The prospect of a “joint venture” between the United States and the Islamic Republic of Iran to manage the Strait of Hormuz is not merely a diplomatic anomaly; it is a window into a governing style that prioritizes the intuition of a single man over the machinery of state. The proposal emerged following a question from ABC News’ Jonathan Karl regarding whether President Trump could accept a toll system for vessels passing through the critical waterway—a system codified in Tehran’s 10-point plan for ending the war.
The financial implications of such a concession are staggering. While Iran did not collect passage fees before the conflict, at least one vessel has already paid $2 million to pass. According to estimates from JPMorgan, a formalized toll system could net Iran between $70 billion and $90 billion annually, effectively providing the reparations Tehran has demanded for wartime destruction.
When asked about the arrangement, President Trump responded: “We’re thinking of doing it as a joint venture. It’s a way of securing it — also securing it from lots of other people. It’s a beautiful thing.”
This approach, characterized by intellectual inconstancy and gambling audacity, represents a departure from modern technocracy. By substituting interagency rigor with mercurial decision-making, the administration has adopted what some describe as “mad-king governance,” a style that is as exhausting for the global diplomatic community as it is risky for the American economy.
The Cycle of Destruction and Reform
The rise of this populist governance is not an accident; it is a reaction. For decades, a liberal technocracy—the era of “wonks” and interagency briefing memos—removed critical questions of trade and foreign policy from democratic contestation. Voters often felt that regardless of their choice at the ballot box, they were consigned to the same free-trade deals and perpetual conflicts. Trump’s 2016 ascent was, in part, a successful effort to re-politicize these issues.
Still, the tragedy of the current approach is that it can smash existing systems but struggles to design novel ones. This pattern mirrors the historical conflict between Andrew Jackson and the Second Bank of the United States (BUS). Jackson, known as “Old Hickory,” destroyed the BUS to challenge the Northeastern commercial establishment. While he succeeded in dismantling the institution, his failure to plan for the aftermath led to a rash of “wildcat banking” and a prolonged economic recession.
The contemporary parallel is most evident in the administration’s handling of trade. Trump correctly identified a crisis in US manufacturing, but his solution relied almost exclusively on tariffs. Without accompanying legislation or a comprehensive industrial policy—elements that were later integrated into semiconductor and renewable energy initiatives under the Biden administration—the results have been contradictory.
| Metric | Reported Outcome | Source/Detail |
|---|---|---|
| Manufacturing Jobs | Loss of >100,000 jobs | JEC Senate Data |
| Public Approval | ~1/3 Approve / ~2/3 Disapprove | Newsweek Poll |
| Legal Status | Authority invalidated | US Supreme Court Ruling |
War by Market Fluctuations
The most dangerous application of this governance has been the recent conflict with Iran. According to two administration officials—one current and one former—the war was conducted without a standard interagency process. There was no formal exchange of views between the security and foreign-policy apparatus; instead, decision-making rested with the President and a small circle of advisors.
The objectives of the conflict shifted with dizzying frequency. At various points, the goals ranged from regime change and the degradation of military capacity to the total “obliteration” of Iran’s nuclear program. The rhetoric regarding the Strait of Hormuz was particularly erratic, moving from demands that Iran “fucking open it” to claims that the U.S. Didn’t actually need the strait at all.
Perhaps most surreal was the reported synchronization of military operations with the stock market. Iranian state television frequently mocked the administration, claiming that operations were eased on Sundays to ensure the Dow Jones Industrial Average would climb on Mondays, only to ramp up again as the markets closed for the weekend. When national security tactics are adjusted based on equity values, the line between a war of necessity and a corporate gamble disappears.
The Strategic Aftermath
The result of this approach is a paradox: the U.S. Pursued the goals of the “deep state” hawks but did so with such inconsistency that the strategic outcome favored Tehran. While the Iranian regime was battered, it did not collapse. Instead, it hardened its internal position and improved its ballistic missile capabilities.
Crucially, Tehran learned that it possesses a powerful alternative to nuclear weapons: the ability to throttle one of the world’s most vital economic arteries. By accepting a 10-point plan that potentially codifies a toll system, the U.S. May be granting Iran a permanent source of revenue and a recognized lever of global economic influence.
The American experiment now finds itself caught between two extremes: the imperious, often detached bureaucracy of the technocrats and the capricious volatility of the “mad king.” While the former can be stifling, the latter proves that without a functioning legislative branch to provide checks and balances, the country is susceptible to policies driven by whim rather than wisdom.
The next critical checkpoint will be the formal negotiation of the 10-point plan and the subsequent legal review of any “joint venture” agreements regarding the Strait of Hormuz, which will determine whether the U.S. Formally recognizes Iran’s right to collect transit fees.
We invite readers to share their perspectives on the balance between executive decisiveness and bureaucratic oversight in the comments below.
