By Fabio Bosco
On November 26, the State of Israel agreed to a 60-day ceasefire with Lebanon, negotiated by representatives of American and French imperialism. During this period, Israeli troops will withdraw from southern Lebanon. Hezbollah has committed to a ceasefire and the withdrawal of its military bases from southern Lebanon, with the Litani River as its border. French troops will reinforce UNIFIL (UN military force located in southern Lebanon and tasked with preventing any action against Israel, whether by Hezbollah or any other political or military force). Additionally, the United States will increase funding for the Lebanese National Army and negotiate with Saudi Arabia and Qatar to do the same. Since the withdrawal of Syrian troops from Lebanon in 2005, the United States has become the primary sponsor of the Lebanese army, investing around $2.5 billion since then. This ceasefire agreement follows the basis of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1701 of 2006.
The main Israeli demand was not met. Israel wanted the unrestricted right to attack Lebanese territory. This absurd request has been replaced by an international committee led by the United States that will receive reports of violations of the agreement, whether for the launch of any bombs across the border, or for the presence of Israeli troops or Lebanese militias in southern Lebanon. These complaints will be forwarded to the Lebanese army, which will have to guarantee the signed agreement. Other Israeli demands: not even the disarmament of Hezbollah and the transformation of southern Lebanon into a buffer zone are not guaranteed, despite the American commitment to seek their implementation.
Israeli aggression in Lebanon was at a standstill. There were two alternatives: qualitatively increase the military force and occupy southern Lebanon, or sign this ceasefire agreement with its main allies as guarantors: American and French imperialism.
Several factors weighed on the Israeli decision: the fear of a growing number of daily victims of soldiers of an army ready to commit cowardly genocides but not for ground combat (more than 50 soldiers were killed by the Lebanese resistance, in addition to a good known Zionist archaeologist who wanted to prove that southern Lebanon was part of Greater Israel); the shameful situation of the over 60,000 Israelis evacuated 400 days ago, who cannot return to occupied northern Palestine; the possibility that Hezbollah will increase drone, rocket and missile attacks that could easily reach Tel Aviv, accelerating the exodus of Israelis abroad; the probable strengthening of the protests of the liberal Zionist opposition; the need to recompose military forces while awaiting Trump’s green light for an attack on Iran; and Joe Biden’s blackmail to hand over $680 million in weapons in exchange for the ceasefire agreement (according to the Financial times).
Hezbollah accepted the deal, a decision that is consistent with its position since before the Palestinian offensive on October 7, 2023. Hezbollah, like Iran, has always avoided large-scale military conflict against Israel. Their attitude has always been to react on a smaller scale to Zionist military aggression.
Coordinated action with the Palestinian resistance?
Palestinian preparation for the October 7 offensive included several attempts to take coordinated military action with Hezbollah and the Iranian regime starting in the first half of 2021. However, these efforts failed due to Iranian and Hezbollah’s policy of avoiding long-term conflicts against Israel. Therefore, the Palestinian resistance had to launch the attack in isolation, which facilitated Zionist genocidal aggression in Palestine.
After the October 7 offensive, Hezbollah decided to carry out a symbolic action, a low intensity attack, against the farms of Shebaa, a Lebanese territory occupied by the State of Israel. Since then, the Zionists have carried out increasingly intense aggressions in various parts of Lebanese territory, while Hezbollah has limited itself to low-intensity attacks on the border strip in northern occupied Palestine.
Two moments of Israeli aggression
Faced with Hezbollah’s rocket fire against Shebaa, the State of Israel decided to give priority to the genocide in Gaza and to bomb southern Lebanon with specific attacks in Beirut, Sour, Nabatieh and Baalbek. Furthermore, it launched white phosphorus all along the border strip in southern Lebanon. White phosphorus is an incendiary weapon whose use is banned in populated areas and which Israel pledged to ban in 2013.1
As of September 2024, the Zionists have qualitatively changed their military offensive in Lebanon. Explosions of communications devices, assassination of Hassan Nasrallah and senior Hezbollah commanders, heavy bombing of several Lebanese cities
On October 1st they began a ground offensive accompanied by the demand for surrender by the Lebanese state, which would have had to renounce its sovereignty to allow the free incursion of Israeli troops and bombings. This offensive was openly supported by US imperialism, through political, diplomatic, financial and military means. More than a million Lebanese have had to leave their homes to move to the capital and the north of the country. More than 3,800 Lebanese have been killed and more than 15,000 injured by Israeli attacks.2
The decision to launch this genocidal aggression against Lebanon was mainly based on the need to empty the growing protests of the liberal Zionists who threatened to overthrow the Netanyahu government, whose artificial majority of only four seats presented growing internal frictions.3 A genocidal offensive against Lebanon had broad support among the Israeli Jewish public. Second, there was an immediate issue – the return of some 60,000 Israelis evacuated and held in empty hotels due to the closure of Israel’s powerful tourist industry – and a strategic issue: the reduction of Hezbollah’s war power, which has multiplied and it has become more sophisticated since the last Israeli military aggression in 2006.
However, this offensive reached an impasse: escalation or ceasefire. In practice, the Zionists recognized the difficulties encountered in achieving a decisive military victory and opted for the second alternative.
In the words of Israeli political analyst Ameet Makhol:
“This may be the first rational decision, which recognizes the limits of its power, that the army is exhausted and overstretched, and that soldiers are very stressed, especially reservists.”4
The ceasefire agreement was negotiated by US Representative Amos Hochstein. Its goal is the same as Israel’s – to impose a qualitative change on power in Lebanon by marginalizing Hezbollah – but the means are different. Hochstein works for the election of a new president and the appointment of a new prime minister in line with American and Zionist interests. Its presidential candidate is General Joseph Aoun, and the Lebanese parliament could make that decision as early as this week. Another of Hochstein’s objectives is a qualitative strengthening of the Lebanese army to enable the transformation of southern Lebanon into a buffer area and prepare the conditions for the disarmament of Hezbollah.
