1970-01-01 02:00:00
The military police inquiry opened to investigate the soldiers who should have protected the Planalto Palace in the face of the coup attacks on January 8 freed the troops from blame and pointed to “indications of responsibility” of the Secretariat for Security and Presidential Coordination, which is part of the portfolio of the GSI (Institutional Security Office).
The investigation concluded that, if there had been “adequate” planning at the beginning of President Lula’s (PT) government, it would have been possible to have avoided the invasion of the palace or minimized the damage.
The confidential report, obtained by Folha, was finalized on March 2nd and supplemented on the 14th of that month.
The investigation indicates the responsibility of the GSI secretariat in a generic way, without mentioning the names of those responsible. The conclusion also cites the acronym DSeg, from the Department of Presidential Security.
At the time, the secretariat was headed by General Carlos Feitosa Rodrigues. He came to office in 2021, in the management of Bolsonarista Augusto Heleno. He was kept in the Lula government by General Gonçalves Dias, a GSI minister who resigned in April after the release of images that called into question the agency’s performance during the 8 January.
As in the case of Feitosa, the situation was repeated in the Secretariat’s Department of Presidential Security. The director, Colonel Wanderli Baptista da Silva Junior, had also been appointed by Heleno and retained by Gonçalves Dias. He was directly below Feitosa in the cabinet’s internal structure.
The military inquiry states that, within the scope of the GSI, “it remains evident” that “the planning, activation and employment” of military personnel “with regard to actions related to maintaining the physical integrity of the Planalto Palace and surroundings” is the responsibility of the secretariat.
The report highlights that, according to the protocol that defines the actions of the GSI and the CMP (Comando Militar do Planalto) in the defense of the palace (called the Plan of Operations Shield), it was up to the DSeg to “activate the displacement” of the shock troops of the Army.
It was also the responsibility of the secretariat to “seek essential information for planning preventive actions” from Abin (Brazilian Intelligence Agency) and the bodies of the Public Security Secretariat of the Federal District, which was not done.
On the 6th of January, a Friday, the GSI predicted a situation of “normality” over the weekend. As shown to Sheet in April, Abin says that the former GSI minister received 11 alerts on his WhatsApp from January 6th until the beginning of the attacks.
By way of comparison, the military police inquiry found that the number of military personnel on January 8 was lower than that of July 31 of last year, when Jair Bolsonaro (PL) summoned demonstrators against the STF.
At the time, Planalto security had been reinforced by 110 soldiers – the equivalent of a subunit or three platoons. On January 8, the Planalto Military Command sent only one platoon (36 men) around 12:00.
“In this way, it is possible to conclude that, if adequate planning of security actions is carried out, with the activation of sufficient troop value, the execution of security actions by the CMP troops would have better conditions of success”, he says.
“In this sense, the invasion of the Planalto Palace could have been avoided or minimized the property damage suffered”, he adds.
The military inquiry states that, due to lack of planning, the troops in the field were unable to react to the coup attack. For this reason, he says that “no signs of military crime or common crime were found in the actions of the troops”.
“Due to a prediction of ‘normality’ by that body [Secretaria Presidencial] —which did not happen in reality—, the staff requested from the CMP and employed was below the necessary given the large number of invaders and their aggressive behavior.”
“On another vertex, it is concluded that there are indications of responsibility of the Secretariat of Security and Presidential Coordination/Dseg regarding the invasion of the Planalto Palace, considering that there was a failure in the planning and execution of the actions”, points out the military inquiry.
Images from the closed circuit cameras of the Planalto Palace during the invasion showed not only the low number of men in the place, but also the lack of command. The main entrance to the building was unguarded for about 45 minutes.
The inquiry was opened on January 11 to investigate the performance of the Planalto Military Command troops. The investigation was conducted by Colonel Roberto Jullian da Silva Graça, now Chief of Staff of the CMP.
The military police inquiry is a pre-procedural investigation carried out by the military themselves to assess whether there are signs of a military crime and who might be responsible. Feitosa was not even heard during the investigation.
The document was sent to Minister Alexandre de Moraes, of the STF (Federal Supreme Court). In February, he decided that the military involved in January 8 will be prosecuted and judged by the court itself.
The minister also ordered the Federal Police to open an inquiry to investigate the military of the Armed Forces and the Military Police of the Federal District. The PF, therefore, may come to a different conclusion from that pointed out in the military inquiry.
Army does not comment on investigation
Questioned by Folha, the Army did not explain why General Feitosa was not heard in the inquiry. The institution stated that clarifications on January 8 will be provided “exclusively” to the competent bodies.
“The Army does not manifest itself in the course of investigation processes. It should be noted that this is the procedure that has guided the relationship of respect between the Brazilian Army and the other institutions of the Republic”, he said.
The GSI stated in a note that “it is unaware of the conclusions of the investigation of the Military Police Inquiry established within the scope of the Planalto Military Command, to which it did not have access”.
A Sheet he was unable to contact General Feitosa and Colonel Wanderli. The defense of General Gonçalves Dias was sought, but did not appear.
The military police inquiry also raises the flaws of the Secretariat of Public Security of the Government of the Federal District – although the folder was not the focus of the investigation nor does it appear in the conclusions.
The document points out that the GSI and the CMP were not called to the meeting organized by the Secretariat on January 6, two days before the attack, nor “communications of their decisions or intelligence reports”.
Faced with the risk of invasion of the headquarters of the Three Powers, the Government of the DF prepared a protocol of integrated actions in which it defined what each body responsible for the security of the Esplanada dos Ministérios should do on that day.
The inquiry also states that the PM-DF —according to the action protocol itself— should have prevented the arrival of the demonstrators to Praça dos Três Poderes, which did not happen.
Another argument used in defense of the military is that “the only information” sent by the Military Police was that the demonstrations would have “low animosity”, with “up to two thousand people”.
The report also downplays the Army’s role in the coup camp set up in front of the headquarters in Brasília.
The inquiry states that the area was occupied from October 30 “in an intense but peaceful way” and that there was a “gradual reduction in the number of demonstrators” from November 15 “due to the restrictive posture” of the Military Command of the Highland.
The document also says that, unlike the “restrictive stance” adopted by the CMP, “the Government of the Federal District authorized the demonstrators to disembark” in the Urban Military Sector, where the barracks are located.
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