Mirage on the Med: A Mishpacha Magazine Feature

by Mark Thompson

Cairo, January 27, 2026 — A plan to rebuild Gaza, spearheaded by Jared Kushner’s Board of Peace and now featuring a newly appointed Palestinian administrator, is raising eyebrows—and tough questions—about its feasibility and ultimate goals. Is this a genuine path toward Palestinian self-governance, or a carefully constructed facade?

The initiative, backed by the U.S. and several Arab nations, aims to reconstruct the devastated Gaza Strip, but its reliance on a largely untested administrative structure and the complex political realities on the ground are fueling skepticism.

  • Dr. Ali Shaath, a civil engineer and veteran of the Palestinian Authority, has been appointed to lead the “National Committee for the Administration of Gaza.”
  • The committee’s mandate focuses on reconstruction and routine public services, explicitly excluding security matters and disarmament of Hamas.
  • The plan relies heavily on international funding and coordination between multiple actors, including the U.S., Israel, Egypt, Qatar, and Turkey.
  • Critics question whether Shaath’s committee can effectively govern Gaza without addressing the underlying issue of Hamas’s control.

What exactly is the role of this new committee, and can it realistically operate independently of Hamas, which maintains a firm grip on power in Gaza? The appointment of Dr. Ali Shaath as head of the “National Committee for the Administration of Gaza” signals a significant, if uncertain, step toward rebuilding the territory, but the path forward is fraught with challenges.

A Technocrat in a Warzone

About two weeks ago, Egypt, Qatar, and Turkey jointly announced Dr. Shaath’s appointment. Four days later, in a Cairo hotel, the 67-year-old civil engineer formally signed the mandate outlining his responsibilities—his first official act in the role. Shaath is tasked with leading a committee of 15 Palestinian technocrats, charged with managing daily life in a Strip grappling with immense devastation: 68 million tons of rubble, the displacement of nearly all 2.2 million residents, and the collapse of essential infrastructure like water, electricity, hospitals, and schools.

Who is Ali Shaath?

Born in 1958 in Khan Yunis, southern Gaza, Ali Abd al-Hamid Shaath comes from a prominent Fatah-affiliated clan. He has spent much of his career in the West Bank. His academic credentials include a 1982 bachelor’s degree in civil engineering from Ain Shams University in Cairo, a 1986 master’s from the same institution, and a 1989 doctorate in infrastructure planning and urban development from Queen’s University Belfast in Northern Ireland.

Shaath’s career within the Palestinian Authority has been extensive, holding positions such as deputy minister of planning and international cooperation, secretary-general at the Ministry of Transport, chairman of the Industrial Zones and Free Trade Authority, and head of the Ports Authority. In 2005, he participated in permanent-status negotiations, focusing on technical aspects like borders and maritime access.

His publicly stated political positions are limited. A 2011 interview with Israel Army Radio revealed support for a two-state solution and nonviolent resistance. He also suggested that Jewish citizens could potentially purchase land in the West Bank—a view not widely shared among Palestinians. Family sources indicate a consistent avoidance of factional politics, though public information about his activities between 2007, when Hamas took control of Gaza, and 2023 is scarce.

A Middle Ground, By Design?

Shaath’s appointment followed negotiations involving Fatah, Hamas, Israel, the United States, Egypt, Qatar, and Turkey. President Trump’s plan called for a “technocratic and apolitical” Palestinian committee to administer Gaza, a proposal endorsed by UN Security Council Resolution 2803 in November. From a list of 40 candidates, 15 were selected, with the final choice coordinated among the involved parties. Nickolay Mladenov, a former UN Middle East envoy, reportedly approached Shaath with the offer.

Israeli security officials approved the committee’s composition, describing its members as “Fatah figures who are not extreme, similar to Palestinian Authority officials we already work with.” Shaath’s low profile—his relative anonymity and lack of scandal—was considered an asset. But some question whether he was chosen for his abilities or simply because he poses no immediate threat.

The committee’s success hinges on a delicate balance: navigating the complex political landscape of Gaza, securing international funding, and rebuilding infrastructure while avoiding direct confrontation with Hamas.

The Board and the Committee

The National Committee for the Administration of Gaza comprises 15 politically independent technocrats, many with ties to Fatah and the Palestinian Authority. Shaath chairs the committee and oversees energy and transportation. Key members include Sami Nasman, a retired Palestinian General Intelligence officer previously imprisoned by Hamas, responsible for internal security; and Ayed Abu Ramadan, chairman of the Gaza Chamber of Commerce, overseeing economy and trade. Hana Tarazi, Gaza’s first Christian female lawyer and an expert in Islamic law, is also a member.

The committee’s official mandate focuses on routine public services: electricity, water, health, education, rubble removal, infrastructure rehabilitation, and managing international aid. The mandate document emphasizes rebuilding “not only in infrastructure but also in spirit.” However, the committee is explicitly not tasked with security matters or coordinating with armed factions. Disarmament of Hamas is the responsibility of a yet-to-be-established International Stabilization Force (ISF).

The committee lacks political authority to represent Gaza’s residents internationally and operates as a temporary administrative body under the oversight of a complex structure: a “Peace Council” chaired by Trump, an “Executive Council” including Jared Kushner, Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan, and Tony Blair, and Mladenov as the senior representative on the ground.

The Elephant in the Room: Hamas

The central question remains: Is Shaath expected to confront Hamas? Officially, no. His role is limited to civilian administration. However, the ISF has not been established, and Hamas effectively controls large areas of the Strip. Hamas has welcomed the committee’s establishment, expressing willingness to transfer civilian powers while maintaining its military control.

Palestinian researcher Jihad Harb succinctly stated, “The committee’s ability to maintain security will be limited because the actor that controls Gaza is Hamas. Shaath’s mandate is confined to civilian, economic, and aid issues.” This scenario—a civilian administration operating alongside a powerful armed organization—raises concerns about a “Hezbollah model,” where civilian governance masks underlying military control.

A Return to PA Control?

Shaath has outlined a three-stage reconstruction plan: a six-month emergency aid phase, a two-and-a-half-year recovery phase, and a long-term reconstruction and development phase, estimating a total of seven years for full recovery. He has proposed innovative solutions, such as using rubble to create new land. However, he has remained largely silent on security issues and has not directly addressed Hamas.

Notably, Shaath is a veteran of the Palestinian Authority, having served under Yasser Arafat and Mahmoud Abbas. The committee’s composition largely reflects this background, raising concerns from Israel, where Prime Minister Netanyahu has repeatedly stated the Palestinian Authority will not rule Gaza. The appearance of a PLO flag in a video featuring Shaath has further fueled these concerns.

Whether Ali Shaath is the right person for Gaza depends on the desired outcome. If the goal is to manage reconstruction under international supervision while leaving Hamas untouched, he may suffice. But if the aim is to establish a governing authority that replaces Hamas and truly rules the Strip, a civil engineer lacking enforcement power seems unlikely to succeed. It increasingly appears this plan is a backdoor attempt to restore Palestinian Authority control over Gaza.


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