Naftali Bennett’s rhetoric belongs to the political campaign, not to Israel’s ongoing campaign against Iran. “A turning point,” as he called the past year. Even if it is accurate, and this is indeed a turning point in the strategic and operational aspects, this is not a turning point in the level of chatter. Not turning enough. Benjamin Netanyahu tended to sail on Iranian affairs whenever it served him politically. Now it turns out that Naftali Bennett is also prone to this. A suspicious correlation is revealed between the approaching elections and the intensity of the growing threat.
Here is the turning point: “The days of immunity, in which Iran repeatedly attacks Israel and spreads terrorism through its affiliates in the region, but remains unharmed – are over.” Indeed, in this Israel raised a gear, as Bennett put it. The Iranians understand that they will absorb in their own home as well, and not just in backyards like Syria and Lebanon. They are more comfortable acting through messengers, less comfortable they are endangering themselves. Israel insists: If you continue on your way, you will also endanger yourself. Israel warns: We will also act within Iran. Warns in deeds – so according to foreign publications.
And as a result, most of the talk is unnecessary. A mysterious explosion in Tehran makes it clear to the Iranians what they want to clarify. Rahav’s words in the Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee do not clarify but burn. They force the Iranians to respond with their own arrogant words, and later, presumably, also in the realization of their share. No, they probably will not “flatten Tel Aviv and Haifa,” as one of the Iranian army commanders warned this week – but they can cause damage. And Bennett, who with one hand sends them a message of restraint, sends with his other hand a message that almost forces a response on them.
It has not been a successful week for Bennett, but it is precisely in the Iranian arena that positive progress has been made that there was no reason to spoil. While there is nothing yawning, in readers and writers, more than the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), nevertheless, the move it made this week, when it criticized Iran, explicitly stated that it does not provide plausible explanations for uranium remains discovered where they were not supposed to be, It’s rolling that it’s hard to predict its end. It could lead to more sanctions. It certainly complicates negotiations for an agreement, making it difficult for the powers to ignore Tehran’s mask of lies. It already has, the Americans have published, enough fissile material for three bombs. This requires precision: the material is there, the enrichment has not yet risen to the level of a bomb. 60%, not 90%. How long will it take her to ascend this step as well? Probably no more than a few days. If you decide to break the tools.
Will you decide to break the tools? The ongoing campaign reinforces the sense that the Iranian challenge is not a challenge that ends in a catastrophic doomsday, whose date is approaching hour by hour. Not the area of Tel Aviv, nor the erasure of Tehran. It is a challenge of mutual attrition, a game about points, and without a referee whistling for a finish. Iran hopes that in the end Israel will play, until it breaks. Israel hopes that in the end Iran – or rather, the repressive police – will be eroded, until it breaks. A mirror image of expectations, a mirror image of actions. Chess without matte option.
Whose problem
It’s worth listening to the remarks of India’s foreign minister last week at a conference in Bratislava, and perhaps even thinking about them. What about us and this? What about us and faraway India, what about us and the remote Bratislava? Here is what he said: “It is time for Europe to mature from the state of mind in which it is as if the problems of Europe are the problems of the world.”
And perhaps, in Israeli translation: the time has come for us too to grow out of the state of consciousness in which Israel’s problems are the problems of the world.
The Indian foreign minister has denied reports that traders in his country are laundering Russian oil on the way to world markets. India does not serve as Russia’s agent, and on the other hand, is also not keen on cooperating with the sanctions regime that the Americans and Europeans have imposed on the Russians because of the invasion of Ukraine.
Here, this is the explanation: in the eyes of the Indians, the days were gone when a problem of Europe was necessarily a problem of the whole world. To the Indians, the Russian invasion of Ukraine is a European problem. Let the Europeans solve it. Two years ago, the foreign minister mentioned, when China sent forces to attack the Indian border, Europeans had no particular interest in intervening in the crisis. In the same way, India has no interest in intervening. Because either all the problems are everyone’s problems, or each problem only interests those who live in the area. And Ukraine is not around.
