In the dizzying flow of news from the State of Israel and the politics of government formation the day after the elections, the demand for peace from the Gaza Strip last Saturday – the first rocket fire since Operation Dawn – seems like a distant memory.
After three months in which the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PAJ) – which remained isolated in the last operation and suffered a military blow – refrained from firing rockets at Israel, even when its operatives were eliminated in an operational activity in IOSH, last weekend the organization tried to revive the equation again. After the assassination of Farouk Salama in Jenin, four rockets were fired from the Gaza Strip – three of which landed in Palestinian territory and one was intercepted by Iron Dome.
More than the rocket shooters themselves, the Islamic Jihad, it seems, wanted to convey a message that apparently their recovery period from the latest operation is over. A quick look at the recent history of the Gaza Strip since the disengagement in 2005 shows that even after periods of silence, the first shot heralds the breaking of the dam. It will gradually be followed by more events that will once again, after a year and a half of being the quietest in the south, return the Gaza Strip to the top of the political and public agenda in Israel.
The Gaza Strip and what is happening there, the balances between the use of force and the improvement of the economic situation there and the attempt to solve the issue of prisoners and missing persons, which has not progressed anywhere in recent years, are expected to accompany the incoming Israeli government as a significant challenge already in its first year.
As far as Israel is concerned, every shooting from the Strip is also an opportunity to damage quality assets that Hamas is accumulating for itself under the auspices of peace. The underground site for the production of rocket engines that was bombed with almost 20 tons of explosives unique to penetrating underground targets, near Deir al-Balah in the center of the Gaza Strip, clearly expresses the dilemmas of both Israel and Hamas.
Beyond the damage to an important operational site, the security establishment believes that charging a significant price for each rocket fire will cause Hamas to impose its will on the GAP as well, as has usually been the case for the past year and a half. There is logic and rational reasoning in this concept, and Hamas has already demonstrated many times that When he wants, not even a jump shot off the leash.
But at the same time the latest signal from the GAP, the expected continuation of the escalation in the Yosh and the warming also in the Jerusalem sector, will greatly challenge this logic. In the current state of affairs, Israel may find itself in a renewed conflict in the Gaza Strip much sooner than the timetables in which it and Hamas are interested.
This challenge will be faced by the next government and by the Minister of Defense who will replace Benny Gantz on the 14th floor of Kirya in Tel Aviv. The differences in security issues in policy management and the exercise of force under checks and balances are not expected to be large.
Different rhetoric and statements may indeed have an impact on reality, and nuanced differences are expected in the shaky relations with the Palestinian Authority and its leader Abu Mazen, or in symbolic decisions that will give the incoming government a more hawkish status than the outgoing one.
These differences should not be underestimated, and a change in atmosphere may also affect the situation on the ground. But at the same time, in a careful assessment of almost all the issues from the Palestinian arena in the Palestinian Authority, the continuation of the activity against the establishment of Iran in Syria and the Middle East, the Iranian nuclear issue and the building of the IDF’s military capabilities for the possibility of a direct confrontation with Iran, internal security issues and other issues – are not expected Major changes in Israel’s security policy.
It is likely that Benjamin Netanyahu as Prime Minister will seek to continue to strengthen the alliances forged with the Gulf countries and the Abraham Accords signed during his time. Behind the scenes, the last year was very successful for Israeli interests in cutting coupons and extracting political-security bills from these agreements, when the American Central Command is of great importance as the sponsor of alliances in the dominant security-defense axis. The same goes for issues such as improving relations with Turkey and Erdogan on the basis of common interests and maintaining relations with Jordan.
Even with regard to the economic water agreement signed with Lebanon, despite the sharp criticism, it is likely that Netanyahu sees importance in achieving stability that currently avoids a confrontation with Hezbollah on the northern border. Netanyahu is expected to face a difficult and complex dilemma in supporting Ukraine in the war in Europe, in an attempt to walk through the cracks of security interests vis-a-vis Russia.
You did not escape here
Above all, despite the sharp criticism of the Democratic Biden administration, Netanyahu’s clear preference for Trump’s previous Republican administration, and the frequent tendency of elements on the right to reduce the importance of the US’s security-political support – Netanyahu understands it well and deeply.
Compared to the cheerful Trump days that allowed Netanyahu freedom of action in the Palestinian arena, the current reality is distinctly different. The weakness of the Democratic Party and the position of the US President, the political crisis and the rising progressive forces that are not in Israel’s favor, make the challenge of relations with the US much more complex and sensitive.
