The Swiss state currently maintains a sprawling ecosystem of financial support that Schaltegger describes as a thicket no one can fully comprehend or control. According to calculations by the IWP, more than 22,000 primary recipients receive state support annually, though Schaltegger states that in truth and fact, there are many more.
The 50 Billion Franc Subvention Network
The sheer volume of these payments is staggering. With nearly 50 billion francs in total subsidies, the state is essentially spending half of its federal budget on these allocations.
Beyond these broad categories, Schaltegger points to what he considers absurd financial flows. He specifically highlights funding directed toward corporations such as Rolex and Nestlé, as well as associations like the Eritrean Media Federation. These payments often depend not on whether a group is financially well or poorly positioned, but on meeting specific political criteria, such as global political concerns or equality.
Lobbying and the Political Trade-Off
The process of securing these funds has created a symbiotic relationship between interest groups and parliamentarians. Schaltegger describes a system of cattle trading,
where lobbying groups and members of parliament form voting blocs to support each other’s interests in exchange for access to the state treasury. He explains that many parliamentarians serve a lobby that brings them votes during an election, while the lobby in turn receives subsidies.
They go after the booty of the state treasury with the exchange of votes, says Schaltegger. Christoph Schaltegger, IWP Director
This dynamic leads to what Schaltegger calls a double loss of welfare for society. First, the state treasury yields to requests that would never be capable of achieving a majority on their own. Second, the resources consumed by lobbies—including expensive staffs, secretariats, and communication offices—are dedicated to meeting subsidy criteria rather than creating actual value.
Redirecting Funds to National Defense
The opportunity cost of this spending is most evident in Switzerland’s security posture. Schaltegger notes that the defense budget has been halved since 1990, stating, With a halving of the defense budget since 1990, we cannot perceive our security policy efforts. He argues that the federal government does not need to increase value-added tax—as the Federal Council decided in June—to fix this, as the money already exists within the current subsidy budget.
The mathematical potential for reallocation is significant. Schaltegger notes that with 50 billion in subsidies, it would be strange if a decent defense capability could not be built from these funds. According to his calculations, cutting subsidies by just 10 percent would be enough to double the army’s budget.
The Risk of Paradise
Ironically, Switzerland’s strong financial position is viewed by the IWP as a liability. With tax revenues growing even faster than the economy, Schaltegger believes the Swiss live in paradisiacal conditions. This abundance fosters a luxury mindset that makes it difficult for the state to stop intervening in areas like family and energy policy.
To prevent the all too frivolous access to the state treasury, Schaltegger demands more transparency and a temporal limitation of subsidies.
The central tension remains whether a government operating in such comfort can find the political will to dismantle these established interest-group networks in favor of long-term security.