Of course, Iran is not exactly around either. In fact, in the case of India, it is a bit more of an environment. India’s history, vague as it may be, is woven into Iran’s history. But in the case of China, Iran is a little less close, and in the case of the United States, not at all close. Which begs the question: Whose Iranian problem is it? The threat of extermination is not a justification. Even because the extermination of Israel is not a problem of the world, it is a problem of Israel. For many hollow.
Former Mossad chief Tamir Pardo, who joined the Institute for Jewish People’s Policy as a senior fellow this week, said at a conference of the institute that the era of discounts for Israel has ended. Forever, Fredo said, Israel’s patience will soon run out, as strong as Popeye and desperate for help like Olive.
So what could be the rationale? The IAEA’s activity is key to understanding a key rationale. Let them decide that if Iran is allowed, they are allowed too. It is agreed on everything, or almost everything, that after Iran will come Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, in one order or another. If Iran arm itself, it will arm itself. And then why not more countries to come as well, as in the Domino theory of the Cold War days? Countries like Taiwan or like Japan will recognize an opportunity. The Japanese will understand that they cannot rely on the American defense umbrella. Taiwanese will decide to take a risk in order to remain independent. These two are the headache of the Chinese. Therefore, they may motivate China to consider the need to stop the Iranians. Not a lover of Israel. Not from hating Iran. Concern for China. Not for reasons of morality – for reasons of usefulness.
A sacred area
Holiness is “the space from which an instrument is not made,” which is not used as an instrument. This is a definition formulated this week by the professor of philosophy, Moshe Halbertl, at a conference we mentioned, on morality and policy. From the definition arises a question: What is the sacred space of our society? And translated into practical language, perhaps a little simplistic: what do we not do even if it may benefit us?
Here is a script. Fiction of course. An Iranian scientist walks down the street. A motorcycle passes him and the rider pulls out a gun and shoots him. What is the sin of the scientist, an exemplary family man, a devoted father to his children, a friend to his friends, a good neighbor to his neighbors? Perhaps he has in mind solutions to complex missile flight questions. Maybe he understands how to make compounds of metals so that they can withstand the heavy pressures of a fission chain. His interest is in science, not in strategy, not in politics, not in Islamic radicalism. He has nothing and a half against Israel. He is simply interested in ballistics, and in order to engage in his field he has no escape from the service of the needs of his country. Is he a mortal?
Here is a question that can be addressed in seminars. Perhaps it will actually provide the Iranians with the key that will bounce them to a level of development that Israel cannot tolerate.
Perhaps he is a mortal, because his death will intimidate other scientists, who will hesitate in choosing their areas of expertise, thus making it difficult for the Iranian system to man the jobs it needs. Perhaps every Iranian who serves the Iranian government is a mortal. This is of course a far-reaching statement, but it can also be defended. Attach a moral reasoning to it.
It was interesting to understand whether the Iranians, when they set out to strike Israel, also ask themselves questions about morality and policy. Not sure it’s important. Perhaps Israel should engage in such questions without asking itself what the position of its enemies is. But history, and perhaps also logic, teaches that attitude entails attitude. He who is slaughtered by his enemies will show a tendency to slaughter them. Whoever suspects that he will end up being massacred by his enemies will find a tendency to remove from his hands cables of restraint. This is true for the whole world, it is also true for Israel. We asked the Jewish residents of Israel how the IDF should conduct the battle. The answer was clear: to win. Of course – it is desirable to win without harming someone who does not have to harm him. But it is very undesirable to lose.
Which leads us to the data presented at the conference. Data that are an invitation to an argument. This is a debate that goes down to the roots of the existence of the State of Israel. Debate over the question of whether the purpose of Zionism is to normalize the Jews, and to do so for all peoples, or whether its purpose is to give them a place of refuge where they will continue to be special and different. How exactly are they different? For example, they differ in that they base their foreign and security policies on moral values. Maybe not always, but more than others.
