Critical Minerals: Geopolitical Rivalry vs. Global Governance in the Energy Transition

by Ahmed Ibrahim

The global push toward a low-carbon economy has triggered a high-stakes geopolitical scramble for the raw materials that power it. From the salt flats of the Andes to the rainforests of the Congo Basin, les minerais critiques, essentiels à la transition énergétique, sont au cœur d’une nouvelle ruée minière, shifting the center of gravity for international diplomacy toward the Global South.

While these minerals—lithium, cobalt, nickel and copper—are the bedrock of electric vehicle batteries and renewable energy grids, the race to secure them is increasingly bypassing the particularly environmental and social safeguards the energy transition is meant to protect. The result is a fragmented landscape where strategic supply chain security often outweighs the rights of indigenous communities and ecological preservation.

The scale of this dependence is stark. The Democratic Republic of Congo holds nearly 50% of the world’s cobalt reserves, while the “lithium triangle” of Chile, Argentina, and Bolivia accounts for more than 35% of global lithium. Chile as well controls nearly 30% of global copper reserves, and Indonesia and the Philippines lead the world in nickel production. As the demand for these materials surges, the tension between multilateral governance and bilateral power plays has reached a breaking point.

The Erosion of Multilateralism at COP30

For a brief window, there was hope for a unified global framework. In June 2024, the UN Secretary-General established a group of experts to address the equity, transparency, and human rights implications of critical mineral extraction. By September, this group had proposed seven guiding principles and five concrete recommendations intended to ensure that the transition to green energy did not mirror the exploitative patterns of the fossil fuel era.

The Erosion of Multilateralism at COP30
Critical Minerals China

These principles were a focal point at COP30 in Belém, Brazil, and the subsequent UNEA-7 assembly in Nairobi. The “Belem Action Mechanism” (BAM) was designed to integrate critical minerals into a “just transition” framework, supported by the G77 and China. Some nations, including Colombia and Oman, pushed for a legally binding global treaty to ensure the traceability and sustainability of these minerals.

Sur cette photo, Edwin, 15 ans, employé de la Bolivian Mining Corporation (Comibol), met en marche un générateur diesel destiné à fournir chauffage et électricité à un camp minier installé dans le désert de sel d’Uyuni, en Bolivie. Les salars boliviens ont suscité un intérêt international de la part des entreprises du secteur énergétique en raison de leurs réserves de lithium.

However, these ambitions were thwarted by a Russian and Chinese veto, leading to the removal of critical minerals from the final version of the just transition program. Instead of a binding treaty, the UN Environment Assembly (UNEA-7) adopted a non-binding resolution that merely calls for “strengthened dialogue.” This shift marks a transition from a pursuit of global justice to a system of voluntary, unenforceable mechanisms.

The Rise of Bilateralism and Strategic Securitization

As multilateral efforts stalled, the world’s superpowers pivoted toward bilateral agreements designed to exclude rivals. In January, the United States signaled this shift by withdrawing from several international bodies and reducing its participation in UNEA negotiations.

The US v China: critical minerals race | Global News Podcast

By February, Washington began promoting a non-binding framework for the supply and processing of critical minerals. The objective is clear: accelerate investment and reduce dependence on Chinese-controlled supply chains. Simultaneously, China and South Africa launched a bilateral cooperation initiative in November to support African modernization, specifically targeting the critical minerals sector.

This “securitization” of minerals means that access is no longer viewed through the lens of environmental governance, but as a matter of national security. The result is a fragmented global map where minerals are traded as pawns in a larger geopolitical struggle.

Des barges chargées de minerai de nickel
Des barges chargées de minerai de nickel sont ancrées au large de l’île de Kabaena, en Indonésie, le 16 novembre 2024.

Regional Ambitions and the “Nickel Corridor”

Producer nations are attempting to forge their own alliances to avoid becoming mere extraction sites. In February, nickel industry associations from the Philippines and Indonesia announced the creation of an “Indo-Philippine Nickel Corridor.”

From Instagram — related to Indonesia, Chile

Indonesia has already set a precedent by banning the export of raw nickel ore since 2020, forcing companies to build refineries locally. This strategy has turned Indonesia into a critical hub for battery-grade nickel. The new corridor aims to align governance, ESG criteria, and investment facilitation across Southeast Asia.

However, the “sovereignty” promised by these regional efforts remains fragile. Much of Indonesia’s refining expansion has been financed and operated by Chinese firms. The Philippines, while signing agreements with the U.S. To develop refining capacity, still exports the vast majority of its raw nickel to China. Without autonomous processing capabilities, these nations remain deeply embedded in value chains structured by foreign capital.

Key Critical Mineral Reserves and Producers
Mineral Key Regions/Countries Strategic Significance
Cobalt DR Congo (~50% reserves) Essential for EV batteries
Lithium Chile, Argentina, Bolivia (>35% reserves) Core component of Li-ion batteries
Copper Chile (~30% reserves) Critical for electrical wiring/grids
Nickel Indonesia, Philippines High-density battery production

The Human and Ecological Cost

While diplomats argue over supply chains, the physical reality on the ground is often one of conflict. The “green” label of these minerals obscures the devastation of local ecosystems and the displacement of indigenous peoples. From water scarcity in the Atacama desert to labor abuses in Congolese mines, the social cost of the energy transition is being borne by those who benefit from it the least.

The current trajectory suggests a world of “dispersed rules,” where environmental and social justice are sidelined in favor of industrialization and geopolitical leverage. The fundamental question remains: who truly profits from this new mining rush?

The next critical checkpoint will be the implementation phase of the UNEA-7 working group’s guiding principles. Whether these voluntary standards can actually influence corporate behavior or will remain mere diplomatic window-dressing will determine if the energy transition can ever truly be called “just.”

We invite readers to share their perspectives on the balance between strategic security and environmental justice in the comments below.

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