We no longer discuss the Cyprus issue much. Even though it was once one of the topics that played a catalytic role in the way modern Greek history evolved. However, it seems like it does not weigh as heavily on our collective thought anymore. Although, let’s not forget, Cyprus, a member country of the UN and the European Union, remains divided, with part of it still under a condition of illegal occupation, and the prospect of reunification, in any form, still seems distant.
Beyond Simplistic Narratives
Of course, the truth is that even when we discussed it, we often did so in a somewhat simplistic manner. The narrative was simple: at some point, Turkey, which always considered Cyprus as its territory, decided to invade.
Obviously, to some extent, the narrative is valid: a part of Turkish nationalism was that “Cyprus is Turkish,” and indeed, Attila 1 and Attila 2 were illegal and brutal invasions.
However, as is often the case with “narratives,” they do not tell the whole story…
Because in Cyprus, the demand for Enosis, which explosively came to the fore with the uprising of 1931, the famous “October Events,” and the burning of the Governor’s Palace in Nicosia, had a strong anti-colonial character, but simultaneously overlooked that there were also Turkish Cypriots on the island.
A role in this was played by the fact that the forces that led the struggle for Enosis at various times had both intense nationalism and anti-communism. In Cyprus, supporters of Grivas viewed him as a figure of struggle, yet he also served as the leader of “X,” a nationalist and anti-communist organization that had a specific role in the Greek Civil War.
Ultimately, the EOKA included Gregory Afxentiou and Evagoras Pallikaridis in its ranks but also Nikos Sampson, the later tragic head of the coup government. After all, Grivas and EOKA from the beginning chose a two-front struggle against both the British and the leftists and communists. Leftist fighters Michalis Petrou and Ilias Ttofari were murdered by EOKA members on January 21, 1958.
Essentially, the need for a partnership with the Turkish Cypriot community was systematically underestimated, leaving plenty of room for Turkey to exploit this fact, but even the prospect of independence was not examined in its entirety, even though, in reality, it was the only feasible solution to break away from colonialism. And it gradually became apparent that this was also preferred by the Cypriot economic elites as they secured a state where they would have a voice instead of being in a subordinate position in Greek society.
The British policy also played a role in all this. We must not forget the brutality of its colonial policy. The “imprisoned graves” remind us that they did not even respect the right of the executed to have a proper burial in their homeland. Furthermore, they played a significant role in cultivating discord among the communities (betting on “divide and rule”), investing in the Turkish Cypriots developing strong national consciousness and obviously insisting on the logic of “guarantees” that ensured their continuous presence through military bases.
The Contradictory Path of the Republic of Cyprus
The result was that we had the very problematic situation shaped by the Zurich and London agreements, which formed the unacceptable regime of guarantees, that is, a de facto condition of “reduced sovereignty” that simultaneously gave the two “motherlands” the opportunity – and formally… – for all sorts of interventions in the internal affairs of the young Republic of Cyprus.
And while the young Republic of Cyprus joined the Non-Aligned Movement, a product of the anti-colonial struggles, and Makarios, despite his origins in a very conservative and nationalist environment, sometimes echoed the “anti-imperialist” rhetoric of the time, we must also remember that the “push” of the Turkish Cypriot community in the 1960s began when, after the conflicts of 1963-1964, Turkish Cypriots gathered in the formed “enclaves.” Conflicts that began when Makarios, with the “13 points,” for which he had the initial support of the British, sought to amend the constitutional framework in terms that effectively downgraded the position of the Turkish Cypriots in the governance of the Republic of Cyprus.
Part of the confrontations throughout the period up to 1974 included paramilitary organizations that did not hesitate to murder even members of their “own” community. The leftist trade unionist Derviş Kavazoğlu, along with the Greek Cypriot Kostas Misiavoutis, was murdered by Turkish Cypriots from the paramilitary-terrorist organization TMT, which was established in 1958 as a counter-flame to EOKA. At the hands of Greek Cypriots from EOKA B, student Kyriakos Papalazarou was murdered in Paphos.
The Road to Invasion
Obviously, at a certain point, Turkey’s change in strategy plays a role. What would later be recorded as “revisionism” regarding geopolitics, that is, the perception that the balances of the Treaty of Lausanne and those that followed “wronged” Turkey, appeared already in the 1950s, directly affecting the Cyprus issue, as it is clear that Turkey was now oriented not only towards preventing Enosis but also ensuring that even independence would be a prelude to a variation of “double union.”
