On the night of February 24, the Russian army invaded Ukraine. According to Russian war plans, the battle for Ukraine was expected to end within two weeks. Russian forces invaded and began attempts to eradicate the Ukrainian army. Beyond the operational and logistical problems of the Russian army, its forces encountered severe civilian resistance that they did not expect. As of this writing, about six weeks after it began, it seems that the end of the battle for Ukraine is still a long way off.
On July 8, 2021, US President Joe Biden announced the advance of the withdrawal of US forces from Afghanistan after 20 years. American forces withdrew from Afghanistan on August 31, when it was estimated that the current government in the country, which had been established by the Americans, would last between one and two years.
On August 15, the United States began evacuating its forces, and after only two days, the Taliban began occupying territory in the country. By August 30, with the completion of the American withdrawal, the country was already controlled by the Taliban.
What the two incidents have in common is that both are based on an intelligence failure, based on an incorrect intelligence assessment. This article will present the two incidents and the intelligence failure that is similar in its characteristics in both cases.
Afghanistan
The war in Afghanistan has been the longest in U.S. history. Its citizens, as former President Barack Obama has admitted, are tired of being “the policeman of the world.” And Biden, which plans to complete the evacuation of all U.S. forces by Sept. 11, just on the 20th anniversary of the murderous terrorist attack on the Twin Towers and the Pentagon.
The offensive that led to the occupation of Afghanistan and the bloody war in al-Qaeda and the Taliban. Biden, before the withdrawal, at a press conference held on July 8, 2021, when asked whether following the US withdrawal, the takeover of the Taliban is inevitable, he replied in the negative by comparing the order of the Afghan army (350,000 troops) to that of the Taliban ( 70,000 soldiers).
Biden’s statement at the time was supported by about 20 different intelligence assessments from four U.S. intelligence agencies, which estimated that the U.S.-formed government would last between one and two years after the withdrawal. Another military intelligence report, the DIA, estimated in April that the Afghan government would last at least 18 months and allow the country to stabilize.
The American intelligence assessment was that the Taliban forces, which were significantly inferior in number and ability, would not be able to withstand the Afghan army, which was large and well-equipped – with the best American technologies and means. But the Afghan army surrendered to Taliban forces with almost no fighting, and American weapons were handed over to Taliban forces, including rifles, ammunition, armored vehicles, tanks, artillery barrels and combat helicopters.
Thus, on August 30, the last day of the withdrawal of Afghanistan’s gates to the United States, the Taliban was already in full control of the Afghan state. .
The U.S. president and senior government officials estimated that the Taliban would allow U.S. forces to end the withdrawal and not act militarily until it was completed, an assessment that was found to be wrong two days after the August 15 withdrawal began when the Taliban began intensive military operations to take control of large areas. But at the same time, and despite the change in intelligence assessment, President Biden has adhered to his assessment that Afghanistan will not soon fall into the hands of the Taliban.
The American intelligence assessment did not even take into account what the Russians had learned about their flesh decades ago, and it is the Taliban’s guerrilla tactic (beyond the spirit of the faith), which knows how to take advantage of topographic conditions and asymmetry to their advantage.
Ukraine
The Russian army prepared for an invasion of Ukraine several months before it actually took place. Russia has concentrated large forces on its borders with Ukraine, on the border between Belarus and Ukraine, as well as on the Black Sea. On February 10, Russian military forces even held a long ten-day readiness exercise, uniting all the arms of the army. On February 14, about ten days before the invasion, a Russian cyber attack began on government sites and banks in Ukraine, and on February 24, the combined invasion began, from the south, east and north.
Since the invasion, the Russian army has progressed only in slow steps, contrary to all its plans, functioning in a shlomial, unintentional and uncoordinated manner. Its air forces do not work to achieve full air control and assist but little to the ground activity of the ground forces. The ground forces operate without coordination between them, and get stuck on the roads due to logistical and technical problems – malfunctions, lack of spare parts, lack of food and fuel.
Along with these reasons for describing the cumulative failure of the glorious Russian army, rich in technologies and means, another important element emerges, which is perhaps the basis for all the beginnings of the military moves and this is the intelligence element.
Russia, the third largest power in the world, immediately after China, is larger, stronger and better equipped than the Ukrainian army. Ukraine has a relatively respectable army, does not possess nuclear weapons similar to Russia, and is, in effect, alone on the battlefields against the Russian opponent. Russia even understood that the West would not intervene militarily and act in favor of Ukraine.
The Russian government understood the map, and interpreted it as one that tended in its favor, and decided to take advantage of the situation and the weakness of the West and start a campaign. In this context and in order to give it weight and validity, Russia waved its nuclear forces – another signal to the West not to intervene.
The Russian move was said to be quick and effective – invasion, eradication of the Ukrainian army and control of Ukrainian territory. The Russian intelligence assessment was that the “liberating” Russian army forces would be welcomed in Ukraine and that they would receive local logistical assistance.
