Tribune. The electoral campaign which is ending will at least have allowed an important clarification. By taking up the concept of ecological planning defended by Jean-Luc Mélenchon, Emmanuel Macron was able to surprise. And for good reason, at a time when the IPCC (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change) confirms its alarming forecasts in its 6e report, the President, who is standing for re-election, notes by this unexpected declaration the impasse of the strategy followed until now in terms of climate policy. The desire to entrust the market with the task of coordinating the energy transition has not made it possible to split our production and consumption systems. The economic chain reactions of the war in Ukraine provide a tragic opportunity to better understand the reasons.
The massive increase in energy prices that followed the attack on Ukraine introduced a de facto carbon tax. And the amount of this could be further increased if additional measures were taken on one side or the other to reduce imports of Russian hydrocarbons. But what is the effect of this price shock? Far from accelerating the transition, it has on the contrary slowed it down, opening up the catastrophic prospect of a lost decade for the climate. The European Commission, which was preparing to deploy the various components of its Green Deal, is now busy increasing deliveries of shale gas from the United States. For their part, national governments are multiplying subsidies to cushion the rise in fuel prices, while the restarting of coal-fired power stations is being considered. Developing countries are seeing their capacity for climate action reduced to ashes by the double impact of the Covid crisis and the indirect effects of the Ukrainian crisis. Minimizing the consequences of rising energy and raw material costs at all costs is becoming the new mantra. For the price of carbon, the war in Ukraine is a funeral that does not say its name.
Putting a price on carbon to solve the problem of climate change. This idea is a commonplace among economists and the main policy advocated in this matter. Thus, in 2021, 64 carbon pricing instruments are deployed worldwide, covering more than a fifth of emissions. Admittedly, the vast majority of them are at very low levels, so that they do not substantially alter either business investment or consumer behavior. But when the price reaches significant levels – and therefore produces tangible economic effects – the adjustment processes are so violent that they are most often unacceptable.
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