Heavyweights in both the security and political systems have a fantastic and long-standing wishful thinking, which refuses to die despite the fact that reality kills it every time it is thrown into the arena in the guise of policy.
Fantasy is the ability to turn a bitter enemy into a mild opponent. A terrorist organization may turn into a social movement and a political party, a backward enemy state may turn into a Western-style, predictable and risk-manageable rational state, and so on. According to this concept, recognition, economic incentives, demand for transparency and compliance with Western standards alongside international guarantees are effective tools in trying to tame the bear.
My heart sank upon reading the quote of Minister Michaeli, a member of the Cabinet, when she explained the logic behind signing the agreement with Lebanon in its current form. But it merely reflects a traditional view of the security establishment and the left.
As hollow and flimsy as the arguments she put forward may sound, their feet are still rooted in the vision of the “new Middle East” and promises to turn Gaza into Singapore. Akiva Bigman wrote about aspects of military thinking that have taken root in the IDF in recent years and serve this concept, and I would like to turn the spotlight on Hezbollah, its place in Lebanon and its attitude to Israel over the years.
The longing for recognition
According to Michaeli, the agreement constitutes a de facto recognition of Hezbollah in Israel, something she attaches the utmost importance to, because it “pulls the rug” from under Nasrallah’s feet and the necessity of maintaining weapons against Israel.
The argument and the language in which it was said is an echo of the words of Major General Giora Island, who claimed that Hezbollah is required to provide the public in Lebanon with a legitimate argument for the continuation of fighting in Israel and therefore, “as soon as there is an agreement, a rug is thrown under his feet, and Nasrallah does not like that.”
There is no doubt that Hezbollah recognizes Israel and not from today, the important question is what kind of recognition is involved. Israel for Hezbollah is an existing fact that it seeks to erase. He has been fighting it for four decades and set himself the goal of removing it from the world, as part of a systematic ideology.
The Israeli longing for recognition, whatever its nature, obscures the simple fact that the recognition we receive has nothing and nothing to do with political recognition which stands, first and foremost, in recognizing Israel’s right to exist. In this one important parameter – there is no recognition, there has never been recognition and it is not expected that the gas agreement or any other indirect agreement will change the situation.
This categorical assertion relies on two simple historical facts: first, the gas agreement is not the first agreement signed through an intermediary with Hezbollah; And secondly, Hezbollah has never changed its intentions towards Israel as a whole, even if it has discovered, and it can be assumed that it will continue to discover, flexibility in the use of force in the tactical aspects.
During the 1990s, the IDF conducted two counter-fire operations in Lebanon, ‘Accountability’ and ‘Grapes of Wrath’, which ended in “the girls” drafted through American mediation. In the case of ‘Grapes of Wrath’, Hezbollah generally demonstrated adherence to the rules , among other things, because these were especially convenient for him at the same time that they limited the IDF’s ability to respond to fire incidents.
Following the operation, a monitoring group was established that included Israel, Lebanon, Syria and France. As expected, the Clinton administration considered the working group’s understandings and action “a useful indicator that the new government in Israel, the Syrians, and the Lebanese are interested in finding ways to defuse tensions… and shows that they can do business.” After the IDF left Lebanon, a number of prisoner transactions were carried out, all through mediation, none of which had the same effect on the recognition of Hezbollah in Israel.
Hezbollah, therefore, made extensive use of third-party brokerage services on several occasions when it suited its interests. All this did not prevent him from continuing to define Israel as an enemy that must be destroyed. The “recognition” that Michaeli is talking about, the result of briefings by the heads of the defense establishment, is a ridiculous recognition that empties the concept of its meaning.
consistent position
[חלקים בפסקאות הבאות מבוססים על הניתוח המוצג בספרו של אייל זיסר, ‘לבנון – דם בארזים’]
It is common to identify five principles in Hezbollah’s ideological infrastructure:
1. Recognition of the necessity of establishing an Islamic order.
2. The rule of the cleric.
3. Commitment to jihad (holy war).
4. Commitment to the unity of the Arab nation
5. Commitment to social justice.
Under the fourth principle, the commitment to the liberation of Jerusalem is mentioned as part of the liberation of Palestine as a whole, while the third principle enshrines the personal duty to take part in this war in accordance with the ruling of the clergy, who constitute a higher authority.
Over the years, Hezbollah has faced challenges several times that threatened its freedom of action and the internal-Lebanese legitimacy necessary for its existence: the Taif Agreement which it initially opposed, but was forced to accept and integrate into, the withdrawal of the IDF from Lebanon, the “Cedar Revolution” (2005), the Second Lebanon War ( 2006), the outbreak of the Arab Spring and the involvement of the organization in the fighting in Syria, the explosion in the port of Beirut and the current economic crisis are prominent examples of this.
