A July 18 ambush in Mali, claimed by the Azawad Liberation Front (FLA) and al-Qaeda affiliate JNIM, highlighted growing alliances among armed groups against Malian and Russian forces, according to Al Jazeera. The attack, which killed at least 50 soldiers, underscores how shared enemies are driving cooperation between separatists and jihadists, complicating Bamako’s security strategy despite Russian military support.
Alliances Born of Necessity
The July 18 ambush near Anefis, which killed at least 50 Malian soldiers and targeted a joint Malian-Russian convoy, marked a turning point in Mali’s conflict. The attack was jointly claimed by the FLA, a Tuareg separatist coalition, and JNIM, an al-Qaeda-linked group. For Héni Nsaibia of ACLED, the collaboration reflects a pragmatic alliance rather than ideological unity. The Tuareg-led separatists and JNIM are currently fighting together because they share a common enemy in the Malian armed forces and their Russian partners from the Africa Corps,
Nsaibia told Al Jazeera.
Despite differing long-term goals—FLA seeks autonomy, while JNIM aims for Islamic governance—the groups have found mutual benefit in pooling resources. They act as force multipliers for one another, allowing them to pool resources and mutualise their efforts to confront their adversaries more effectively,
Nsaibia explained. The alliance also leverages shared kinship ties, with both groups framing their struggle as defending ancestral territory
against invading forces.
Russia’s Role and Limits
Russia’s Africa Corps, which replaced the Wagner Group as Moscow’s military presence in Mali, has bolstered the Malian army with combat support, drones, and aircraft. This has strengthened Bamako’s ability to respond to attacks, according to Nimi Princewill, a regional analyst specializing in West Africa. Russia has helped strengthen Mali’s military, which was at risk of being overrun, and has given it more support on the battlefield,
Princewill said.
However, the July 18 attack and earlier seizures of territory like Kidal suggest Russia’s involvement has not altered the conflict’s trajectory. The conflict remains deeply rooted, with geographical and ideological dimensions that are proving difficult for the junta to tackle,
Princewill noted. The Malian military’s decision to abandon the 2015 Algiers Peace Agreement and request the withdrawal of the UN mission MINUSMA has further eroded diplomatic avenues, pushing armed groups toward coordinated tactics.
Governance Vacuums and Local Realities
Analysis shows that Mali’s armed groups have filled governance gaps left by a weak state. Since 2012, political instability and external interventions have allowed groups like JNIM and the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS) to consolidate power. Non-state armed groups in the Sahel, particularly in Mali, have emerged as key power brokers, shaping local governance by filling gaps left by weak state institutions,
the authors wrote.
In regions where the state is absent or distrusted, these groups provide dispute resolution, taxation, and basic order—functions that, while not aligned with local populations’ ideologies, are often accepted out of necessity. When there are few alternatives, people adapt. They follow the rules because they need to survive, not because they believe in them,
the study found. This dynamic makes armed groups resilient, as their strength lies not just in weapons but in their integration into local realities.
Why Military Strategies Fall Short
International efforts to combat Mali’s armed groups have often overlooked the governance functions these groups fulfill. France’s 2013 intervention, for example, drove extremists into rural areas where they built ties with communities, exacerbating local tensions. Similarly, Russia’s military support has not addressed the root causes of the conflict, such as land disputes and resource competition, which extremist groups exploit to gain legitimacy.