The most explosive and sensitive issue facing the Americans at the moment is not exactly issues such as the nuclear issue in Iran or the American presence in the region. More than anything, this is the Palestinian arena. That is why Netanyahu, who wants the security-political agenda vis-à-vis the US to be focused on the nuclear issue, is expected to be cautious on this issue.
It is likely that quite a few elements on the right who wish to see a fundamental change in the expansion of settlements in Judea and Samaria, the annexation of territories, the repeal of the law of secession, the severing of ties with the Palestinian Authority, the change of the status quo on the Temple Mount, and a number of other issues that stand at the core of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, may be disappointed by the more cautious and moderate line that is expected to be taken by the designated prime minister.
Bezalel Smotrich and Itamar Ben Gvir are not political novices, and it is likely that they are well aware of Netanyahu’s pragmatic practical history and the caution he has taken in the past on these issues in the face of reality. Therefore, they are supposed to try to establish this time a different equation of the significant lecturer of Netanyahu’s policy towards the right.
One can get the impression that Smotrich, designated for the position of a senior minister in the Israeli government, carefully chose his words when he attacked the Shin Bet for the activation of agent Avishai Raviv, which he claims led to the encouragement of the murder of the late Yitzhak Rabin. Despite the harsh criticism that was also heard from the right side of the political map, this was not a fluke or just a reminder of Smotrich’s position on the activities of the Jewish department in the Shin Bet. More than anything, this seems to be a signal to Netanyahu towards the guidelines for his view that the government in Judea and Samaria should act on, Even if they are against the position of the security establishment.
The Palestinian issue and the conduct in Judea and Samaria are expected to be at the heart of the internal struggles and crises of the next Israeli government. Netanyahu, most likely, is very aware of the fact that his voters, and in particular those of the religious Zionist party, which has gained significant political power, want to actually see the implementation of right-wing policies on the ground. But he also understands very well the political constraints and the international environment.
maintain stability
The position of Minister of Defense is considered one of the most important and prestigious in the Israeli government, but it is far from being a political bon ton for the person holding this complex file. Given that the next defense minister will not be Smotrich (although anything is possible), Gantz’s replacement may find himself, by virtue of his position, as the leftist marker of the next Israeli government, and as a convenient address for attacks from within the government itself.
For more than two and a half years, Gantz held the position of Minister of Defense in the governments of Israel. In a critical article I wrote in this column after he assumed the position of alternate prime minister and defense minister in a joint government with Netanyahu, I clarified that the defense system, after years of frequent changes and instability, first of all needs a full-time defense minister.
My opinion on the subject of the way in which a new concept in Israeli democracy of an alternate prime minister came to the world, has not changed. The way to circumvent legal limitations of appointing Netanyahu to the position of minister in the second part of the rotation that was allegedly planned, led to the creation of a new political mutation of an alternate prime minister. A move that does meet the definition of the law, but to a large extent led to a rapid evolution to a situation where in the Israeli system of government, a prime minister can hold only 6 mandates.
Almost three years later, and at the end of a considerable number of years during which the position was changed almost at the rate of changing socks, whether you are for or against the positions of the outgoing defense minister, the defense establishment in recent years has had a full-time defense minister. The Ministry of Defense itself stabilized after years of acting as substitutes in various positions, and very important procurement plans for the building of the army’s power were advanced after at least three years of delay. The Ministry of Defense even played an important role in strengthening security ties with the Gulf countries and tightening cooperation with the US.
In other matters, the security system, after years of malfunctions and terrible bureaucracy in the treatment of the disabled in the IDF, woke up from its slumber. Admittedly, this happened very late, only after Itzik Saidian, who became the symbol of the struggle, set himself on fire and fought for his life for months, but from that point on, a change took place Distinctive in the attitude and policy regarding the treatment of the disabled in the IDF. Even the decision to move Amman to the south, despite the reservations of the army and the chief of staff due to fear of a manpower crisis, can be attributed to the defense minister.
In very complex years, the outgoing defense minister worked to distance the army from the heart of the political debate in Israel. The army was backed up and there were no major upheavals in the relations at the top of the defense. On the other hand, there are those who believe that the army, as a hegemony and great public powers, needs more supervision and criticism from the government and in particular from the minister in charge. The same is true of decisions made by Chief of Staff Aviv Kochavi on budget issues and a multi-year plan, which was announced and launched before being approved by the political echelon.
The question of the strengths of the Ministry of Defense and the ability to influence as an intermediary between the political echelon and the great power that the IDF has as a professional body that greatly influences the decision-making of the political echelon, is an unsolved issue, which will probably not change even in the term of the next Minister of Defense. He too will probably find himself Busy above all with the continuation of the escalation and terrorism in the Palestinian arena.
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