Something bad has been happening to the Hezbollah organization in recent weeks: its drones have been shot down one after another, it has been caught twice spreading false and inferior propaganda, and even the Lebanese government, its own government, expresses open reservations about its provocations in Israel. But all of this is not necessarily good news for us .
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The one who was burned in Ruthin in July 2006, was very careful in Tsonnin in the 16 years that have passed since the Second Lebanon War. Hezbollah was very calculated in the risks it took during this period, and our northern border enjoyed almost complete peace. Even if in 2019 he toyed for a moment with the idea of re-igniting the line of confrontation in the north, the explosion at the port of Beirut came in 2020, and Hezbollah found itself on the defensive in front of the Lebanese public, who demanded that it clarify whether it was a “protector of Lebanon” or an Iranian agent.
Added to this were four years of “maximum pressure” of the sanctions imposed by President Donald Trump on Iran, combined with the complete bankruptcy of the Lebanese state, and together eroded Hezbollah’s assets, both material and political. In the eyes of many Lebanese, he is seen as the one responsible for the disintegration of the country and as the one blocking any chance of outside aid, and some even dare to express this understanding in more blunt words than ever before. But in recent weeks it is evident that Hezbollah sees the agreement being formed with Israel on the marking of the maritime border line as an opportunity to reassert its position as Lebanon’s protector. Hezbollah is trying to position itself as the only one that will stop the Lebanese government from giving up Lebanese assets to Israel.
His actions so far in front of the “Shark” rig appear to be a calculated risk: sending unmanned drones in an attempt to photograph the rig and present an image achievement. But the downing of the drones put him in trouble: first he published a video taken from a letter on Channel 12 as if it had been filmed by him, then He was forced to reveal that his fourth UAV had been shot down, although Israel did not disclose the incident, and finally tried to boast of shooting down an Israeli drone, a claim that was quickly refuted by the IDF.
The erosion of the organization’s credibility, which it has traditionally been careful to maintain and be proud of, is a sign of desperation – and desperation may herald Hezbollah’s willingness to take greater risks. The “Shark” rig is a vulnerable site, and it is tempting to turn it into a bone of contention, even though the Lebanese government also agrees that it is not even close to the disputed border line.
Unlike in the Leviathan gas reservoir drilling, where there was a drilling rig that connected a pipe between the gas well on the seabed to the production rig near the shore and went on its way, in the “Shark” drilling there is a rig that will remain above the well in the middle of the sea for the next 20 years. It’s not exactly a rig, but a floating production ship (FPSO) that positioned itself above the gas well and dropped 12 anchors. It is the one that, starting in September, will pump the large gas reservoir (about 40 billion cubic meters) and flow it through a pipeline to the rig in front of Dor Beach.
It will not only be a production rig but also an unloading port. The “Shark” reservoir also contains a substance called condensate – condensed natural gas, which is a flammable and efficient fuel almost at the same level as gasoline. The ship will pump it, store it, and every few weeks another ship will dock next to it to which the fuel will be transferred. It is already a soft and vulnerable target, located about 90 km from the coast of Israel, and defending it will not be easy.
The Navy currently has one ship on which a naval iron dome has been installed. The two new defense ships – model Sa’ar 6 – are only at the beginning of the process of installing operational systems and capabilities, and will only become operational in a long time. Israel does not have the ability to maintain a permanent iron dome attached to the rig, so its defense depends on the intelligence’s ability to warn of a planned attack. So far the intelligence has proven itself, but if Hezbollah decides to launch a volley of Yakhont coastal missiles – even an intelligence warning will not be able to prevent damage to the strategic site.
The documentation from Hezbollah’s drone. Photo: Arab Networks
The ground threat
The erosion of the funding that Iran transfers to Hezbollah and its political status has slowed down the organization’s strengthening process but has not stopped it. In addition to the precision capabilities that Hezbollah is slowly but steadily accumulating, a ground capability has been built that should worry Israel more: Hezbollah’s Rachwan forces, which are stationed across the border, are ready to go into action a few hours from the moment the order is given. These forces have an orderly plan and the ability to occupy an Israeli settlement in a few hours.
Faced with this ability, the IDF began to fortify the barrier along the northern border, but slowly and modestly. The entire project – the construction of an advanced barrier along 130 km from the head of the Nakra to Metola – will cost about NIS 3 billion and will take about three years to build. In the meantime, the IDF is relying on the high intelligence capability it has developed against Hezbollah. All the large exercises conducted in recent years assumed a scenario of deterioration, in which the IDF has time to gather a force that will promote a ground attack by Hezbollah. But what if Hezbollah emerges unexpectedly?
The IDF must assume the aggravating scenario of a basic surprise and prepare for it. With the amount of tasks assigned to the IDF, it does not have the ability to permanently maintain a ground force in the north on a scale that would be able to repel a Hezbollah attack. But he can set up a permanent fire array there, one that can destroy any village from which a Rachuan attack emanates. Such a proven ability, which will also be demonstrated in exercises, will be able to create a deterrence equation that will make Hezbollah think twice before launching a ground attack.
Israel has not experienced the occupation of a settlement by its residents since the War of Independence. It is doubtful whether today’s Israeli society is capable of containing such an event, where Hezbollah will take over a settlement for a few days, and when it leaves – will also take a few citizens captive with it. This is an event that will engrave a deep scar in the Israeli mentality, which no subsequent firefight or offensive maneuver will be able to erase.
While we are building an offensive option against Iran, it is equally important to strengthen the defensive capacity. When we see the scope and skill of the force that Hezbollah is building north of our border, we must prepare for the case in which it surprises us. Hezbollah has already surprised us many times – in the kidnapping in Mount Dov in 2000, in the kidnapping in 2006 – the working assumption should be that it may surprise again.
The writer is the military commentator of News 13
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