The United States has long maintained a sophisticated capacity for innovation, economic dominance, and cultural projection, but it has historically struggled with a more fundamental democratic requirement: holding its most powerful figures to account. From the executive branch to the corridors of think tanks, a recurring pattern of impunity has allowed the architects of strategic failures to remain not only unpunished but influential.
This systemic lack of accountability is not a new phenomenon. The precedent was set early and reinforced often: President Gerald Ford’s pardon of Richard Nixon, George H. W. Bush’s pardons for those involved in the Iran-Contra scandal, and the decision by the Obama administration to forgo prosecutions for those who authorized “enhanced interrogation” techniques. Even the financial architects of the 2008 crisis largely escaped legal reckoning, returning to their positions of influence as the nation simply turned the page.
The current aftermath of the conflict with Iran serves as a stark contemporary example of this cycle. While a fragile cease-fire may currently be in place, the decision to pursue military escalation has left the United States in a demonstrably weaker position. In a matter of months, the strategic landscape shifted: oil and gas prices surged, inflation climbed, and the Strait of Hormuz—a critical artery of global trade—fell under tighter Iranian control. Meanwhile, U.S. Missile stocks have been depleted and regional facilities damaged, all while the Iranian government has emerged with greater internal public support and a more hard-line leadership.
To break this cycle, the U.S. Must initiate holding pro-war elites accountable, focusing not only on the leaders who sign the orders but on the intellectual and political infrastructure that makes such decisions seem inevitable.
The Architecture of Influence
Wars of choice rarely begin with a single order; they are preceded by years of atmospheric conditioning. In the American context, this process is driven by a network of pundits, lobbyists, and advisors who normalize the apply of force. By framing a geopolitical rival as an absolute evil incapable of reform, these figures create a narrow corridor of “acceptable” policy options, where military intervention is presented not as a last resort, but as a strategic necessity.
The formula is consistent: the enemy is demonized, the coming campaign is promised to be swift and inexpensive, and the benefits are described as far-reaching. Simultaneously, the human cost—both in terms of civilian casualties and long-term regional instability—is treated as a secondary concern or ignored entirely. This intellectual groundwork ensures that when a leader is presented with the option of war, the risks have been minimized and the rewards exaggerated.
The Pundits and the Press
The role of the media in legitimizing escalation is critical. Bret Stephens of the New York Times has been a prominent voice consistently advocating for a more aggressive posture toward Tehran. His history includes support for the 2003 invasion of Iraq, a stance he has continued to defend. Regarding Iran, Stephens wrote in 2024 that “We Absolutely Need to Escalate in Iran,” and later provided “The Case for Striking Iran” on the eve of the conflict. Even as the strategic costs mounted, his columns continued to insist the war was progressing well.
Similarly, Matthew Kroenig of the Atlantic Council has spent over a decade arguing for military action. In a 2012 analysis, Kroenig suggested it was “Time to Attack Iran,” employing a strategic framework that paired optimistic assumptions about U.S. Success with worst-case scenarios regarding Iranian inaction. As recently as 2025, he maintained that a wider war was unlikely because Iran would not escalate—a prediction that failed to materialize once the first strikes were launched.
The Think Tank and Lobbying Pipeline
Beyond the opinion pages, a concentrated group of policy experts at institutions like the American Enterprise Institute (AEI) and the Hoover Institution provided the theoretical justification for regime change. Danielle Pletka, Marc Thiessen, and Michael Rubin of AEI openly discussed the merits of assassinating Iranian leaders and predicted that toppling the government would be a straightforward process.
Niall Ferguson of the Hoover Institution similarly urged the U.S. To “finish the job,” asserting that removing the Iranian regime would be a benefit to the world. Ferguson initially promised that the U.S.-Israeli effort would not last long, though he later shifted his tone to wonder if the conflict might go “global.”
The military establishment has also provided cover for these policies. Retired four-star Gen. Jack Keane consistently described military force as the “best option” and a “historic opportunity” for regime change, praising the administration’s decisions even as the conflict dragged on.
The Role of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies
The Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD) and its CEO Mark Dubowitz played a pivotal role in dismantling the diplomatic framework of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). By pushing for a “maximum pressure” campaign, the FDD helped convince the administration to withdraw from the nuclear deal, despite Iranian compliance at the time. This move, critics argued, directly accelerated Iran’s enrichment capabilities and narrowed the path toward a diplomatic solution, eventually leading to the current crisis. Dubowitz explicitly stated in early February that the U.S. Had to “strike first and then talk.”
| Individual/Org | Primary Role | Key Argument/Action |
|---|---|---|
| Bret Stephens | Journalist | Advocated for escalation and military strikes in NYT columns. |
| John Bolton | Former NSA | Opposed JCPOA; justified February war as “totally justified.” |
| Mark Dubowitz (FDD) | Lobbyist/Expert | Pushed “maximum pressure” and “strike first” policies. |
| Niall Ferguson | Historian | Urged the U.S. To “finish the job” of regime change. |
| Matthew Kroenig | Scholar | Predicted low risk of Iranian escalation in response to strikes. |
The “Execution” Fallacy
As the conflict reaches a stalemate or potential defeat, a familiar defense is emerging among the pro-war elite. They are likely to argue that the idea of the war was correct, but the execution by the administration—specifically by figures like Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth or Secretary of State Marco Rubio—was flawed. This “execution alibi” is a strategic maneuver designed to protect the theorists from the consequences of their theories.
But, the incompetence of the administration was evident long before the first strike. When the underlying logic of a war is based on the flawed assumption that a regime will collapse effortlessly or that a regional power will not retaliate, the failure is one of strategy, not just tactics. To continue treating these advisors as experts is to ignore the empirical evidence of their failure.
Former National Security Advisor John Bolton exemplifies this duality. While Bolton has become a critic of the current administration’s handling of the war, he spent years advocating for the very force he now critiques. He maintained that the decision to go to war was justified and that the world would have been safer had such action been taken two decades prior.
Redefining Expert Guidance
Preserving the freedom of expression does not require granting equal prominence to voices with a documented history of catastrophic failure. The goal is not to censor these individuals, but to diminish their role as the primary “experts” in the American foreign policy Rolodex.
For the U.S. To stop repeating its strategic errors, a shift in institutional behavior is required. News editors must apply greater skepticism to the submissions of known warmongers; networks should diversify the voices they invite for commentary; and, most critically, policymakers must seek counsel from those who prioritize diplomatic stability over ideological regime change. The first step in holding pro-war elites accountable is simply remembering what they said and comparing it to what actually happened.
The next critical checkpoint for the region will be the formal review of the current cease-fire terms, expected in the coming weeks. Whether this agreement holds will depend largely on whether the U.S. Continues to rely on the same circle of advisors who led the nation into this conflict or whether it finally turns toward a more sustainable, diplomatic approach.
We invite readers to share their perspectives on foreign policy accountability in the comments below.
