2023-12-31 16:42:47
Dr. Gavriel Charitos presented his assessments on the outcome of the war in the Middle East, the next day in post-war Gaza and on the internal political developments in Israel in the established special edition of the Greek research institute ELIAMEP, which was made public yesterday, December 30. Demokratiki tis Rhodes hosts Mr. Haritos’ estimates for 2024.
The October 7 war drastically changed the Israeli political agenda. Thus, the end of 2023 is nothing like the Israel of protests and endless institutional crisis. The failure of the state apparatus to foresee what tragically happened, shattered the confidence of the average Israeli in the military establishment, which until now was perceived as invulnerable, incorruptible and ready to face any threat. Society expects those responsible for this great defeat to be held accountable, even though the prevailing belief is that on the battlefield Israel will win. When this war is over, the establishment – political, military and judicial – knows that it will be called to account. It remains unknown, however, whether the answer to the question “is it their fault” will be given within 2024, as the duration of the war is still unknown.
The fronts of war
The specificity of the war that began on October 7 lies in the multiplicity of its active fronts. Officially, the front is one and it is in Gaza. However, the additional ones, unofficial so far, but by all means active fronts in South Lebanon and the Red Sea, are capable of expanding the war scene.
Although the government in Beirut does not wish for additional adventures, Hezbollah seems willing to be the Iranian Procrustes, repeating the war of 2006. Thus, the Israel-Hezbollah front was activated just twenty-four hours after the start of the war, with the organization’s leader, Hassan Nasrallah, to speak of a “war of attrition”. Israel, however, now demands the immediate implementation of Security Council resolution 1701/2006, which mandates the transfer of South Lebanon under the control of the regular Lebanese army, the disarmament of Hezbollah and its withdrawal north of the Litani River. If the diplomatic efforts of the US, France and Germany do not succeed, it is estimated that it is only a matter of time before Israel declares a parallel war against Hezbollah, taking advantage of the current enhanced Western military presence, which acts as a deterrent against Iran. After all, Israeli society seems ready to support such a development, so that citizens can safely return to their homes on the Lebanese border – an expectation exactly the same for citizens who left their destroyed homes on the border with Gaza.
Prototype of the war is the new front opened against Israel by the pro-Iranian Houthi rebels in the Red Sea. This front involves the risk of internationalization. In addition to the US, Britain and most countries whose economies are affected by the closure of the Bab-Al-Mandab Straits sea channel, Saudi Arabia may well see the current situation as a unique opportunity to counter Iranian regional revisionism, maintaining the pro-Western momentum for a future normalization of relations with Israel.
Finally, Israel feels that it is able to manage the usual frontline mobility in the West Bank, having learned to manage the Palestinian Authority security forces to its advantage – mainly at the level of intelligence gathering.
The day after Gaza
Despite disagreements with the Biden administration, the Israelis will insist on placing the Gaza Strip under their own military control. They have already taken action on the ground to impose a 1-2 km perimeter security zone to be accompanied by limited clearance operations (possibly while activity in South Lebanon intensifies), encouraging the idea of a “multinational humanitarian command” with the participation of those Arab countries that maintain normal relations with Israel (Egypt, Jordan, UAE, Morocco, Bahrain) with the expectation of an additional Saudi presence. If the White House rejects such a proposal, Israel would seek to buy time by hoping for a Republican return to power in 2025.
In contrast to Israeli aspirations, it is estimated that the US and the international actor will promote the recovery of control of Gaza by the Palestinian Authority. With the Americans promoting the democratization of Palestinian institutions, they will want to attract Islamist voices, willing to repair their former relationship with today’s Hamas. Arab/Muslim governments are expected to be encouraged in this direction. In addition to Qatar and Turkey, it is estimated that a useful role may be proposed to Algeria, mainly due to a series of “Palestinian reconciliation” initiatives previously undertaken by the country’s President, Abdelmadjid Teboun. However, the entourage of Palestinian President Abbas and the Fatah ‘deep state’ will carefully weigh the balance before (and if) they respond positively.
Netanyahu’s future
The outbreak of war and the participation of the popular Benny Gantz in the government of national unity under Netanyahu actually prolongs the latter’s stay in power, at least until the end of the war. While the completion of his criminal case trial was considered crucial to his political future, his plea is expected next April. However, under the (unfinished) judicial reform, his prime ministership is not threatened by a conviction in the first instance. On the contrary, if he faces personal political responsibilities for what (didn’t) happen on October 7th, then only his political future may be threatened.
Mr. Gavriel Charitos teaches History of Greek-Israeli-Cyprus Political Relations at Ben-Gurion University and Panteion University. He is a researcher at ELIAMEP
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