Polls conducted by the Federal Security Agency, FSB, on the eve of the invasion indicated sympathy for the Ukrainian public, especially among separatists living in the south of the country. The FSB’s intelligence assessment of public support for Russia in Ukraine formed the basis for a decision on the date of the invasion and the ability to replace the Ukrainian president. As part of the campaign of legitimacy and against the background of intelligence assessment, Putin used the Ukrainian neo-Nazi narrative, several days before the invasion.
The Russian intelligence assessment did not take into account nationalist aspects and the Ukrainian mobilization and popular resistance, in which the citizens fight the Russian forces, in almost every means at their disposal – from Molotov cocktails and rifles to anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles. All of these disrupted all Russian intelligence assessments.
Moreover, the planners of the Russian operation, including military intelligence officials, if any, did not take into account the period of the year and the accumulated mud on the side of the roads, which led to the Russian armored vehicles and armaments moving on the roads. Used it and managed to effectively impede the progress of the Russian army through planned ambushes.
During the fighting it seems that there is a lack of tactical intelligence, which is required for the movement of forces and the planning of the fighting days. The collection capabilities of the Russian military intelligence, the GRU, are extensive and advanced capabilities, such as sigint (electronic signal intelligence), cyber and contractual capabilities using the Russian observation satellite array. But from the progress and failures of the forces, it seems that tactical intelligence does not reach them. Otherwise, it is very difficult to understand the failing Russian progress in these aspects.
Surgical intelligence operations carried out by special intelligence forces, such as the attempts to assassinate the Ukrainian president, were also in vain.
The intelligence assessments that came out of Putin were all doomed to failure, as Putin was willing to hear only what Putin was willing to hear. It was enough to watch a video virally circulated on the Internet at the end of February, in which the head of the Russian intelligence organization SVR was forced to make a statement that matched Putin’s wishes.
Intelligence failure
In the two test cases mentioned in this article similar elements of intelligence failures. In Afghanistan as in Ukraine, American and Russian intelligence found it difficult to properly assess the power and importance of the ideology, which was a critical driving force in both events.
Such intelligence is based on a deep and rooted understanding of culture and anthropology, which is often not taken into account in “classical” intelligence.
In Afghanistan, the US president was fed intelligence assessments that predicted the regime’s ability to last one to two years, but as the withdrawal date approached, US intelligence changed its assessment, and despite this, the US president found it difficult to change his mind. In Ukraine, the Russian president did not agree to accept different views, and was adamant in his opinion and belief that the Ukrainian people, certainly in the south of the country, in the separatist region, would support and assist the Russian army.
Afghanistan did not take into account the asymmetrical combat capability of the Taliban, which has managed to defeat a significantly stronger opponent. In Ukraine, too, Russian intelligence did not expect a civilian militia fighter to subdue the Russian army by asymmetric means.
In both cases there appeared to be no shortage of information on the part of the relevant intelligence organizations, but rather the analysis of the information and the assessment of the intelligence carried out were based on psychological, cultural and organizational biases, and hence incorrect intelligence assessments were obtained.
Summary
The role of intelligence organizations is to provide a picture of the situation and describe the reality to the decision-makers – whether they are decision-makers at the political level or at the military / security level. Intelligence organizations are responsible for collecting information, cross-referencing, evaluating and constructing the picture of reality accordingly.
But the reality will never be clear, and there will never be gaps in its understanding. This is the work point of intelligence.
Intelligence assessment is designed to interpret known reality, clarify and bridge information gaps through scenarios, “intelligent” guesses and based on past knowledge. Intelligence assessment is done by people and therefore it, depending on our human complexity, will always be based on the psychological biases of those who evaluate it.
Biases include, for example, underestimation or overestimation of the opponent, the “herd” phenomenon, cognitive dissonance or other organizational and political elements. Therefore, intelligence failures will always be an integral part of the intelligence work and are inevitable.
Intelligence failures lurk like a shadow behind some of the greatest disasters we remember, such as the warning of the Yom Kippur War or the attack on Pearl Harbor in World War II, the fall of the Soviet Union, the twin disasters, the failure of American intelligence to predict the Iranian revolution, and Saddam Hussein’s misjudgment. The mass extermination, an estimate that underpinned President Bush’s decision to invade Iraq in 2003.
At the end of the campaign in Ukraine, armies will turn to learning and learning processes. There is a lot to learn here, about the Russian weapons, operational planning processes, logistics, air and land forces, the participation of the navy in the land, the importance of accurate aerial missiles, the participation of drones and unmanned aerial vehicles in the battle, the importance of anti-aircraft missiles. The role of the tank and land maneuvering, and more.
The campaign in Ukraine will also provide intelligence organizations with a broad cushion for learning – about the importance of visual intelligence in intelligence gathering, conducting intelligence operations beyond enemy lines, the use of human agents, the importance and role of influence operations and psychological warfare. But this campaign will be an interesting cushion for developing and updating theories, methods and tools for intelligence assessment at all levels – political, social, strategic and tactical.