Leaders should avoid surrounding themselves with “sayers”. Emcea Baram

by time news

32 years ago, at the end of February 1991, an international coalition led by the United States expelled the last Iraqi soldier from Kuwait after eliminating about a third of the Iraqi army. Following the defeat, a massive Shia rebellion broke out against the regime (which was mainly Sunni), and the Kurds also joined. The rebellions were suppressed with great difficulty and in rivers of blood and left a terrible sediment of hatred between the rebel communities and the Sunni community. In the foreign arena, Iraq has become a leper.

The initiator of the invasion of Kuwait, Saddam Hussein, thought correctly about the first stage: the military operation. He prepared the Iraqi “Republican Guard” well, and within hours the small country was conquered. He also managed to keep his plan a secret, so that the whole world was surprised, and therefore did nothing to prevent the invasion. But he made a grave mistake by not consulting anyone other than the commander of the “Mishmar” and two associates, and they were not free to express their opinion either. He does not consult the political leadership, at least two of whose members served as foreign ministers, Tarek Aziz and Sadoon Hammadi, knew the United States well.

No less serious: the Minister of Defense and the Chief of Staff, experienced generals, learned about the invasion when the “Mishmar” had already finished occupying Kuwait. They knew a lot about the United States Army and could have warned against confronting such a superior army. Indeed, when Iraq already controlled Kuwait, Chief of Staff Abdel Karim Khazraj warned Saddam Hussein that he should retreat without a fight because a war against the United States and the coalition would end in disaster. Saddam Hussein, who did not understand the limitations of his army and the capabilities of the United States, immediately dismissed him from his position. Without wider consultation, he did not think more than one step ahead, and the result was catastrophic.

The reason for this behavior was sheer force. Iraq’s points victory over Iran in 1988 was a pyrrhic victory, as it left Iraq without territorial gains, with heavy losses and severe destruction. But following him, Saddam Hussein established himself as an absolute sole ruler and stopped consulting. No one could object. Every strategic decision was made in the head of Saddam Hussein. This was the way other leaders also made disastrous decisions, before and after him. The closest example is Vladimir Putin’s decision to invade Ukraine. As far as is known, he consults only his closest associates, all of them yes-men, who did not understand Ukraine, NATO, and the real capabilities of the Russian army.

In January 1990, Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir sent a high-ranking envoy to Geneva, where Razan al-Tahriti, Saddam Hussein’s brother, was sitting as a diplomatic representative. The messenger offered Saddam through his brother a peace agreement or an end to the state of war. Saddam Hussein, who until 1986 considered contact with Israel in order to receive aid from the United States, rejected it and demanded that his brother cut off contact immediately. He threatened Israel with a chemical attack if it attacked Iraq. He probably believed that this threat would prevent Israel from helping Kuwait when the Iraqi army invaded it. On August 2, 1990, Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait. After he once again voluntarily rejected the American demand to withdraw from Kuwait in peace, on January 17, 1991, the war began. From that moment on, most of Saddam Hussein’s decisions made sense, but it was too late.

Although there was a debate in Israel about whether he would dare to launch missiles, he launched a missile, and this for two reasons. First, to redeem his honor; Second: to draw Israel into the war, which would have dismantled the coalition built by President Bush Sr. Saddam Hussein also refrained from using chemical warheads. This consideration was also rational, and there were also differences of opinion on this matter in Israel before the war began. Yitzhak Shamir, in turn, made the rational decision not to intervene in the war. In the midst of the war, Saddam Hussein’s decisions were rational, but the tremendous damage had already been done.

This article comes as a warning to any leader, dictator or elected leader, who at some point in his career surrounds himself with “what they say”, and feels that he is no longer capable of being wrong.

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