2024-07-11 09:56:08
During the presidential election on June 28 and July 5, 2024, the Iranian regime hoped to expand its electoral base and reduce the abstention rate, which barely exceeded 40% during the last parliamentary election in the spring of 2024 .Beyond this objective, the government also trying to appease a polarized society, on the verge of rupture, as shown by the demonstrations after the death of Mahsa Amini on December 16, 2022. This time by allowing the participation of reformist candidate Massoud Pezeshkian, the regime sent a signal to reformers to encourage them to take an active part again in the political life of the country, while respecting the framework of the regime Velayat-e Jurisprudence1. From the beginning of his election campaign, Pezeshkian reaffirmed his loyalty to the Guide, showing that he had received the message.
The power strategy is the result of an awareness of its increasing undemanding in a society that has been greatly transformed, especially in big cities. The regime can no longer impose the same societal restrictions without paying a very high price. In a very tense regional context, especially because of the Gaza war, Iran is trying to calm the internal situation. Certainly, by responding to the attack on its embassy in Syria on April 13-14, 2024, Iran demonstrated its military strength and strategic maturity in the face of its Western adversaries. However, this success on the international stage leaves an apathetic population exhausted by an ever-increasing cost of living, and a middle class on the brink of bankruptcy.
Six million abstainers are mobilizing for the second round
The first round of the election failed to reduce the abstention rate. 60% of Iranians did not vote, believing that this vote would not change anything in their daily lives. Although this rate was disappointing for the regime, it was not an electoral hemorrhage that could have been expected after the “Woman, Life, Liberty” movement that shook the country.
There were still two contenders in the race in the second round: the reformist Pezeshkian leading with 44.4% of the votes and the conservative Saïd Jalili with 40.3% of the votes. Two other conservative candidates, Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf (more than 14% of the vote) and Mostafa Pourmohammadi (0.88%) asked to vote for Jalili. One might have thought, in this context, that the conservative candidate had won. But the dynamics of the second round elections changed the situation. Pezeshkian became the next president of the Republic of Iran with almost 54% of the vote in an election where the turnout reached almost 50%. Six million abstainers took part in the second round, all in favor of the reformist candidate. Historically, Iranians have been able to take advantage of the meager margins of maneuver left in elections controlled primarily by the filtering of the Council of Guardians of the Constitution to send a message. His vote is not always in favor of a candidate or camp, but often against his opponent.
In addition to the 6 million abstentions in the first round, Pezeshkian undoubtedly benefited from the votes of some Galibaf voters who did not follow his call to vote for Jalili. In fact, the victory of the reformist candidate is also due to the fragmentation of the conservative camp, united ideologically, but often very divided on the basis of conflicting economic interests. Since the assassination of General Qassem Soleimani on January 3, 2020 by the Americans, no charismatic personality has succeeded in uniting the conservatives. The appointment of Galibaf to the post of parliament speaker reflects this division. He was only elected with the support of deputies close to the reformers in a parliament that was nevertheless largely conservative.
What can be changed
It is impossible that Pezeshkian will be able to restore the regime. He has never had any military or organic connection with reform parties or groups. He is often described as a conservative reformer, however he has more possibilities to act without systematically coming up against a wall of conservative deputies who are united against him. From a financial point of view, he has never been involved in scandals, unlike many political figures, both conservative and reformist. Internally, its purpose is to establish greater tolerance in the sphere of society. Some of the abstainers who voted for him are waiting for him on this matter. A Conservative-led parliament is unlikely to be an insurmountable obstacle, and a conservative split could work in its favour. In addition, some conservatives interpreted the massive public rejection of the election as an alarming sign, prompting them to reflect on the attitudes that led to this result.
In economic matters, however, one must be careful. Pezeshkian, like the other candidates, is a defender of the free market and is surrounded by ultra-liberal economists such as Massoud Nili and Ali Tayebnia. The latter, the minister of the economy in the first government of Hassan Rouhani (2013-2017), was criticized for his methods to fight inflation, which is considered responsible for the evasion of almost 100 billion dollars (92 billion euros) of the country by some economists. .
Little room for maneuver in international politics
During his campaign, Pezeshkian promised to pursue a policy of openness towards the West. But again, we shouldn’t expect any unrest. The main directions of foreign policy are set elsewhere and the role of the President and his Minister of Foreign Affairs is reduced to following the line defined in the Directive. Under the mandate of President Raïssi and his Minister of Foreign Affairs, Hossein Amir-Abdolahian (who died in the same accident), Ali Shamkhani, the representative of the National Security Council, and not Raïssi or Amir-Abdolahian signed the strategic agreement with Saudi Arabia as a result of the Chinese intervention in March 2023, although they are very close to the Directive. Sensitive matters regarding the strategy of the “axis of resistance” and possible agreements with the West fall within the scope of the Directive. Certainly, the president and his Minister of Foreign Affairs can accelerate or delay the negotiation of certain issues, such as relations with China and Russia, but their scope of action is still very limited. The days of former Foreign Minister Mohammad Djavad Zarif (2013-2021), who was very popular in the West, are over. Despite his strong association with the Pezeshkian campaign, he is unlikely to lead the country’s diplomacy tomorrow.
However, Washington could look favorably on Pezeshkian’s coming to power. Both countries have taken a similar stance on the Gaza war and seek to avoid a regional expansion of the conflict. Washington did not want to increase tensions with Iran, and interceded with the Europeans to present the offer from the United Kingdom, France and Germany to the Security Council of the European Union.DO after Iran’s fire against Israel became less aggressive. For its part, Tehran does not want to definitively close the door to the West and continues to negotiate with Washington through the Omani power. For Tehran, poet of JCPOA (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action) – an agreement signed in Vienna in 2015, from which the United States withdrew Donald Trump in 2018 – closed. But one-time agreements that allow the release of funds blocked abroad are desirable, especially since Trump’s return to the White House threatens to close all doors. In a world under stress, Iran, though militarily powerful, urgently needs huge investments to rebuild its economy. The integration is not in BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa), or membership in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (OCS) have not yet yielded the expected results.
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