Jordan in the catch. The King of Jordan, Abdullah II, and the President of the Palestinian Authority, Mahmoud Abbas, in Ramallah, on May 28, 2022 (Photo: Flash90)
In recent times, Jordan has found itself in a trap. On the one hand, a few months ago it entered into an open conflict with Israel, following the tensions in Jerusalem and the question of control of Al-Aqsa. On the other hand, Israel supplies Jordan with two of its most basic needs – water and gas.
Some researchers and commentators, among the most experienced and veterans in the Jordanian political discourse, analyze the situation from several angles.
One of them, Dr. Marwan Al-Moashar, former Jordanian ambassador to Israel (in the 1990s), Jordanian foreign minister and deputy prime minister, and currently vice president for research at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington, wrote an article that was published in the widely circulated daily Al-Quds Al-Arabi, in which he reviewed the economic alternatives available to Jordan and suggested reducing reliance on Israel.
Ureib al-Rantawi, a Jordanian publicist and researcher and director of the Al-Quds Institute for Policy Studies, published an article on the website of the pro-Western Al-Hura network, in which he called for a re-examination of the assumptions that shaped the relationship between the two; and suggests creating a new perception towards these relationships.
Dr. Muhammad Abu Roman, a former minister in the Jordanian government, wrote two articles on the subject on the critical website Al-Arabi Al-Jadid. The first reviewed the changing attitudes and transformations that occurred within Israel regarding issues related to Jordanian-Israeli relations; the second discussed the ways in which Jordan to act following the change that took place in Israel, and which affects its relations with Jordan.
Despite the difference in their positions, all the writers agree that Israel-Jordan relations are on the verge of a dramatic change – and they strive, each in their own way, to influence this change and shape it according to their perceptions. But first it is worth understanding how we reached this situation in the relations between the two countries, and why exactly now.
On the one hand, most writers note that during the tenure of the Bennet-Lapid government there was an easing of relations, after the long reign of Benjamin Netanyahu. But the last month of Ramadan was accompanied by a sharp conflict between Palestinians and Israelis, which culminated in the killing of journalist Shirin Abu Aqla.
This confrontation led to statements by the Prime Minister at the time, Naftali Bennett, who denied the Hashemite guardianship of Al Aqsa, and was accompanied by threats from senior Israeli officials regarding the transformation of Jordan into a “Palestinian state”.
According to Abu Roman, “Prime Minister Bennett’s statements, as a response to the escalating Jordanian position against the Israeli violations at Al Aqsa Mosque and against the Jews of Jerusalem, go beyond the tactical level, and the discourse takes on a strategic nature of re-looking at the Hashemite guardianship of Jerusalem.”
This distinction of Abu Roman’s may have some explanation for another claim, which the researchers agree on: the change that has taken place in Israel with reference to Jerusalem is not a policy change by one or another prime minister. This is a profound and radical change in Israeli society, in all its parts.
“The problem lies in the structural changes in Israeli society, and not in the political layer alone,” writes A-Rantawi, explaining that the Israel with which Jordan signed a peace agreement in 1994 is no longer the same Israel. In his view, this fact may justify the reconsideration of the assumptions underlying the signing of the agreements.
You might be interested
The researchers also point to strategic-regional changes that had the power to influence the strategic change that Israel is taking, including: the Arab normalization agreements, which reduced the importance and centrality of the Palestinian issue; As well as the Turkish coup that happened only recently, in which Ankara withdrew from the Jerusalem issue.
To these strategic changes must be added the fact that it seems that maintaining the stability of Jordan is no longer in Israel’s interest, after all the “demographic threat” currently outweighs any other external threat in Israel’s eyes. That being the case, it seems that protecting the interests of her friend from Mizrah is no longer at the top of her mind.
What can Jordan do?
All these reasons together may explain the deep transformation that has taken place in Israel in the context of its relations with Jordan. But what can Jordan do? The authors offer several options.
Most scholars have mentioned the issue of energy, but al-Mu’asar puts it first. In the question of the deteriorating relations between Jordan and Israel, it is impossible to ignore the elephant in the room – water and gas.
As part of the agreements between the two countries, Israel supplies Jordan with a significant amount of water and gas – existential sources that are definitely essential to Jordan. If the researchers aspire to take a second look at the foundations that led to the agreements between the countries and even reshape them, they must treat these issues seriously.
In general, al-Mu’asar claims that the existential considerations are the ones that should dictate the policy, and not the economic considerations. Economic considerations are a question of momentary expediency, in his view, and they do not take into account the overall picture, while existential considerations are based on long-term effects.
Al-Muashar and other researchers fear that Israel will use Jordan’s dependence to bend Jordan if necessary – as part of Israeli society’s shift to the right and the strengthening of Jerusalem’s importance.