The State of Israel, according to the Declaration of Independence, “will be founded on the foundations of freedom, justice and peace in light of the vision of the prophets of Israel.” It is a beautiful wording, which hides behind very few practical guidelines for action. How do you establish a state on the “foundations of freedom, justice and peace”, how do you realize the “vision of the prophets of Israel” (each of whom had a slightly different vision)? An example is given: Israel must decide how to deal with Ukraine and Russia at war. Is there in the vision of the prophets of Israel practical advice on how to do this? And what is this advice? Another example is given: Poland passed a law that denies rights to Holocaust survivors, is there in the vision of the prophets of Israel practical advice on how to respond?
These are questions that have been examined in the world of action, lately. Tested – and also get some kind of response. Last week we mentioned two such responses. How Israel came down from the tree against Poland, even though the Poles did not change the “Polish law” concerning Holocaust survivors, and how the US on its way down from the tree against Saudi Arabia, even though it did not come for its punishment after the horrific murder of journalist Jamal Khushkji. And America has chosen a little less morality, and a little more political realism. This is probably what the majority of the Israeli public probably chooses, a choice that is worth dwelling on, because it has a dimension of internal contradiction.
On the one hand, as revealed in the index survey, 65% of the (Jewish) public in Israel believe that Israel is more moral than the rest of the world. 72% of the (Jewish) public believe that the IDF is the most moral army in the world. On the other hand – there is also a second side. The IDF must win. And if the public recognizes the possibility of difficulty winning because of a moral problem of harming innocent people, they prefer victory. Yes – “try not to hurt the innocent”, this is what the majority (66%) prefer. No – only 20% of the public will agree to a “less unequivocal victory”, not to mention a “loss” (2%), in order to maintain an innocent life on the other side of the barricade.
The bottom line is clear: one has to balance considerations of interests with considerations of morality, but with a clear priority for interests. Only 2% of the public will agree to a policy that is entirely moral. 13% will agree to a policy that is full of interests. Balance is the king’s way: a lot of interests and a little morality, or a lot of morals and a little interest, or equally. Each matter according to its importance, according to the benefit to Israel and according to the moral price.
Index survey (Photo: Maariv Online)We asked about the following scenario: “A European country that supports Israel, sells products to it, and maintains relations with it, passes a law that prohibits transferring more money from the state to Holocaust survivors who have lost property in it. What should Israel do?” 60% said not to harm the Israeli interest. It may be possible to protest, but only if it does not endanger the relationship. We asked: Should we sell spyware to an Arab country? And again, these would mean that you have to spend for these processes. Sell, but under restrictions. This is what was overwhelming the majority. Fredo, who viewed the survey findings, said that the Israelis who responded to him responded to the questions as if they were living in a volatile Israel in the spirit of 1966 or 1973.
There are large gaps in the decisions of right and left voters. The right speaks in the language of interests, the left in the language of values. This can be misleading, creating the impression of disagreement between equals. But the lumps are not equal. The Jewish-Israeli majority is a center-right and a center-right majority, and this majority (78% and 60%, respectively) chooses a policy of “interests,” or “interests with exceptions in the event of a serious violation of morality.” The president of the Jewish People’s Policy Institute, Prof. Yedidya Stern, believes this is a problem. This week he wrote: “The Jewish nation-state is supposed to express its Jewish character in its foreign and security policy through the manifestation of a moral sensitivity that has characterized the Jews since time immemorial.”
In fact, it’s a problem upon a problem. Not only does the Jewish majority disagree with his position, but it turns out that the more Jews consider the “Judaism” of the state as a central consideration in shaping its policies, the less they agree with it.
Here, the argument we mentioned, and which touches on the roots of our existence here. Existence as grades, who may just want to be normal. Existence as Jews, among whom there is no agreement on the question of what exactly obliges them the elusive concept of “Jewish morality.” Prof. Stern writes: “The moral sensitivity that characterized the Jews.” It is like writing “in light of the vision of the prophets of Israel.” A beautiful, poetic statement, from which it is not always clear what is derived from it in the field of policy.
This week we used information and data from the Jewish People’s Policy Institute, the index website, the Wall Street Journal and the New York Times, and the Pio and Gallup polling institutes.