The invasion of Ukraine by Russia has led to intense diplomatic activity in New Delhi: some visitors have come to test the waters, others to talk about what is happening outside Ukraine, others to seek solidarity and others, finally, issue veiled warnings. New Delhi has been open and patient. What India did not appreciate much, however, was the public disapproval of its policy towards Russia, namely its decision to pursue trade with it and its refusal to condemn the Russian aggression.
Many who came to New Delhi [dont des envoyés européens, britannique, américain et japonais] seem to miss a crucial point: India is not in Europe even though, despite occasional aberrations, it shares many of the norms and values dear to much of the international community. They forget something even more important, which is that although many Indians live in the West and relations between the peoples are warm, India is a former colony; she is therefore sensitive to the way her Western interlocutors treat her.
A country in economic recovery
Moreover, it is unfair to ask a developing country facing serious economic difficulties and trying to recover from the impact of Covid-19 not to buy Russian oil at a discount, especially when some of those who criticize India continue to obtain energy from Russia, at reduced prices or not. Several Western political commentators wonder with dread why India is unwilling to endure a bit of economic pain to send a loud and clear message that it does not support any territorial aggression.
Again, the answer lies in the state of India’s economy, its need for an unrestricted supply of defense equipment and its geopolitical situation. There is no doubt that the war in Ukraine will impact the Indian economy, slowly perhaps, but surely. Unfortunately for India, the sanctions against Russia come at a time when its economy is still recovering from the impact of Covid-19 [qui a officiellement fait 500000 morts].
Democracy or “non-democracy”?
One of the arguments insisted on by several Western partners of India is that the war between Russia and Ukraine is in fact a wider conflict between democracies and “non-democracies” and that India must therefore decide which side of the ideological divide she wants to be on. This is not only an unfounded myth, but a dangerous assertion, which may plunge the international community into a new futile ideological rivalry. New Delhi must not be led down this path. Russia’s military aggression is unjustified, but India’s decision to refrain from condemning Russia is geopolitical (India also did not condemn the US invasion of Iraq in 2003). It has nothing to do with whether India is a democracy or not.
The second argument is that Russia will not help India in a possible conflict with China. This argument is not false, but here too it misses the point. Russia may not help India against China but what is certain is that India cannot afford to have another unfriendly country in an already very unfriendly region. And that is a very good reason not to alienate Russia. Westerners insinuate in their speeches that they might not support India against China if India does not support them today. This reasoning ignores the reality that China poses a threat to both India and the United States, albeit to varying degrees. India needs the help of its partners to face China, but it is not a one-way street.
India’s time has come
This is India’s moment as a great power. The fact that the opposing sides in this war are sending high-ranking emissaries to New Delhi to curry favor with India also shows that India is the most courted “rocker state” in the contemporary international system; a role she has played very well so far. China sees the war in Ukraine as a way to build an anti-American world order through regional unity, which at least partially explains the recent visit of Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi. He was closely followed by his Russian counterpart, Sergei Lavrov, the only visitor who secured an interview with Prime Minister Modi, indicating that India has no intention of abandoning Moscow, at least for the time being. instant.
By refusing to ally itself exclusively with one side or the other, while maintaining good relations with them, India may have finally applied the principles of strategic autonomy which it has long professed but which she found it difficult to put into practice. Contemporary Indian diplomacy is an example of a pivotal state refusing to swing one way or the other.
Asia’s Tomorrows Will Be Sinocentric
However, there is a time to be a “Tipping State” and a time to see further. Asia’s geopolitics will become increasingly China-centric. The adrenaline rush generated today in New Delhi by being a key country courted by several strong suitors will eventually die down. This is the harsh reality of geopolitics. And that’s why India needs to play its cards right today if it wants to reap geopolitical dividends tomorrow. Indian policymakers need to return to their desks and draw up long-term plans that take into account the whole region – including China – and the international community.
In other words, New Delhi must keep its long-term goals in mind, even during the difficult balancing act it is engaged in today. Having both the West and Russia on its side tomorrow would be ideal.
Author: Happymon Jacob
Happymon Jacob is a senior lecturer at the School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi.
Courrier International