Is the new federal government drawing lessons from the sometimes disastrous experiences of participating in international military operations? If you look at the coalition agreement, it is more likely that the previous course will be continued. Deployments abroad and defense of the alliance are the two tasks that the Bundeswehr “has to fulfill” in equal measure, they say. You present yourself as a “reliable partner” who sticks to its “foreign and security policy commitment”. But there are passages that give hope. Every foreign assignment should be preceded by a “review of the requirements”.
In terms of the past three decades, three cases deserve special attention: Afghanistan, Mali, and Ukraine. In the Hindu Kush it was a NATO mission that mutated into a combat mission, in Mali an EU training and UN stabilization mission, in Ukraine a comprehensive, predominantly non-military engagement – three qualitatively different approaches on three continents.
If you take Afghanistan, in retrospect it seems astonishing that it took the federal governments responsible for this 20 years to realize that a military-backed state structure was unsuccessful. Perhaps one succumbed to one’s own whitewashing and / or relied on alliance solidarity until the end. The Merkel government saw the presence of the Bundeswehr in Mali as a historic step and proof that Germany has accepted its new role as a “creative power”. But Mali, too, was a failure in what was still a fragile state. The army there staged two coups in nine months. A corrupt government is no longer in office, but has been replaced by barely better military men. It was astonishing that, in view of this failure, the CDU / CSU, SPD, FDP and the Greens pleaded in the election campaign to stay in Mali, which was strikingly reminiscent of the flight from reality on the subject of Afghanistan.
The commitment in Ukraine has a different quality in several respects. It takes place in the immediate vicinity of the EU and thus directly affects German security interests. Ukraine is also of great geopolitical importance for the USA, especially for Russia. With Russia, a major nuclear power is involved, which is not afraid to protect interests perceived as “vital” through its military potential. The strategic goal of German government policy was or is to solve the Ukraine case in such a way that integration into the West is ensured.
Commission on Afghanistan
Just how realistic is that as long as the protagonists of this conflict have completely different political and strategic ideas? Moscow is about influence and balance. This means that Ukraine should ideally belong to its own sphere of influence and under no circumstances should it become a NATO member. Given the opposing strategic goals of the counterparties, there is a risk of permanent escalation.
Of course, fragile statehood and the associated social inequality remain a challenge for peace and stability in the south-eastern neighboring regions of the EU. But the upcoming federal government should not overestimate the influence of external actors to pacify internal conflicts. Nation building is a protracted historical process that is subject to complex internal social dynamics. If rival nuclear powers are also involved, as in the Ukraine conflict, the scope for action for central powers like Germany narrows even further. Therefore, peacekeeping must be the primary goal. The study commission announced in the coalition agreement for the evaluation of the Afghanistan mission offers the chance to learn from bad experiences for future missions abroad. It would not be a surprise if it emerged that “social engineering” carried out by external actors is expensive in other societies and does not work, especially not militarily.
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