He encourages Jordan to rely on independent sources, and if this is not possible, to strive to diversify its sources as much as possible, and not to rely on one country – certainly when it seems that it is acting against Jordanian interests. “Furthermore, the pawning of Jordan’s strategic resources in the hands of one country has turned out to not only contradict the Jordanian political position, but also works against the long-term national interest, which poses a serious danger to Jordan’s economy and Jordan’s future ability to defend the independence of its positions.”
One of Al-Muashar’s suggestions is to pray with sea water in Jordan instead of Israel. “Is the cost of desalination in Israel lower than in Jordan? I doubt it,” he writes, and assumes that the desalination of Red Sea water will ultimately cost less than the desalination of Mediterranean water in Israel and its transfer to Jordan.
In addition, he criticizes the secrecy surrounding the bilateral contacts, and calls for a reliable and transparent study to be conducted on the subject. Al-Muashar tries to prove to the reader that there are economic alternatives, and ends his article with a call to action before it is too late.
At the same time as reducing dependence in the energy sector, another channel for limiting Israel’s power may be the relationship with Joe Biden’s administration in the US. The researchers show how the Jordanian regime has high hopes for assistance from the Biden administration in the face of the changes taking place in Israel. However, Abu Roman claims that in light of the situation The variable, it does not seem that Jordan can stop the moves.
“Among the reasons, the facts and the many profound changes in the internal, international and regional balance of power, the essential question that needs to be asked is: To what extent can Jordan really break through the status quo and protect Jerusalem from the Jews of Al Aqsa Mosque by the Zionist project? In recent years it has become clear that we are walking in the footsteps of Huge for such an outline.”
Following this question, Abu Roman asks: “What can the American government actually offer?” Even if the Republicans and supporters of the former president, Donald Trump, do not return to positions of power, it does not seem that the American administration is preventing the Judaization of the Old City, or seeks to reverse the decision to move the American embassy to Jerusalem.
The efforts of the King of Jordan, the Foreign Minister and other factors to oppose the Israeli line, at the regional and international level, should not be taken lightly. In general, it seems that Jordan is the only Arab country at the moment that takes such a firm position, and it seems that this fact irritates Israel, according to Abu Roman.
However, there is no escaping the recognition that the Israelis’ stubborn perception of Jerusalem has changed. They are well aware of the limits of Jordanian diplomatic efforts, and see them as tactical operations rather than an orderly strategy. The Jordanians must recognize these facts.
The Israeli perception of Jerusalem has changed. Israeli security forces at the Al-Aqsa Mosque compound, on April 15, 2022 (Photo: Jamal Awad / Flash90)
In light of the changing situation, a reexamination of the guidelines for the agreement between the two countries seems essential for Jordan. A-Rantawi emphasizes that one of the reasons for Jordan’s entry into the peace agreement with Israel was the desire to prevent Israel from taking over the West Bank. The settlement project continued to expand, and as mentioned, not even the Jordanian-American relations were able to prevent this, and therefore the Jordanians must recognize that an agreement cannot protect Jordan, existentially and nationally.
Besides reducing reliance on Israel and maintaining relations with the US, A-Rantawi claims that Jordan must prepare for a confrontation with Israel: “The conclusion (which emerges from the conferences held on these issues; DL) says that Jordan must work in the near future to build forces in preparation for a confrontation It is painful and difficult in its relations with Israel. It must reduce its reliance on Israel, and mobilize support for its Arab and international positions and approaches, and one must not stop strengthening the internal front in order to avoid any unwanted pressure in the next phase.”
The researchers seem to agree that at this stage, despite the conflict of interests between the two, Jordan cannot break the rules and cancel the agreements. However, the articles intelligently and deeply analyze the transformations and Israeli interests, and come to the conclusion that Jordan must be ready for a confrontation with Israel.
This readiness is not only financial. It includes first and foremost, according to the researchers, the construction of new assumptions of origin for the relations between the countries, and the dismantling of the previous assumptions of origin. After all, it was shown how Israel has a clear strategy, which grew out of deep-rooted and broad concepts in Israeli society, so why should the Jordanians not design a clear policy that stems from the interests of the people?
According to Abu Roman, the research institutes are an extremely important player in shaping a clear Jordanian policy, based on the interests and desires of the people, and the researchers at these institutes must offer alternatives and enable an in-depth dialogue on the issue. It is clear that Israel aims to exploit the intra-Jordanian disagreements to its advantage, but the Israelis have a firm and clear position on political issues, why not take a clear position against Israeli propaganda, the researchers ask.
Doreen Lizer writes in the project Horizon, Cooperation between the Van Leer Institute in Jerusalem, The forum for regional thinking and the Alam center. The project makes available to Hebrew readers processed content from media websites, magazines, research and information centers and academic journals in Arabic