A Black Hole in the Heart of Europe. Old Strategies Don’t Work Anymore

by time news

by Paolo Valentino

There is a double political crisis that is paralyzing Germany and France, the two countries that for better or for worse have been the true center of gravity of the Union

And autumn urpe. It is the beginning of a new legislature like perhaps never seen in the memory of the community, that of the European Union. Difficult, complex, but above all dramatic on a political level. The new Commission is taking shape, still under the leadership of Ursula von der Leyen, who has already lost the battle for gender equality (at best she will only have about ten women in the college of 27) and is now preparing for a Cencelli-style balancing act in the distribution of roles. The European Parliament is sharpening its weapons, where on the one hand the pro-European majority, reconfirmed but weakened by the June elections, is preparing for the ritual of hearings that every five years allows it an almost situationist act, that is, the possible rejection of individual commissioners. And on the other, a sovereign right, stronger yet more fragmented, is ready to claim its place in the sun.

But it is the European picture in general that is causing the greatest concern, catalysing fears, instability and great uncertainties. There is a black hole today in the heart of Europe, grappling with the double political crisis that is paralyzing Germany and Francethe two countries that for better or for worse have been the true center of gravity of the Union, if not the most important engine, certainly the essential reference point for every point of balance and progress of common action. In completely different ways, the advance of right-wing populist forces in both countries has been the detonator that has literally shattered their respective political landscapes.

In Germany, a quarrelsome and weak government led by a chancellor without qualities seems to be at the end of the line, after the vote in Thuringia and Saxony, marked by the victory of the ultranationalist, xenophobic and pro-Russian Afd, which was matched by the affirmation of the left-wing populists, also pro-Putin, of Sahra Wagenknecht’s BSW. The vote on September 22 in Brandenburg, where Olaf Scholz’s SPD has governed since 1990, could sound the death knell. For him, if not for the entire government, composed of social democrats, greens and liberals.

In France, only the electoral system and the unnatural alliance between the left and the liberal center have stopped Marine Le Pen’s Rassemblement National, which nevertheless has 25% of the seats in Parliament. But the interminable time that Emmanuel Macron needed to appoint a prime minister speaks of a paralyzed system and unpredictable developments, including the scenario of the early resignation of the President of the Republic himself.

The question is the same for both countries: how to stop the extremist wave? So far, the solution in the two countries has been to form cordons sanitaires, giving rise to alliances or, in the case of some German Laender, hybrid majorities, which then don’t work.fueling dissatisfaction and resentment which, in a vicious circle, transform into new consensus for the sovereignist parties.

Does this mean that the sanitary cordon doesn’t work? Much depends on the degree of extremism of the forces in question. Italy has offered a model, that of the so-called melonization, which has seen the leader of Fratelli d’Italia moderate her intentions, accept constraints and compatibilities linked to the place of our country in Europe and the Western world.

Even in France, Marine Le Pen is attempting a complicated and arduous convergence to the center that could make her acceptable to a majority of French people in a presidential election. But it is not certain that she will succeed.

The real problem is Germany, where AfD wants to be anti-system, has a close relationship with Putin’s Russia and above all, according to the assessment of civil intelligence, is dominated by “proven extremists” and represents a constitutional threat. What and on what should we negotiate with a force that among other things has not abandoned the idea of ​​leaving the Union, fights every idea of ​​integration, asks for separate classes for the disabled? Which does not mean ignoring the fears that fuel their success. Starting with immigration, now out of control in Germany and Europe.

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