The publication was allowed today (Thursday) that in recent months the GSS has exposed the activities of Iranian intelligence officials against Israeli academics and former senior members of the defense establishment by contacting those Israelis while impersonating academics, journalists, businessmen and philanthropists.
Thus, in fact, authentic identities of foreign entities that are unaware of the use made of their identity are used.
References were made while presenting a relevant “cover story”, in order to gather information about the Israelis and even bring about their “attraction” abroad with the intention of kidnapping or harming them. It is a well-known method of operation of the Iranian intelligence and security bodies, headed by the Intelligence Organization of the Revolutionary Guards, Quds Force and the Ministry of Intelligence.
Method:
Contact with Israeli citizens is made by e-mail, using a very similar email address, changing a letter or sign, to a recognized authentic address of the ordering party abroad whose identity has been “stolen” for the purpose of establishing contact. After making initial contact with the Israeli object, he is asked to switch to a conversation on WhatsApp in front of a new phone number that is unfamiliar to him.
The Israeli citizens who received these suspicious inquiries refrained from responding to them and even alerted them to the security forces.
The GSS emphasizes that the activity is carried out using authentic information – a recognized research institute, a recognized logo and authentic inscriptions, which can be verified in an online test. The authentic identities of Israeli academics and reservists were also used, including through the use of their photos from the academy’s websites and / or social networks.
Examples of Iranian attempts at attraction revealed by the GSS:
Invitation to a conference in Europe on an academic background:
In this case the address is used [email protected], Very similar to the authentic address of Professor Oliver Thränert, a well-known Swiss researcher in the field of security. The source who impersonated Prof. Turnert contacted a number of Israeli citizens and invited them to attend a conference in a European country. The request was based on the professor’s authentic name and his alleged email address. The same source who impersonated Oliver sent Israelis files and links that allegedly pertained to the conference. The Israeli citizens to whom the referrals were made were suspicious and even turned to clarify the issue with Oliver Turnert, who denied the existence of the conference and feared that his email had been hacked. Note that a number of Israelis were already on the verge of going abroad following these orders and the exposure of the method thwarted this intention.
Using the identity of a European journalist:
In this case, the authentic identity of a journalist named CON COUGHLIN, who also writes under an American institute called GATESTONE INSTITUTE, was used, while offering Israeli citizens to write an article for the so-called institute.
E-mail address [email protected] It is also used in a similar way to the authentic address of the same journalist.
Using the identity of a Russian billionaire:
Another example is impersonating a man of Russian descent, who allegedly serves as an assistant to a Russian billionaire named Andrei Andreev. The same assistant who introduced himself as “Nikolai” made contact with alleged Israelis to help Israelis of Russian descent. The same “Nikolai” offered assistance to Israelis of Russian descent and also offered them to meet with him abroad, noting that the same Andreev allegedly had contacts with officials in the Armenian government, including with the deputy prime minister of Armenia.
Impersonation of a business profile for attraction abroad
Alongside the above, Iranian attempts to connect with Israeli citizens on social media through fictitious profiles, while creating an appropriate cover story, continue in favor of a friendly or romantic relationship.
This is part of the attempts to “attract” Israelis abroad in favor of abduction or harm to them. For example, a fictitious “Sophia Walsh” profile has recently been used.
Warning lights – why should you pay attention?
A request from a suspicious email may be very similar to the authentic address with a request to switch to a messaging app (such as WhatsApp) with an unknown phone number. Avoiding having a video call or watching the face of the “customer”.
2. Non-routine invitations to unique or prestigious conferences when the inviting party showers praise on the Israeli side, in a way that does not necessarily match or is committed to reality.
3. In cases where there is a suspicion that this is a course of networking, it is necessary to avoid transferring personal details to an unknown party or to respond to it in any other way, as well as to alert the security officials.
A senior GSS source: “As part of the affair, many profiles were used by Iranian intelligence agencies, and a great deal of information was gathered about the factors behind their operation. Among other things, the vigilance of the citizens contributed to the thwarting and prevented serious incidents.
The GSS said: “The General Security Service, together with its partners in the intelligence community, will continue to thwart Iranian intelligence activities while maintaining ongoing monitoring and monitoring of its activities in the network space, and using advanced tools and capabilities.”
Photo: GSS Communications
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