editor: Very insightful,Dr. Al-Jabari. Before we conclude, what is your overall outlook on the future of Turkey’s role in Syria, especially if Assad is indeed ousted?
Dr. Al-Jabari: If Assad exits, Turkey could emerge as a powerful arbiter in the region, but it’s critically important to remember that power transitions are rarely smooth. Historical precedents from Libya and Iraq indicate that systemic challenges will persist. While Turkey may relish a stronger position, the fundamental question remains: can Ankara effectively manage the diverse interests at play in the post-Assad landscape? Only time will reveal whether Turkey can transform opportunity into stability.
Editor: Thank you so much for your insights, Dr. Al-Jabari. This discussion sheds light on the high stakes involved in the Syrian conflict and the opportunities for turkey on the horizon.
Dr.Al-Jabari: Thank you. It’s been a pleasure discussing this critical topic.