On various occasions Israel has assessed that the events and processes have the power to cause a change in the pattern of Hezbollah’s activity, especially in its military aspects and its ability and willingness to persevere in the armed struggle. Nasrallah conducts himself in the domestic Lebanese arena with a flexibility that combines violence, complicity in the political game, diligence in cultivating military and economic power, sectoral concern for the Shiite community alongside activity against the other communities in order to expand his base of legitimacy and assuming the role of “protector of Lebanon” for all that it implies.
On the other hand, in everything related to the struggle with Israel and the lack of willingness to give up the organization’s weapons, Hezbollah practices with pious consistency. In October 2005, Nasrallah expressed himself regarding the organization’s attitude towards Israel:
In our view this country [ישראל] It is illegal and is a cancerous entity and the cause of all crises and wars, and it cannot be a factor helping to achieve true and just peace in the region. Therefore we cannot recognize the existence of a country named Israel, not even ‘one day’ as some try to say. Time does not invalidate the Palestinian right…”
At about the same time, there were people in Israel who believed that Hezbollah’s room for maneuver was shrinking against the background of the Cedar Revolution and the expulsion of the Syrians from Lebanon. According to this approach, which has been nicknamed the “rusting pipes”, time and internal pressures will help in reaching a political solution to the Hezbollah problem and reduce the degree of threat posed by the organization.
Along with the voices heard today that correspond with the very same concept, it is worth listening again to a fresh reference by the Secretary General of Hezbollah from last week, referring to the gas agreement between Israel and Lebanon and the USA: “If you ask me how far your sea reaches? I will say that it extends to Gaza… On the day Palestine is liberated, we will not be divided on the maritime border.”
If there is a historical lesson from these crises, then the lesson is that Hezbollah demonstrated pragmatism in everything related to responding to internal pressures and even retreated from the core of its faith in the internal arena, while continuing to persevere in the struggle against Israel. Another lesson is that here in Israel there is nothing new and every chance, however slight, flimsy and theoretical, for a possible moderation of Hezbollah immediately turns into reheated noodles served to the Israeli listener in a new package.
The effect of the agreement on the status of Hezbollah
One of the claims heard regarding how the agreement will affect the status and strength of Hezbollah was that the agreement will weaken Hezbollah because it will reduce its dependence on Iranian support, strengthen Lebanon economically and weaken its ability to go to war, as this will endanger economic assets and an improved economic situation.
The argument rests on the traditional approach of throwing money at the problem and providing economic incentives designed to strengthen moderate forces, to add the rebellious state to the family of nations and to weaken the influence and power of the extremists in the equation. With this thesis there are countless problems and countless examples that show its futility. Here too, it is a fantastic line of thought.
There is a basic logic in stabilizing a political system through an improvement in the economic situation, when it comes to functioning countries. However, according to any acceptable objective standard, Lebanon is not a functioning country and the strongest military force in it is not the army but a terrorist organization. Hezbollah also maintains freedom of action in aspects of autonomous use of border crossings for its own needs, for the purpose of transferring illegal drugs, transferring fighters, money and drugs. The organization operates in large areas as a sovereign – collecting taxes, collecting donations, setting up roadblocks, etc. the state’s authority over external and internal security aspects.
Although not the news headline, it is also worth watching this excerpt from Nasrallah’s speech this evening, during which he responds to criticism that his organization is responsible for the border lines: “If you ask me how far your sea reaches? I will say that it extends to Gaza… the day Palestine is liberated we will not be divided on the maritime border”. received applause from the audience pic.twitter.com/CxhdQwzvN1
— roi kais • Roi Kays • Roi Kays (@kaisos1987) October 11, 2022
This fact does not stand on its own and is subject to the broader regional context: Hezbollah acts in Lebanon not only as a protector of narrow interests in the name of the Shia community, but under the influence of Iran, from which it receives funding, military aid, and ideological guidance. Those who expect the agreement to drive a wedge between Lebanon/Hezbollah and Iran are throwing Lazari is, once again, a hollow argument that cannot be thought of in any logical way to justify it. Especially due to the fact that Iran is facing a diminishing resistance. The sanctions regime is loosening and the US is not interested in a direct confrontation with Tehran but is trying to integrate it into the region as part of an overall strategy, even in these days when In Iran, a widespread wave of protests against the regime.
Hezbollah’s strength is not based only on military strength. Along with the budget from Iran, the organization manages a world-wide economic system of drug business, smuggling, construction, import and more. This system is disconnected from the internal crises in Lebanon. Hezbollah also has significant representation in the House of Representatives in a bloc numbering 61 members of parliament out of 128. Its economic power and the freedom of action it enjoys allow it to act in a fundamentally different way from the government, and to realize the fifth principle (“social justice”) in the form of charitable enterprises, managing a parallel banking system, and intervening in the market The energy and more.