The international factor also played a role in all of this. Not in the simplistic way we often discussed in Greece, that is, the perception that the USA was always with Turkey and orchestrated Turkish maneuvers until the invasion. But certainly in the way that a certain suspicion towards the foreign policy of the young Republic of Cyprus created concerns about the direction that the “unsinkable aircraft carrier” would take. As a result, both the Greek Junta, when it orchestrated the coup, and the Turkish government, when it chose the path of invasion, believed they would have, if not support, at least the tolerance of the USA regarding their choices.
And while we must continuously emphasize that the situation in Cyprus is not the result of a “confrontation of communities,” but of a brutal and illegal invasion, we should also not forget that the pretext for the invasion was provided by the decision of the Athens Junta, specifically at the stage when the “invisible dictator” Ioannidis was dominating to collaborate with the far-right elements of EOKA B in the coup to overthrow Makarios.
We know the continuation: the coup failed, primarily because Makarios escaped and was able to deliver the historic speech that began with “Greek Cypriot people, the voice you hear is familiar,” the Junta collapsed under the weight of its inability to respond to the invasion, Turkey with Attila 2 completed the occupation of the northern part of the island, and we entered the phase of negotiations for a possible resolution.
Negotiations that very soon coalesced into the multifaceted formula of a bi-zonal and bi-communal federation, which in reality sought to transcend the de facto division by fully legitimizing it.
All these were also influenced by Greek-Turkish relations, with periods of tension sometimes translating into a corresponding deterioration in the situation in Cyprus.
At the same time, it became clear that the issue of settlers created an additional problem, especially after the declaration of the “Pseudo-State” in 1983, what is now referred to as the “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus.” However, it was not only that; the problem was that gradually trends were forming on both sides of the “green line” that even if they did not admit it, were aiming at a partition.
The Difficult Search for a Solution
The proposals coming from the “international community” sought to combine the transcendence of the division with the opposing dynamics that were forming within the two communities. The culmination was the “Annan Plan,” which while it seemed to provide for the first time a seemingly feasible solution, simultaneously formed a condition of “reduced sovereignty” and “tutelage” that led to its rejection by the Greek Cypriot side, despite being accepted by the Turkish Cypriot side. In reality, the Annan Plan created a state so difficult to govern that many warned it sowed the seeds of new tension, potential ungovernability, and new conflicts.
Of course, it was also the period immediately following Cyprus’s accession to the EU, which of course proved that it was not sufficient on its own to resolve the problem. On the contrary, a sense that Cyprus could serve as a point of reference for the establishment of offshore companies within the EU and for “parking” oligarchs’ capital from countries like Russia became the starting point for illusions that both the economic crisis following 2008 and the new geopolitical divisions after 2014 disproved.
Not coincidentally, things began, especially after the collapse of the negotiations in Crans Montana, to lean much more towards the formal validation of partition. Ultimately, this is what was also affirmed by the shift of Turkish and occupying policies (in conflict with the desire of a significant part of the Turkish Cypriot community) towards the logic of a “two-state solution,” which effectively cancels even the prospect of a “bi-zonal bi-communal federation.” However, even on the Greek Cypriot side, there was the logic that “out-of-the-box” solutions to the bi-zonal – bi-communal federation were needed, in short, a version of partition with joint exploitation of hydrocarbon reserves (although to the extent that these become exploitable).
The Difficult Path of Coexistence
Throughout this journey, there were undoubtedly voices that leaned in the opposite direction. Those that would give meaning to the demand for independence through the coexistence and common struggle of the two communities beyond the pursuits of the “motherlands” (and where it needed to be against them), but also beyond various geopolitical rivalries. However, they could never become hegemonic or turn into a tangible plan, even when political forces that tried to represent such positions found themselves in government.
Does this mean some fatalism that things will ultimately lead to a variation of partition? No, because ultimately this would represent a compromise with something that continues to be a gross violation of any notion of international law, but also because it would leave the anxiety of many people unaddressed in the hope that some day this island could become a place of coexistence of a people with two communities but a common disposition to carve out its own autonomous historical course.