In a field such as deterrence where every word counts, those spoken by Emmanuel Macron, Wednesday October 12, on France 2, where the Head of State was questioned in particular on the possible response of France in the event of a Russian tactical nuclear strike on Ukrainian theatre, have been raising a number of questions for the past two days, particularly within specialist circles.
“France has a nuclear doctrine, and our doctrine is based on the fundamental interests of the nation, and they are defined very clearly”, began by recalling the Head of State. The concept of“fundamental interests” relating more to internal security, he commits here, in this first part of his answer, a surprising imprecision, the French doctrine speaking rather of“vital interests”. These are, moreover, not precisely defined, out of necessity, precisely, to maintain ambiguity, and therefore the force of deterrence.
But it is especially the second part of Mr. Macron’s response that has been casting doubt since Wednesday. About these vital interests, the Head of State continued: “This is not at all what would be in question if there were, for example, a nuclear ballistic attack in Ukraine or in the region. » “Wouldn’t that call for a nuclear response?” »then revives the journalist Caroline Roux, taken aback. “Obviously, that is not our doctrine today. We have a framework for us”replies Emmanuel Macron, indicating that it would only be a “historical responsibility” of Russia.
Verbal escalation
However, during a founding speech on the strategy of defense and deterrence delivered in February 2020 before the School of War, Mr. Macron had endeavored to define this famous notion. “Let’s be clear: the vital interests of France now have a European dimension”he had indicated, marking French public doctrine with its seal.
The remarks made by Mr. Macron on Wednesday evening are part of a verbal escalation on the subject of nuclear energy since the start of the war. In a complex game combining the desire to show Vladimir Putin that he is taken seriously, the desire to reassure the European countries which depend on the American nuclear shield in the name of “extended deterrence”, while trying to send warning to the Russian military hierarchy, the American president, Joe Biden, had, for example, mentioned on October 6 the risk “nuclear apocalypse”.
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