Briefly:
- A repressive machine is like an alligator that, once it has started swallowing food, cannot stop and spit it out.
- The Hunweibins of the regime can always claim that, for example, “you don’t celebrate May 9 that way.”
- There is a large part of the audience that simultaneously trusts both state and non-state media, or is not interested in either.
- Official propaganda seeks to prove that Alexander Lukashenko is the only defender of peace and stability.
– Why does the regime continue repression, gives the harshest sentences to representatives of Tut. by and at the same time arrests those regional journalists who have not written about any politics for a long time? What is the meaning of this and what message do they send to society with these sentences?
– I once liked the image that a repressive machine is like an alligator that, once it has started swallowing food, cannot stop and spit it out. The process of persecution of the independent press has been going on for a long time, and they have been punished “to the maximum” for a long time. As for those independent publications that remained in Belarus and changed their editorial policy in order to survive and not “run into” repression, they are being persecuted for “former merits”. The same thing happens to many Belarusian citizens: they are persecuted not because of what is happening now, but because they find old photos, comments on social networks, something similar.
The second point is the desire of various power structures to show their “necessity” and “efficiency”. If brighter and more famous figures have already been planted, then it is the turn of the next ones. And people who now do not publicly raise their voice against some actions of the ruling regime, or even against some non-political issues (such as, for example, ecology) cannot feel safe either, because the attention of the security forces may switch to them as well.
The same thing happens with the media, because they are the nerve of society that reacts to problems. Those mass media that changed their editorial policy still remained with a different hierarchy of values, different from the official one. And it can manifest itself in the most “innocent” topics. The Hunweibins of the regime can always make claims to them that, for example, “you don’t celebrate May 9 that way” or “you don’t miss it that way.”
— Are today’s repressions aimed more at the past or the future? Is it primarily revenge for some past actions or a warning to everyone else for the future?
– They are focused on both. It is time to punish those who have not yet been punished for the past. Security forces need even fictional opponents – otherwise the meaning of their existence is lost. At the trial of Tut. by there were words about some kind of “coup d’état”. Naturally, such a case would be beneficial to the security forces – in order to justify new repressions, especially on the eve of new electoral campaigns.
— If we talk about the general picture of the mass media in Belarus, how is the media consumption of Belarusians changing in general? What trends prevail?
– There are several notable factors here. A number of independent media work in exile, at a certain distance from their main audience. That’s why mistakes happen. This is a problem that the media understands and is trying to deal with. On the other hand, if from the point of view of a person living in Belarus, he does not find important events that affect his life in the media, then he thinks: why should I follow this?
In a situation where the regime has cleared both the political space and civil society, the media are forced to write about something else: for example, about what is happening in emigration, about the war in Ukraine. But the audience in Belarus does not always perceive it as very important.
In principle, we see, according to various sociological surveys, a decrease in visits to some independent media. But at the same time, this does not always mean that news and materials from these media do not reach people. When people read these news on social networks, they are often materials from independent media.
According to available surveys, trust in state media is lower than in non-state media. This is one of those factors that shows that the situation is not so bad for independent media. On the other hand, the gap between them is very small. There is a large part of the audience that simultaneously trusts both state and non-state media, or is not interested in either.
– What are the main directions of state propaganda today? Do they act completely dull, or do they use different approaches and methodologies for different target audiences?
– I would pay attention to what they have in common and mandatory. For several months now, we at Media IQ have been documenting the growth of militaristic narratives related to exercises, the “combat organization of a regional group”, various incidents, and the preparation of a law on people’s militia. All together it increases the degree of anxiety. And against this background, official propaganda seeks to prove that the only defender of peace and stability is Alexander Lukashenko and the regime he heads.
— Are Belarusian supposedly non-state media projects that position themselves as independent but slowly promote official narratives successful? And the second: is it possible to talk about the coincidence of official Belarusian and Russian chauvinist propaganda? Have they completely merged or are they still different?
– There are projects such as “Tochka”, which deal largely with the pro-Lukashenka and pro-Russian agenda. Many news navigators, such as Belnovosti, broadcast pro-Russian narratives that justify the war in Ukraine. And it cannot be said that they provide a diverse view of events and access to alternative information.
It is important to note that in Belarus, a search for news on the Internet leads to Russian resources that clearly promote narratives useful to the Kremlin. If someone uses search in Yandex.dzen, he will most likely come across Russian pro-government resources.