We are now marking 49 years since the Yom Kippur War while referring to various aspects of that war. Within this framework, there are several accepted patterns of thought about the war. Another look at them shows them differently.
Much has been written about the mistake of the AMN (Intelligence Division) which stated that there was a low probability of war in early October 1973. It was a grave mistake, but if the AMN had called for a massive reserve mobilization then the Syrian and Egyptian armies may not have attacked at that time. There is a debate as to whether it is possible that Arab armies were about to attack in May 1973, when there were tensions that led to the “blue and white” alert in the IDF.
The increased preparation of the IDF at the time was seen by some as a ploy by the Arab armies, which was intended to make the IDF prepare for an imminent war, in vain, so that in the future the IDF would not do so, when the Arab armies would really attack. In May 1973, Aman estimated that no There would be a war, and his righteousness was in his hands in October 1973 in which there might have been a similar event. That is, the IDF would have increased alertness, in vain.
Despite the preparation of the Arab armies to attack on October 6, 1973, they could have postponed the attack to another date, certainly if the IDF had been properly prepared to face them. Aman could then once again claim that he was right. This would have helped the Arab armies to attack at a later date, if again the Israeli intelligence had estimated, based on the two previous events, in May and October 1973, that the Arab armies would not attack.
Despite the preparation of the Arab armies to attack on October 6, 1973, they could have postponed the attack to another date, certainly if the IDF had been properly prepared to face them. Aman could then once again claim that he was right
Furthermore, in light of the successes of the IDF in the past, it is possible that the political and military echelons in Israel would have relied entirely on the IDF and avoided raising any alert, so that the IDF would have found itself surprised and exposed even more than in the Yom Kippur War.
The Yom Kippur War is considered by some to be an Israeli victory, others maintain that it was an Israeli defeat and there are those who see it as a draw. There is also an assumption that following the war the Arab countries realized that they would not be able to defeat Israel, after enjoying opening conditions that were considered ideal. But it wasn’t like that because of the time they chose to attack, Yom Kippur.
From a certain point of view, this date was better for the IDF than other dates, in which it was more complicated to organize recruitment and preparation during war. Also, the Yom Kippur War was not necessarily the high point in terms of Arab military capability. They proved in that war that Arabs can beat the IDF in battles and even in a campaign (the opening system in the war, certainly in Sinai and also the October 8 system in Sinai).
Arab armies could continue to improve, and thanks to their quantitative advantage it is possible that at some point the combination of qualitative improvement and quantitative advantage would have allowed them to defeat the IDF. After the Yom Kippur War, Egypt did agree to end its conflict with Israel, but it was not necessarily because it She thought she was unable to defeat Israel, but because of the price it took from Egypt.
Throughout the war, there was a lot of attrition in the IDF, and therefore divisions were in a lower order of strength than the standard, even to a significant extent. In fact, a division was sometimes as strong as two brigades and sometimes even as a reinforced brigade, and so on for brigades, battalions, etc. that were of lesser strength.
In light of this, the challenges and achievements of the IDF must be examined, as well as its difficulties. When a division, brigade, etc. sometimes failed to carry out the task assigned to them, it must be remembered that they were much less powerful than what is accepted according to their official definition.
When a division, brigade, etc. sometimes failed to carry out the task assigned to them, it must be remembered that they were much less powerful than what is accepted according to their official definition
In the Yom Kippur War, the IDF succeeded, at a heavy price, in keeping the Golan Heights in its hands, but even if part or even all of the Golan Heights were occupied by the Syrian army, this would not create an existential threat to the State of Israel, even without referring to the nuclear weapons attributed to Israel according to sources Strangers.
From 1949 to 1967, Israel suffered more than once from the Syrian hold on the Golan Heights because of the water sources, shooting at Israeli settlements, conflict over demilitarized territories, and more. The greatest danger was a broad Syrian attack, certainly as part of an attack by an Arab coalition on several fronts, which would have used the Golan Heights as a springboard and a base of fire to cover the attack. However, a descent of the Syrian army from the Golan Heights would have exposed its forces, and it would have lost the advantage of the Golan Heights.
Beyond that, before 1967 Israel had a certain strategic depth that would have helped stop a Syrian attack. In the Galilee, on its rugged and mountainous expanses, there were more than enough places to prepare for defense. Even in the case of the loss of settlements such as Rosh Pina and even Safed, this would not cause the collapse of the state. The IDF had enough opportunities, time and space to stop the Syrian attack before it could reach the most important target in the north, the city of Haifa.
Not for nothing, with all the importance of the Golan, Israel did not try to conquer the plateau before 1967 – and during the Six Day War this was done towards the end of the war, after reaching a decision on the more important fronts: Egypt and Jordan, and the hesitations and last minute change of decision of the Israeli government, which finally led for the occupation of the Golan Heights.
