On February 24, 2022, Russia invaded Ukraine in a move that surprised many. At the end of a year since the war, which led to an upheaval in Europe and the world in general, it is possible to highlight a number of strategic and operative lessons, which may have implications for the future of modern warfare. Israel must learn the lessons of the war, and build its strength and strategy on the basis of these lessons.
Extensions and interviews with MKs, experts and security personnel from Israel and the world will be given on March 1, at a conference of the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS) in collaboration with Kaan News
Strategic lessons – war in the 21st century
Ukraine received strong American support from the beginning of the war. Biden’s recent visit to Ukraine even strengthened the image of American commitment. The past year has illustrated even more strongly that strong support is a critical component, even if it does not stand alone. In the war in Ukraine, the powerful American backing was a key factor, which provided breathing space for Ukraine, the warring country. The US provided financial support and military means, as well as moral and ethical support which influenced world opinion. But in the end, Ukraine was left alone in the military campaign against Russia. In addition, after it was clear that Ukraine was not defeated but fighting – the powerful support increased. Which illustrates the importance of the independence of the warring state, alongside the powerful support.
Despite the perception that took root before the war and in its first stages, the West and the democratic world proved its strength to a great extent. In the course of a year, the West was not broken, the European armies were greatly strengthened, and the determination of the West to take a risk and stand on the Ukrainian side was revealed, despite the prices the Europeans were required to pay. The accession of Sweden and Finland to the NATO alliance strengthened the organization and its importance as a strategic defense alliance in a world where war is still relevant.
The campaign in Ukraine also highlighted the importance of social cohesion and internal resilience as a decisive element in the war. The Ukrainian social resilience created military resilience and conversely, this can be seen in its involvement in social networks which influenced the world opinion on the war, in the encouragement and support of the population in the army and in the commitment of the civilian population to the fighting. An example of this is the famous case of the downing of a Russian drone by throwing a jar of pickles, by a Ukrainian woman. The high involvement of the civilian population led to the formation of an independent, cohesive and patriotic nation, this is in contrast to the lack of support and the low recruitment rates of the Russian population for the Russian army which contributed to its weakness, in a way that emphasizes the fact that national resilience is a central component of the strength of national security.
When we came to examine the instruments of influence of the international community, we received further proof of the limitations of sanctions in influencing war in the short term. Despite the unprecedented sanctions on Russia, it is holding its own and this did not affect the outcome of the battle. However, we see in the future the possibility of a significant weakening of the Russian state, and an influence on the regime. Therefore, the time frame for the effectiveness of state-sponsored economic sanctions is long. However, it should be noted that in recent years Russia has prepared for these sanctions and has reduced its reliance on economic ties with the West, in a way that helps it “stay with its head above water”.
In the war in Ukraine, the transformation of the private sector into an essential element in the strategy of war and peace manifested itself in a precedent manner. The decision of huge companies to leave Russia on their own accord out of a value consideration, as voluntary sanctions on Russia, Elon Musk’s decision to provide communications to Ukraine and later his demand to take part in the processes of ending the war, are a consequence of the new world in which the private sector has increasing power. Today there are civilian firms with significant economic and technological power than states. The tools of voluntary regulation they used were part of the significant pressure exerted on the Russian regime.
The building blocks of power in modern warfare
The campaign in Ukraine proved the importance of intelligence for warning in particular, and intelligence as a critical component throughout the life of the war. Already at the end of 2021, Ukrainian warnings were revealed in the face of the accumulation of Russian military forces, which was detected beyond the eastern border of Ukraine. Ukrainian military intelligence was even the first to reveal a map that indicated possible directions from which the attack against Ukraine would be carried out. The advance warning allowed Ukraine to prepare for the upcoming campaign, recover faster and foil the Russian ruse. It can be seen that the investment in the intelligence capability, which is a powerful capability, normally, pays for itself in an emergency.
The war also proved that cyber is not a doomsday weapon as it is sometimes perceived. The war in Ukraine is considered the “First World Cyber War”, with Russia’s many and varied actions in the digital space to thwart Ukraine’s political infrastructure, including Russian hackers taking over the network of the nuclear energy company in Ukraine. However, in practice it seems that cyber was a complementary element, not sufficient to change the campaign by itself, but as an additional operative layer that must be taken into account.
The refinement of the innovative force structure, the use of innovative technology, and in particular the reliance on UAVs, did not significantly affect the results of the campaign on the battlefield. The known principles and techniques are still relevant: depth in defense, combination of artillery in defense and attack, close-range anti-aircraft defense, maneuvering and camouflage, etc. . These proved that the classic battlefield is still relevant and there is still no alternative to ground action.
In Russia, Putin was misled by the military that they would easily succeed in conquering the Ukrainian state – and thus the leader suffered a major strategic surprise. The Russian generals claimed this against the background of the success of the conquest of the Crimean Peninsula, a much easier challenge, and due to a culture of lying and a lack of sharp and critical discussion between the military and political echelons. This is how the great weakness of totalitarian charismatic leadership is manifested. This emphasizes and sharpens the importance of the supervision of the political level over the military and security level, with the understanding that the security level has an interest in strengthening its power and status.
The psychological component of the war stood out more strongly as well, with Zelensky’s success in garnering sympathy around the world. It started with his appearances in the media and the drama he created at the beginning of the war, and continued through the diplomacy of activating pressure groups around the world and on social networks. Against this, the Russian failure to influence the West stands out – despite the many attempts, it seems that the consumption of information in the Western countries has dulled the sensitivity to Russian propaganda and attempts at deception. In contrast, the public in Russia bought the narrative of a war against the Nazis. It is admittedly a partial success that was not converted into military commitment, but in general among the general Russian public, Putin succeeded in assimilating the narrative.
Lessons for Israel
Israel needs to learn from the war in Ukraine, and assimilate the various lessons in the building of military power as well as in its political strategy:
1) The powerful American support for Israel is critical, as a layer that will provide a protective envelope and legitimacy for Israel when needed, but does not make the need for Israeli independence redundant.
2) Israel must remain in the “democracy camp”, with the understanding that this is not a fading camp, but a camp whose strength has been proven in the past year.
3) Israel’s social resilience, which is being undermined these days in the face of the political controversy, constitutes a dramatic pillar in its national security as we saw in the war in Ukraine – and this must be taken into account.
4) The economic sanctions, both under the auspices of the UN and the voluntary ones under the auspices of the private sector, have a growing influence, Israel must take into account the possible effects of these sanctions on the Israeli economy in the face of various actions that the governments of Israel decide to carry out.
5) Israel’s operative plans must be examined – emphasizing the importance of intelligence for deterrence, cyber as a complementary operative element, and a balance between the old and new battlefield elements.
6) Against the background of the memorandum of understanding that was agreed upon in recent days between the Treasury and the IDF, the question of the supervision of the political level over the security level must be deepened, although there is no fear of processes similar to those that took place in totalitarian Russia – mechanisms are still lacking in the Israeli system that would ensure optimal direction and supervision of the political level on the security level.
7) And finally, the security establishment, in cooperation with the political echelon, must examine and deepen Israel’s strategy of consciousness, understanding that this is a campaign-shaping element.
Extensions and interviews with MKs, experts and security personnel from Israel and the world will be given on March 1, at a conference of the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS) in collaboration with Kaan News
Acting General Tamir Himan is the director of the Institute for National Security Studies inss, former head of AMN