Funding for political projects does not normally arise overnight. Normally, every euro is a hard struggle in the federal budget. But these are not normal times. Within a few days, the Russian war of aggression in Ukraine prompted the German government to slaughter several energy and security policy sacred cows. These include the abandonment of Nord Stream 2, considerations of longer coal and nuclear power periods, deliveries of weapons to the crisis area and a planned special fund for the Bundeswehr in the amount of 100 billion euros.
In a special session of the Bundestag on Sunday, Chancellor Olaf Scholz (SPD) announced that he would provide a sum for the equipment of the Bundeswehr that is only possible outside of the regular federal budget. These investments are even to be secured by an amendment to the Basic Law. In future, regular military spending should also be based on NATO’s two percent mark, i.e. two percent of gross domestic product.
That would be the largest military spending since World War II. Scholz himself therefore spoke several times of a “turning point in time”. While some people are already jubilant that Germany has regained its former strength, one has to ask oneself: Who benefits from it? Cui bono? In any case, the shares of the armaments manufacturer Rheinmetall rose by around 40 percent after the special meeting. Consulting firms, into whose pockets a good part of the military budget flows, will also have been happy. As we now know after the consultant affair involving former Defense Minister Ursula von der Leyen (CDU), several hundred million euros are spent on McKinsey & Co every year.
It is doubtful whether the massive equipment will actually increase the efficiency of the Bundeswehr or Germany’s defensive capabilities. After all, military spending has risen steadily in recent years to 50 billion euros so far – and yet the current Defense Minister Christine Lambrecht (SPD) believes that the Bundeswehr has “bled dry”. In general, it is questionable whether and how security is increased by mutual upgrading. The opposite is probably the case: weapons are now being produced and ordered that can only be used in completely different applications in several years. The fact that the military is one of the most climate-damaging sectors makes matters worse.
The 100 billion euro package shows very clearly that Germany would have been able to act at any time, invest in renewable energies at an early stage and become independent of Russia (and others) in terms of energy policy. The various aid packages during the Corona crisis have already shown that a financial policy “bazooka” would be possible at any time, but in this case primarily served to rescue companies. In the case of the special fund, it is a reaction to the war, but it is an immediate investment that will only be noticeable in several years. Neither in the pandemic nor in the climate catastrophe are the external crises used in the same way to invest as a precaution through special funds. Apparently there is a lack of political will and the enforcement of economic interests at this point.
The federal government is currently willing to continue to adhere to the debt brake. In the event of higher future military spending, this means that savings must be made elsewhere. Finance Minister Christian Lindner (FDP) has already announced that other projects will have to be abandoned in the future. What is meant is probably social spending in particular. It is therefore to be feared that the terrible war in Ukraine will now have to be used to upgrade a military-industrial complex for years to come, with as yet unforeseen consequences, and at the same time to legitimize a new austerity course. In a few years we will then ask ourselves why we have not invested 100 billion euros in the energy transition. It would be possible at any time.