In the southern suburbs of Beirut, where the landscape is often defined by the scars of aerial bombardment, a 62-year-traditional Hezbollah field commander known only by the nom de guerre “Jihad” operates in a world of extreme caution. He does not use a personal smartphone, he does not meet in person, and he frequently shifts his position to evade the drones and warplanes that patrol the Lebanese skies.
In a rare detailed account of the group’s internal adaptations, Jihad describes a militia that has been forced to revert to analog methods after a series of devastating intelligence breaches. His insights provide a glimpse into how the Hezbollah commander describes fighting Israel in Lebanon, revealing a transition toward a decentralized command structure and a profound distrust of modern electronics following the catastrophic “pager attacks” of late 2024.
The commander, who has been with Hezbollah’s military wing since 2001 and holds a rank equivalent to a two-star general, spoke from a position of recent vulnerability. He had been wounded just a day prior when an Israeli missile struck a street near his shelter in Beirut, an attack that Lebanese authorities say killed more than 350 people. Despite injuries to his arms and legs from flying debris, he remained active, stating, “I have an enemy occupying my land. Where am I supposed to be?”
A Return to Analog Warfare
The most striking shift in Hezbollah’s operational security is a total abandonment of modern consumer electronics. Following the September 2024 attack in which thousands of pagers and walkie-talkies exploded simultaneously, the group has largely eschewed digital communication to prevent Israeli intelligence from tracking or targeting its members.
“We don’t trust anything anymore,” Jihad says. He describes a reliance on “old-school” Motorola devices and radio transmitters. In some instances, the group has returned to the most basic form of secure communication: handwritten notes carried by couriers on motorbikes.
This tactical regression is a direct response to what Jihad calls “mistakes” made in 2024, which he believes contributed to the killing of the group’s long-time leader, Hassan Nasrallah. By stripping away the vulnerabilities of the digital age, the group aims to rebuild its command and control under the leadership of Naim Qassem.
Decentralized Command and Compartmentalization
Under the direction of Naim Qassem, Hezbollah has adopted a decentralized command structure. This approach, pioneered years ago by the late Imad Mughniyeh, splits fighters into semi-autonomous units that operate in isolation from one another. This compartmentalization ensures that if one unit is compromised, the rest of the organization remains secure.
Jihad explains that these units are highly specialized. One team may focus exclusively on firing rockets, while another monitors roads, and a third handles logistics, such as preparing food for fighters. “You execute your own specific tasks, with no understanding of what we as a whole are doing,” he says.
This structure is designed to counter Israel’s technological superiority. “We’re fighting an enemy that has the latest weapons, all the technology, but we are holding our ground,” Jihad says. He argues that the battle is won through “steadfastness” and the ability to lure the enemy closer despite the disparity in equipment.
The Resilience of the Arsenal
A central point of contention in the current conflict is the state of Hezbollah’s weaponry. While a November 2024 ceasefire included promises by the Lebanese Army to disarm the group in the south, Jihad claims the process was a deception. He asserts that the group provided the Lebanese military with “empty boxes” or obsolete equipment to be destroyed, while keeping its primary arsenal intact.
The commander describes a hybrid approach to rearming, combining imported weapons with domestic manufacturing. He notes that the internet has become a resource for learning how to build weaponry, which is then assembled in a network of underground tunnels and caverns—structures that many experts believe remain functional despite Israeli strikes.
Despite the fall of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad in December 2024—which initially led to concerns that the group’s primary supply route from Iran had been severed—Jihad insists that smuggling remains viable. He specifically mentions the continued arrival of Russian-made anti-tank weapons, such as Kornets and Konkurs, through Syrian territory.
Timeline of Recent Escalations
| Date | Event | Outcome/Impact |
|---|---|---|
| Sept 2024 | Pager/Walkie-Talkie Attacks | Mass casualties; shift to analog communication |
| Nov 2024 | Ceasefire Agreement | Lebanese Army pledged to disarm Hezbollah south |
| Dec 2024 | Fall of Bashar al-Assad | Threatened Iranian supply routes via Syria |
| Feb 28, 2025 | US/Israel Attack on Iran | Triggered Hezbollah rocket retaliation on March 2 |
Diplomatic Stagnation and Future Outlook
As the military conflict persists, the prospect of a diplomatic resolution remains bleak. Hezbollah has expressed firm opposition to scheduled talks in Washington between Israeli and Lebanese ambassadors—negotiations that would mark the first official diplomatic dialogue between the two nations since 1983.
The group continues to fire rockets into northern Israel, while Israel maintains its campaign of airstrikes and drone operations. For commanders like Jihad, the struggle is viewed as a war of attrition where psychological endurance is as critical as firepower.
The next critical juncture will be the outcome of the Washington talks, provided they proceed, and whether the Lebanese government can exert any meaningful control over the southern border as mandated by previous agreements.
For those affected by the ongoing conflict in Lebanon, support and crisis resources are available through the UNHCR and the International Committee of the Red Cross.
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