human dignity, a vacillating landmark in the debates

It’s an unavoidable but uncomfortable word, an apparently shared and yet divisive notion: the question of human dignity is today at the heart of the ongoing debates within the framework of the Citizens’ Convention on the end of life, whose the 4th session opens this Friday, January 20.

For some, its invocation must prevent the evolution of the law and curb any attempt to shorten life, directly or indirectly. For others, it should lead to legislating on active assistance in dying, with the argument of allowing everyone to approach death in a “dignified” way.

Uncertain in its content and its uses, dignity has become a floating concept. “It is invoked by everyone, but each one gives it a particular meaning, observes the philosopher Paul Valadier. Our apparently common language causes confusion, since we do not put the same meaning under the same word. »

In the aftermath of the Second World War, the international community, traumatized by the barbarism born of this conflict, had nevertheless entrusted dignity with the role of shield against attacks on human life. “Recognition of the inherent dignity of all members of the human family and of their equal and inalienable rights constitutes the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world”, proclaims the preamble to the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR).

“We are then in the presence of a dignity understood in an ontological sense, shared by Kantian philosophy and Christianity, which affirms that man has an absolute, intrinsic and inalienable value, linked to the simple fact of being human”, underlines the philosopher Éric Fiat. A dignity which man has neither to conquer nor to deserve, which he cannot lose and which must be the subject of unconditional respect.

The end of a consensus

It is this definition that no longer enjoys consensus. “Many difficulties arise from the fact that our time hesitates between dignity in the ontological sense, linked to the simple fact of being human, and dignity in the postural sense., related to posture, deportment, decency, modesty, continues Eric Fiat. In the postural sense, one is worthy in proportion as one controls one’s behavior and the animality which is in us, one is master of oneself. This postural dignity has degrees, it can be measured and it can be lost. »

Today, this second sense of dignity tends to prevail, and the conviction is crumbling that the dignity of man would remain intact in all circumstances, especially when the end of life causes the loss of characteristics essential to the humanity: language, reason, autonomy… The discourse carried by the Association for the Right to Die with Dignity (ADMD), born in 1980, spread the idea that certain ends of life were dignified, and d others no.

“Today, dignity is often understood in a subjective, even subjectivist sense. To claim the right to die with dignity is to suppose that it is up to each person to judge the degree of their dignity, the moment when they feel they have “lost” it”. regrets the philosopher Paul Valadier.

A distorted concept?

The permanence of human dignity, the philosopher Agata Zielinski also regularly notes that it is no longer obvious to her health students. “After giving a course on human dignity and explaining its inalienable nature, if I ask my students: “Can we lose our dignity?” massively and more and more, everyone answers “yes”says the teacher. Even for concerned and informed people, dignity appears as a relative concept. »

Faced with these difficulties, should we consider that the concept of dignity is irremediably distorted, to the point of perhaps considering abandoning it? “It’s a word that retains great nobility, despite its ambiguities”, reacts Paul Valadier. An opinion shared by Agata Zielinski, even if she often observes “better convey the idea that no one can lose their belonging to humanity without using it. The word arouses blockages, but the idea it underlies continues to have an impact”.

A concept to preserve

For the philosopher Frédéric Worms, member of the National Consultative Ethics Committee (CCNE), it is necessary to take the full measure of what this notion can protect, before discussing its limits. “Put respect for the human being and his dignity above all remains very important in the face of obvious violations of human dignity”, he insists, emphasizing the points of agreement it covers: “respect for the person and the human body, the prohibition of the sale of parts of the human body, the prohibition of torture, even in the name of medicine…”“Once these basics have been underlined, we can recognize a disagreement on dignity, a moment when it becomes controversial, when the end of life confronts incurable and unbearable suffering”, he believes.

The dividing line then passes between “those for whom the source of dignity is rooted in freedom and the ability to decide” et “those for whom it rests in life as such”. For his part, Frédéric Worms considers that there is a way for an ethical application of active assistance in dying, compatible with respect for human dignity. “It is not a question of saying: ‘It is up to each person to decide their dignity’, nor of the abstract claim of a ‘right to die’, but of considering that certain requests for death are requests for life, if registering in a concrete struggle against the indignity of death. »

A concrete struggle against indignity: those who refuse euthanasia and active assistance in dying are also sensitive to it, but on the side of end-of-life conditions. In effect, “If no human being can lose his dignity, he can lose the feeling of it when he finds himself in conditions unworthy of his dignity”, says Eric Fiat.

This is why the abysses opened up by the end of life cannot be filled by a theoretical reflection, however fair it may be. There always comes the time when commitment and solicitude, presence and care must prevail over abstract debates. “Being in contact with the end of life awakens our distress and an anxiety of abandonment that is unbearable to us, but, at the same time, it can awaken the gesture of approaching others”, discount Agata Zielinski, which echoes the parable of the Good Samaritan. “Before the wounded man, he does not ask himself if this man is worthy or not: he goes close to take care of him. »

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To read

Small treaty of dignity. Greatness and misery of men, by Éric Fiat (Larousse, 2012, 224 p., €17.95)

“Uncertain Dignity” by Paul Valadier, Review Laennec No. 2/2006. Available at www.cairn.info

For a vital humanism. Letters about life, death and the present moment, by Frédéric Worms (Ed. Odile Jacob, 2019, 278 p., €21.90)

The Loss of Human Evidence. Phenomenology of the relationship in extreme situations, by Agata Zielinski (Ed. Hermann, 2022, 482 p., €35)

End(s) of life, the debate, under the direction of Jean-Marc Ferry (PUF, 2012, 528 p., €29.50)

Human dignity. Philosophy, law, politics, economics, medicine, work coordinated by Thomas De Koninck and Gilbert Larochelle (PUF, 2005, 176 p., €12)

Philosophical inquiry into dignity, by Bernard Baertschi (Éd. Labor et Fides, 2019, 311 p., €30)

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