Hochstein counts in his favor the strength of Western imperialism (even if decadent), the sectarian divisions imposed by the Lebanese regime and the unpopularity of Hezbollah among non-Shiite communities. Working against their plans is the immense difficulty of raising a Lebanese army with the strength and disposition to face Hezbollah; the unpopularity of Israeli aggression among the vast majority of Lebanese; the large Shiite community (representing between 31 and 39% of the resident population) where Hezbollah maintains its social base; the majority of the influential Lebanese Shiite bourgeoisie; and the reconstruction capacity that Hezbollah has, both in social services and in war capacity. Historical experience has shown that the Israeli aggressions of 1982 and 2006 failed to overcome these obstacles. Since then, Hezbollah has lost strength, joining the forces that bloodily suppressed the Syrian revolution and becoming the main opponent of the 2019 uprising against the sectarian regime called the “October Revolution” by the Lebanese.5
Added to these internal factors in Lebanon are global factors, such as the economy, the inter-imperialist dispute between the United States and China, the weakening of European imperialism, the unpopularity of the Gaza genocide among the masses around the world. Any plan to stabilize Lebanon and reconfigure the Middle East will be an extremely challenging task, to say the least.
Perspectives
The Zionist retreat was celebrated in the streets of Beirut and other Lebanese cities, despite the loss of over 3,800 lives, 15,000 injuries and widespread destruction that will cost billions of dollars and take some years to rebuild, in a country that has already been in economic depression for 5 years. But maintaining the ceasefire will depend on the level of dissatisfaction of the Zionist settlers (55% of Israelis opposed the ceasefire) and the policy of the future Trump administration.
On the Iranian side, the Iranian regime’s efforts to normalize relations with Western imperialism are expanding through the resumption of the nuclear deal and the reduction of strong sanctions imposed against the country. Preemptively, the Iranian regime established military relations with Russia. Today, most of Iran’s production of Shaheed drones and Fathi missiles is delivered to Russia to promote genocide in Ukraine. In exchange, the Iranian regime expects Russia to provide
On the Palestinian side there is nothing to celebrate. The ceasefire in Lebanon means that the genocidal Zionists will be able to concentrate efforts on the ethnic cleansing operation in northern Gaza, which continues in full swing, as well as on preparations for the annexation of the West Bank. In this way Netanyahu diverts the Zionist settlers’ dissatisfaction with the ceasefire in Lebanon towards the expansion of genocide and the colonization of Palestinian lands.
Today the Palestinian people rely only on the working class and young Arabs, who do not accept the genocide imposed by the Zionists and need to overthrow the Arab regimes in the process of normalization with Israel, including the Lebanese regime. The Palestinian people also count on the working class and youth around the world to maintain and deepen international solidarity in order to paralyze the imperialist war machine, isolate the Zionist entity and pave the way for its dismantling.
It is this combination of Palestinian, Arab and global forces that can conquer a secular, democratic and non-racist Palestine, from the river to the sea, where the Palestinian and Arab working class replace the corrupt ruling Palestinian and Arab elites and can build a socialist federation of Arab countries.
What role does the United States play in shaping Lebanon’s political landscape and its impact on Hezbollah?
Sently, the geopolitical landscape remains tense as various factions continue to navigate their interests amidst the ongoing conflicts.
In Lebanon, the aftermath of the ceasefire agreement highlights a fragile balance. The makeup of the new Lebanese government, potentially influenced by the United States, will play a critical role in determining the future of Hezbollah and the stability of the region. General Joseph Aoun, as a likely presidential candidate, represents a shift towards aligning more with Western interests, which could challenge Hezbollah’s influence, yet risks inciting backlash from its strong support base.
On the ground, the Lebanese army’s capacity to manage the situation remains in question. Historical resistance to foreign influence and the entrenched power of Hezbollah complicate any efforts aimed at disarming the group or enforcing a buffer zone. The ongoing tensions suggest that military engagement may be replaced by forms of political maneuvering and social unrest, especially as the Shiite community remains largely supportive of Hezbollah’s resistance narrative against Israeli aggression.
Meanwhile, Israel faces internal pressures, as public sentiment grows wary of prolonged conflict without clear victory. The demand for substantial changes to the power dynamics in Lebanon poses a challenge, particularly with the significant military and social infrastructure that Hezbollah has developed over the years. The Israeli public’s dissatisfaction with government handling of the conflict could lead to broader implications for governance in Israel, particularly as it relates to the far-right factions that dominate current political discourse.
Simultaneously, the international landscape is shaping responses to the ongoing volatility. The global economic repercussions of the conflict, intertwined with shifting alliances and the potential for renewed negotiations surrounding Iran’s nuclear capabilities, present a complicated tableau. Other regional players, aware of the potential for unrest, will also weigh in, creating a patchwork of alliances and rivalries that complicate the pursuit of lasting peace.
Looking forward, the potential for a re-ignition of hostilities remains high if political solutions do not address the underlying grievances driving the conflict. The interconnectivity of local, regional, and global factors means that any significant developments will require a nuanced understanding of the myriad actors involved and their respective stakes in the region’s future. The fate of Lebanon, Israel, and their respective populations hangs in a delicate balance, shaped by both immediate realities and longer-term historical trends.