In the Yom Kippur War, the IDF took a huge risk by sending reinforcements to the Golan Heights, including the General Defense Reserve, Division 146. These forces were sent into battle under unfavorable conditions, in a hurry, without enjoying the element of surprise and against an opponent ready for battle.
Although the IDF was able to win the campaign on the Golan Heights, given the circumstances of that campaign, it could have ended differently. The IDF could also have been worn down more than it was actually worn out, which would have undermined Israel’s situation on the entire northern front.
It is true that the IDF was able to win the campaign on the Golan Heights, but given the circumstances of that campaign it could have ended differently. The IDF could also have been worn down more than it was actually worn out, which would have undermined Israel’s situation in the entire north
It is quite clear that it was very important that the IDF managed to keep the Golan Heights in its hands in 1973, but the strategy adopted by Israel constituted quite a serious risk, given the need to maintain power due to the circumstances of that war, with all the uncertainty on the Egyptian front and the joining of additional Arab armies Israel decided that it was better for her to attack the Golan Heights, in order to continue to hold it, than to prepare for defense along the Jordan River, at the price of giving up the Golan Heights.
After that war, and until the last few years, because of the Israeli hold on the Golan Heights, there was a possibility of a war with Syria. Such a war could have cost Israel a heavy price, because of Syria’s ambition to return the Golan Heights to her.
This was also a kind of gamble that Israel took, which has paid off so far. Now the Syrian army is quite weak and will need many years to return to the strength it had on the eve of the Syrian civil war, which destroyed a significant part of its strength. This Syrian landing removes the military threat to the occupation of the Golan Heights for perhaps a decade or even more.
The success of the Suez Canal by the IDF, a major offensive move in that war, would have been more difficult to accomplish without a substantial achievement of a defensive move by the IDF: the containment of the massive Egyptian attack on October 14. The IDF was then based on attack, and this had many advantages but also disadvantages – such as a lack of sufficient awareness of the importance of a defensive battle.
After its failure on October 8, the IDF did not try to push the Egyptian army to attack, in order to defeat it in a defensive battle. When the Egyptian army launched a broad attack, on October 14, it turned out to be a golden opportunity for the IDF, which succeeded, also because of the army’s failures the Egyptian, to have a clear victory. This was the beginning of the turning point in the war, on the Sinai front. This points to the potential of the defensive battle, which was not exhausted, throughout that war, on both fronts.
Many point out that at the end of the war the IDF was 101 km from Cairo and 40 km from Damascus, as one of the proofs of the IDF’s success. In that war, the IDF had many achievements, but in the field of land, its progress was much more modest compared to previous wars.
In Operation Kadesh in 1956 and in the Six Day War in 1967, the IDF penetrated about 200 km deep into Egyptian territory in the Sinai. In 1973 he advanced less than 20 km deep into Egypt. (The encirclement of the Third Army involved a move parallel to the Suez Canal, not deep into Egypt).
In light of the starting point of the war, the balance of forces, the considerable difficulty of the IDF succeeding in Suez, and other challenges, this progress is also impressive. But, as mentioned, it was much less compared to previous wars. “L” was 100 km or closer to the Egyptian capital, and by the same weight it doesn’t matter that the IDF came 40 km from Damascus.
In light of the starting point of the war, the balance of forces, the considerable difficulty of succeeding in Suez by the IDF and other challenges, this progress is also impressive. But it was much less compared to previous wars
Even if the IDF had gotten closer to one or both of these Arab capitals it would not have been important, including if the IDF had somehow managed to reach the gates of one of the capitals. The IDF at the time, on both fronts, was quite worn out. Its supply lines would also get longer and longer as it penetrated into Arab territory, while being subject to the danger of ambushes, shelling, etc. These problems would have made it difficult for the IDF to occupy even a part of an Arab capital .
Furthermore, the Soviet Union would most likely have deployed forces to protect the Arab capitals, and the IDF should have avoided a collision with it, if only because it could have dragged the United States into the cauldron, and in the worst case, lead to a world war.
Also, the Arab armies were expected to fight with more determination to protect their capital, and even if the IDF had arrived there, it is very doubtful if it would have succeeded in capturing some of these large cities, certainly in Cairo, let alone holding them for a long time. In light of all this It is clear that there was no substantial threat, if any, from the IDF to Damascus or Cairo.
In the end, in the Yom Kippur War, the IDF, despite very bad opening conditions, managed to recover. Flexibility, fighting spirit, resourcefulness, advance training and other factors allowed the IDF to achieve achievements such as leaving the Golan Heights in Israel’s hands and advancing towards Arab capitals. But it must be looked at not only from the conventional point of view.