In the mid-nineties, I came to the Russian Foreign Ministry building on Smolenskaya Square in Moscow to talk with the late Sergei Prikhodko. The future deputy head of the presidential administration and deputy prime minister was then a democratic diplomat accessible to journalists, in charge of relations with the Baltic states.
Then Moscow, through the embassies in Riga and Tallinn, made an attempt to persuade residents of Latvia and Estonia, who received a “non-citizen passport” or took Russian citizenship, to move to Russia for permanent residence. The Izvestia newspaper, where I worked at that time, instructed me to deal with this topic.
Constantine Eggert
I remember Prikhodko then frankly said: “Nothing will come of it. People will remain there, even without citizenship. It’s still Europe, life is more predictable than ours, the conditions are definitely no worse, if not better, and even with a” non-citizen passport ” you can live quite well. “
Is COVID-19 “to blame”?
Since then, attempts have been made more than once to urge former Russians or those who have the right to Russian citizenship to move to their historical homeland. And now the Cabinet of Ministers is launching a new campaign to return the Russian emigrants. By his order, special visiting groups of employees of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Internal Affairs must by 2030 convince half a million foreign “compatriots” to move to Russia – an average of 50 thousand migrants a year. The government promises to partially compensate for the travel costs and provide benefits.
I will assume that the current campaign may be related to the COVID-19 pandemic. This is most likely an attempt to compensate for the damage done to the economy and demography by the high mortality rate from the coronavirus. It is high, even if we proceed from the official data. Many believe that they are very significantly underestimated by the Kremlin. Apparently, the Russian leadership hopes to attract money and talents to the country from those who once left Russia (or the perestroika USSR).
Putin creates his own version of Russian history
The topic of “compatriots abroad” also has an important political dimension. Vladimir Putin has been interested in her for a long time, since his second presidential term. At first he used it to influence public opinion in the West, to convince Europeans and Americans that “his” Russia is good just because it turned its back on communism. And certain disadvantages such as the wars in the North Caucasus, the trial of Khodorkovsky, the growing influence of special services and censorship in the media (however, incomparable with today’s) are costs that should not be paid attention to.
The Kremlin is seeking the transportation and burial in Moscow of the ashes of such heroes of the White emigration as General Anton Denikin and writer Ivan Shmelev. In 2007, with the active participation of the presidential administration, the emigrant Russian Orthodox Church Abroad signed the Act of Canonical Communion with the Russian Orthodox Church and became largely dependent on Moscow.
It was then that Putin managed to become a hero for many descendants of the first and second waves of emigration, creating for them the image of a modern Russian sovereign who finally put an end to the remnants of communism and at the same time remained loyal to the imperial great power.
In the future, everything related to compatriots became even more important for the president. Putin has begun to create his own version of Russian history, which should become the foundation of a new Russian civic identity. The main virtue in it is the loyalty of any government, be it the power of the emperor, the general secretary or the president. Because only the authorities are able to ensure sovereignty and “greatness” – that is, to make everyone feared “us” (Russia), and “us” (Russia) had nothing for it.
The idea of a “divided people” dominates Russian politics
After the start of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict in 2014, the ideas of the “Russian world” and the “divided people” became one of the foundations of isolationism, anti-democracy and anti-Westernism, dominating the politics and propaganda of the current regime. Putin is increasingly referring to the Russians as the largest “divided” nation. For him, this is, first of all, the rationale for the policy towards Ukraine, whose people, according to Putin, are almost indistinguishable from the Russian people. The Russian president sees himself as a symbol of the hopes of the Russian people, its world political leader.
There is no doubt that the campaign to attract “compatriots” to Russia will be accompanied by a propaganda campaign by Russian state media, including RT and Sputnik. Those who can be persuaded to return, upon arrival in Russia, will become the prey of the collective “Solovyov-Kiselev-Skabeeva”: left Estonia – “fled from Russophobes”, from France – from “Muslims”, from the United States – from “political correctness.”
“Our Crimea” – at a distance
There is no doubt that someone will succumb to the persuasion of the emissaries of Moscow and return to Russia. But, most likely, there will be few of them. The more or less successful will not want to radically change their existence. Moreover, even those who watch Russian TV and are present on Russian social networks curse the “decayed West” and admire Putin. I have seen many of them, but few of them are ready to sacrifice the advantages of living in the European Union, the United States or the democracies of South America – with all the disadvantages that exist everywhere.
It is much more pleasant and safer to talk about the fact that “Crimea is ours”, sitting with a neighbor on the balcony of a house in Miami, in the garden of a cottage near Estonian Parnu, or in a restaurant in Santiago de Chile: “You know, John (Jaan, Juan), your Biden (Kaljulaid, Piñera) is not a candle to our Putin. ” Only everything “your” suddenly becomes “ours” when it comes to teaching children, vacations, health insurance, doing business or litigation.
In the first half of the nineties, which the Kremlin now ordered to be considered “dashing”, many of those who once left the Brezhnev Soviet Union returned to Yeltsin’s Russia. It seemed then a land of endless possibilities. Someone succeeded, someone was disappointed and left again. But there were hopes and prospects, and they did not need to be stimulated by the seconded officers of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Freedom, law, security – this is a simple triad for attracting both “compatriots” and those wishing to immigrate in general. As long as life in Russia is not associated with these three concepts, the Kremlin’s efforts will change nothing.
Author: Konstantin Eggert is a Russian journalist, author of the weekly column on DW and the interview-project DW “vTRENDde”. Konstantin Eggert on Facebook: Konstantin Eggert, on Telegram: Oberleutnant_Eggert
The commentary expresses the personal opinion of the author. It may not coincide with the opinion of the Russian editorial staff and Deutsche Welle in general.
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