Lebanon is a rotten and corrupt country in the economic aspects, a country where transparency, proper administration and corporate governance do not exist. Lebanon is ranked 154th in the global corruption index, out of 180 sampled countries, and its ranking has been consistently deteriorating since 2012. Those who wish to describe a future picture according to which funds entering the country will find their way to worthy civic purposes such as infrastructure, welfare, citizen services, investment in the business sector, and more, We need to explain what exactly is expected to change the trend and transform Lebanon from a country in the abyss of femininity to a functioning country where the funds invested are not channeled to associates or terrorism.
The attempts made along similar lines with the Palestinian Authority have already shown that it is more difficult to defeat terrorism militarily, it is even more difficult to eradicate structured corruption and institutional decay. There is reason to believe that the task in Lebanon is doubly difficult.
If you take an example from the past of Israel and Lebanon themselves, it is hard not to remember the false hopes planted in the alliance with the Christians at the end of the 70s. The alliance, which culminated in the conclusion of a peace agreement with Lebanon, was based on the fact that the Christians – our allies – would rule the country, stifle the threats to Israel and provide it with security and peace. As we know, this hope ended in disappointment, in the total failure of the strategy and the birth of the conflict with Hezbollah.
In regards to reducing the chances of war due to the economic costs that this will have for Nasrallah, it is important to mention that Hezbollah itself is apparently not interested in war in a traditional way. It is too short to explain the reasons for this, but it is important to note a fact: Hezbollah achieved what it achieved by threatening war and without firing a single bullet, and will succeed in doing so again as long as Israel is perceived as fleeing from a conflict.
In other words, Hizbollah’s policy of using force does not have two states: total absence of violence or total war. As long as Israel is portrayed as escaping from a conflict at an exorbitant price, Hezbollah has no need for an all-out war and can maintain its status as Lebanon’s defender both as someone who stood firm against Israel and as someone who acts responsibly and does not unnecessarily endanger Lebanon in an all-out war.
Here, too, it is appropriate to learn from the past. Hezbollah assumed great operational freedom in regards to operations to kidnap soldiers between the years 2000-2006 and even went to the trouble of announcing that it would do so within the framework of the “National Dialogue”. Even then, as I recall, there were internal Lebanese considerations in favor of restraining activity against Israel (so much so that Israel tended to think that Hezbollah would indeed have difficulty acting forcefully against Israel).
Hezbollah kidnapped soldiers in 2000, tried to kidnap and failed in 2005 and succeeded again in 2006, which led to the Second Lebanon War, contrary to Nasrallah’s early assessment. There is no guarantee or future causal link that can be reliably established between the gas agreement, the existence of Asada, the existence of revenues from gas or foreign investments and between the restriction of Hezbollah’s freedom of action and the reduction of the chance of war.
exorbitant price
Military intelligence and planning organizations have a built-in advantage in short-term situational reading. As you extend the predictions, this advantage goes away and is eliminated. This is the reason why a good strategy is built on a distinct and distinct national interest, and on the best way to serve it, and not on wishful thinking based on an assessment or prediction of trends on the other side.
The concept that an improvement in the economic situation will lead to the strengthening of moderate factors and correspondingly to the weakening of extreme factors is valid, with a limited guarantee, in the scenarios taken from functioning countries. It cannot be used as the cornerstone of a strategy when it comes to a backward country strangled by a powerful terrorist organization that relies on a rogue regional power that strives for regional hegemony.
Such a strategy must make a number of basic assumptions at every point in the future probability tree: if only Hezbollah will weaken, if only Lebanon will adopt World Bank reforms, if only Iran will moderate, if only gas will be found or if only a meteorite will hit Nasrallah’s bunker.
Furthermore, these basic assumptions presuppose a reality in which there is no force opposing their application. When you return to the ground of reality, you find that the force acting against the policy has not changed its position as a whole regarding Israel in all the years of its existence. The fact that he practices caution and measured action in Israel stems from his profit and loss considerations, not from the fact that he joined the “Ten Steps to Transition from Extremism to Moderation” program.
The longing for some kind of recognition or a semblance of normalizing relationships leads us time and time again to adopt an attitude of giving incentives to the aggressor. The simple truth is that despite the popularity of the method in our area, using it as a reward for those who want to eliminate you completely, as a means of recession, has never achieved the desired result. At most, she rolled the hot potato forward to the next term.
It’s okay sometimes to buy a little peace at an affordable price. Sometimes there are legitimate broad considerations, but to tell ourselves such a fantasy, just to qualify an exorbitant payment for silence until after the elections?