“From the Day of Atonement that passed until this Day of Atonement”
On Yom Kippur 1973, which fell on a Saturday, I arrived in Geneva at the end of a week of testing the security arrangements at embassies in Europe. At noon “our man in Vienna” rang and announced that in a few hours war would break out with Egypt.
This is how the war life of my generation broke out. In Israel you can tell which generation you are from by identifying the war you mean when you say “the war”. We are the children of the War of Independence, we fought in the Six Day War, the War of Attrition and the First Lebanon War. But the title “the war” is reserved with us for one war – the Yom Kippur war.
I got on the first flight that left Israel, and on Sunday night we crossed the dark coastline and landed in a darkened country. I went straight to the unit, I was given command of a company and we left for the nameless war that landed on us, as on all the people of Israel, in a complete strategic surprise.
- When does the fast start and when is it allowed to eat? Yom Kippur entry and exit times
A coordinated surprise attack on two fronts overthrew the “concept” that Egypt would not attack in a relationship of forces where it could not achieve a decision and would have a market on its hip like in the Six Day War. All signs of enemy preparations were suppressed or interpreted as drills. The blindness of the conception resulted in the fact that even the fruits of our secret operations, which made it possible to give a warning of the war, were not used.
Go out and learn, there is no danger from excessive self-confidence and outdated concepts. From the Six Day War, the heads of the army and the state did not internalize “for a sin that we sinned before you with raised eyes”. You should always prepare for war according to the enemy’s capabilities and not according to your assessment of his intentions.
On the front of the Suez Canal, I joined Eric Sharon’s commander, who learned the lessons of surprise under deadly fire. The strategically wrong decision not to mobilize the reserve formation and initiate a preemptive strike left no chance for the line of outposts. Under the impressive command of Eric, we carried out, alongside the active-efficient unit of Emzia (Patzi) Chen, infantry missions that are not “special missions” to which we are accustomed, but in war one does what is necessary.
In the midst of our preparations to operate as a reconnaissance force with an Egyptian identity, my good friend to the team and the unit, Captain Amitai Nachmani, arrived equipped with the order that I should go up to the Golan. I transferred the command to him, we talked briefly and said goodbye with a strong handshake and “Take care of the company and yourself”. We didn’t hug then, and to this day I miss that lack of hugs.
I went through the unit, got a new company, we equipped ourselves and went up to the Golan, where the commanding officer of the army, Col. Uri Shimhoni, was waiting for us with mission orders to destroy artillery batteries deep in the Syrian formation. The raids required crossing minefields, navigating through a dense and nervous Syrian formation, quiet stealth, rapid destruction and safe return. In short, what we knew how to do best.
The first night we didn’t find the battery (probably a skip) and we returned tired (14 km each way) and frustrated. The next night we arrived quietly to the battery, which at an excellent time (for us) opened fire with cannons, which allowed us to get within a few meters of the Syrian soldiers, who to this day have not Know where their death comes from.
Then came the Hermon mission, which fell to the Syrians at the beginning of the war. Another quiet penetration into Syria and a steep and tedious climb brought us to a commanding ridge known today as Mitzpe Shalig, where I joined Yoni Netanyahu and together, in three days of fighting, we killed dozens of Syrians in short-range battles, captured more and prevented – at the cost of only two wounded – the reinforcement and satisfaction of the Syrian force with which we were fighting Golani power.
We reported to the Northern Command that the Hermon post was empty, but despite our pleas we were unable to get permission to take it over, because “it belongs to the Golani”. Golani finally arrived after a bloody battle (55 dead and 80 wounded) to the empty post and raised the Israeli flag. To paraphrase the “eyes of the state”, blood could be saved if we could get the “ears of command” to listen to us.
The force that came to us at the end of the fighting also brought with it the good news of Job about the fall of Amitai at the Fayed Airport across the Suez Canal. We got off the Hermon, I stopped at the hospital in Safed to treat my injury, and I fled from there as soon as I realized that they were going to hospitalize me. Yoni and I managed to stop on the way to the unit for dinner at Mimi’s mother’s and Moshe’s father’s. I told them about Amiti and the dozens of our friends who were killed. It was delicious and sad.
We won, but we failed. During the war we knew that the top echelon (military and political) had failed, but we said “now we have a country to save, later we will reckon with them”.
Not only the conception failed. The failure of the counterattack on October 8 proved that we were not prepared for the right war – armor against infantry, anti-tank weapons and deadly air defense. The fighters under our leadership, the younger and more experienced officers, won the war. But at a very heavy price of 2,685 dead (about half of them tankmen, about a quarter officers), 7,500 wounded, 301 prisoners. The much heavier losses of the Egyptians and Syrians did not comfort us at all.
This war actually planted confidence in me. I was proud that I completed all the missions and did not kill a single soldier. Anyone who was a commander in a fateful war will understand this feeling.
Later, when I chaired the security committee for talks with the Palestinians, the Jordanians and the Syrians, I saw again and again the strategic achievement of the Yom Kippur War as an “iron wall” – “If we did not defeat you in that situation, we will never succeed in defeating you”, Egyptian officers told me.
We returned to the unit, and after six months of operations, I returned to studying mathematics and physics. The university opened for the soldiers who remained in the service of the second cycle, and at the same time as the studies Gatha protested. We, who had already fought in the six days, did not intend to let Israeli society return to its old habits. The protest ripened into a revolution, and in 1977 the Likud came to power. Menachem Begin grasped the historic opportunity and sealed the long-term results of the war in the significant peace agreement between Israel and Egypt.
“And from this Day of Atonement until the Day of Atonement that comes upon us for peace” (or for war)
The Israel Defense Forces is relatively stronger than its enemies compared to the IDF in 1973. The IDF must continue to fight terrorism in all its forms, thwart Iranian nuclearization, train and train the units and prepare for a war that this time will include six arenas – southern, northern, depth (Iran), Yosh, home front and even an enemy from home.
We must not forget the lessons of a war in which, if not for our strength and determination, we would have lost “our country, our homeland and our father’s house”.
I will bring five lessons from those days to this time: the first, the need to always be strong and ready for battle. Strive for peace only from a position of victory and with a partner who has given up on overwhelming us. The second, there is nothing more dangerous than “the sin that we sinned before you with raised eyes” – the sin of pride.
The third, defensible borders. Only defensible borders, and in particular the Jordan River, give any agreement the chance of being viable. And remember – there is no substitute for a believing warrior fighting for his land.
The fourth, the nuclearization of Iran. This is an unbearable threat, and no one will fight for us. “If I don’t have me, I have the IDF.” The fifth, terrorism. It is not an existential threat, but a strategic one. Those who do not fight it effectively, leave the key to any development in the hands of the terrorists.
“For this, my brother and my neighbor, I pray – peace be with you”
Almost 50 years after that war, we have the perspective to compare the situation of the Israeli citizen compared to the Egyptian, Syrian, Iraqi, etc. We live in a free, stable and democratic country, strong in terms of security and economy and responding to our three strategic challenges – demography, water and energy. Our national weakness is the lack of cohesion of Israeli society. This is the strategic asset that we must cultivate – the cohesion of Israeli society and the relationship with the Jewish and Israeli communities in the world. Happy New Year and happy signing!
The writer is a champion in the defense and a former MK