The clashes between France and Mali in the ring, sorry, at the UN tribune follow and resemble each other through the spades and accusations launched bluntly and in defiance of the fundamentals of diplomatically correctness.
This Tuesday, October 18, the meeting of the UN Security Council was no exception to the rule: like two co-wives arguing over the turn with the husband, Malians and French confirmed in front of the world their deep differences.
Once again, the arrows hurled by the Malian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Abdoulaye Diop, against the UN and its Security Council and the accusations against France for acts “serious assault and espionage” rained heavily on an audience that probably expected no less, given the tense relations between the two countries.
Bamako, through the voice of its head of diplomacy, seems sure of its business: Paris has shared information and made equipment available to criminal groups. And as during their previous outings, the Malian authorities claimed to have “hard evidence”.
But these are elements that the Malian military junta in power only intends to put on the table during a “specific session” of the Security Council, which it calls for “a.s.a.p”.
“False Accusations”
“False and defamatory accusations. Serious and unfounded accusations.” Paris’s response to the grievances leveled against him by the Malian soldiers who took power by force therefore remained unchanged, and this time again, the French ambassador, Nicolas de Rivière, remained erect in his strict costume of Diplomat.
In an exercise worthy of a history teacher, the French diplomat recalled the circumstances in which the Barkhane force was established in the Sahel and more particularly in Mali within the framework of the fight against terrorism before [d’affirmer] with conviction that his country “has never violated Malian airspace”.
Where then is the truth? Perhaps the “concrete evidence”, always promised but never produced by the Malians, will be essential to say whether, yes or no, France has played this troubled game of which it is accused on the banks of the Djoliba [appellation en langue mandingue du fleuve Niger, qui coule notamment à Bamako].
Unless all this is just a bluff on the part of the putschists, masters of Mali since the coups of August 18, 2020 and May 24, 2021, who have accustomed public opinion to stratagems and other populist tricks to create a diversion on their real intention to keep this power which they must hand over to civilians after a two-year transition.
While waiting for “proof”, real or fabricated, the epic showdown between France and Mali continues. Meanwhile, armed attacks against the Malian armed forces (FAMa) and civilian populations are increasing in a Mali cornered by terrorist fighters and at the same time trapped by power-hungry putschists, but unable to secure a national territory largely in the hands of armed groups.