In recent years, the assumption that the role of the government is to make changes has become widespread. “Reforms” are the touchstone of a government. You didn’t change – you didn’t.
But this is a fundamental mistake. A government as its name is – its role is to govern, that is: to manage the affairs of the state on a daily and strategic level. It is a set of routine actions and routine decisions, most of which do not concern far-reaching changes of the state institutions or the law books. And the key word in running the country is not reforms – but leadership.
Here are some examples. The first, of course, in the field of security. The basic decisions concern decisions such as whether to go to war or not, analyzing the map of threats to Israel, formulating a strategic response, defense appointments and even procurement plans. These are not “reforms”, but management. On top of that, the political field – how should Israel deal with the battle over the nuclear deal with Iran? How can one respond to the renewed campaign for the establishment of a Palestinian state? What do we do with Israel’s sensitive situation in Syria vis-a-vis the Russians, in the context of the war in Ukraine? The answer to all these questions lies in political leadership, and is not related to reforms at all.
The same is true in economics. The basic principles of managing the state economy relate to maintaining a budget balance, a positive debt-to-product ratio, tax rates that will stimulate investments and businesses, and so on. Many of these decisions do not require structural and institutional changes, nor do they require special legislation beyond the budget law. It is certainly possible to manage a growing, prosperous and responsible economy even without economic “reforms”.
This can go on and on. The main point is that the role of the government is to manage the affairs of the state at the basic level, even if not a single action is taken to change it. From the non-exhaustive overview above, it is possible to understand that already in this challenge the basic debate between the left and the right on a variety of issues is manifested – is Israel conducting an open and public campaign against the Biden administration in the Iranian context, or will the entire dialogue be conducted “in closed rooms”? Will the state budget be balanced or “shouldn’t be afraid of public debt”? And so on. The keys to establishing a safe and prosperous country are found in these questions.
What is required to promote right-wing/conservative policies is leadership ability. This is how, for example, the gas plan was passed – despite the political and legal difficulties that were piled up in front of it. And so, in a reverse example from that period, the attempt to stop the establishment of the corporation failed: as I showed at the time, the critical discussions in the Knesset committees on the issue were conducted with the complete dominance of Yesh Atid people, and cynically in the midst of the ‘Tzuk Eitan’ battles. This is not an excuse for the concept of the Netanyahu government at the time, but it clarifies the point: leadership and careful management are the key to success.
This is the first and fundamental floor for administration. This is where it all starts.
The second floor deals with the structure and function of state institutions, legislative needs and so on. Here the right has a long list of ideas and initiatives – the legal system, the clerkships, regulation and the like. There is no need to expand on these issues, since in recent years they have captured the most attention in the right-wing policy discourse, to such an extent that the first layer of the policy – the management of the state – is taken for granted, banal and boring.
The new right-wing bloc – known as the religious bloc – includes many political forces that attract a government of reforms, but harm the ability to run a government on a day-to-day basis. Each party aspires to “transform the country” and has a detailed platform on a variety of issues. But when it comes to everyday government – a problem arises.
The ultra-orthodox and many in religious Zionism and even in Likud are appealing to “social” policies: they want to increase public spending, in welfare, religion and education budgets. In a narrow government it will be difficult to talk about cutting allowances, reducing corporate tax or reducing the “fat man” who rides the economy. Alongside them, in religious Zionism, they are preparing to fight for the Land of Israel in an uncompromising manner – which denies the political flexibility required in this campaign. If any evacuation of an outpost, not to mention a temporary construction freeze or conciliatory political speeches, may endanger the very existence of the coalition – the Prime Minister will have very little room left to maneuver on strategic issues vis-a-vis the American government.
The best right-wing governments were broad governments. And not for nothing. The first Sharon government – which suppressed the second intifada, de facto canceled the Oslo agreement, and carried out economic reforms that shaped the country to this day – was a broad government that included labor, Shinio and some of the ultra-Orthodox parties alternately.
The second and third Netanyahu governments – in which a campaign was conducted against Obama’s initiatives to establish a Palestinian state and advance the nuclear agreement with Iran – were both broad governments that included at various stages a partnership with the Labor Party, Tzipi Livni’s movement, Yesh Atid, and more.
These governments were based for most of the period on a large number of Knesset members, ranging from 66 to 77, presented a combination of a broad Israeli consensus with political flexibility that made possible, for example, the Bar Ilan speech – a political maneuver that helped repel the pressures of the Obama administration in the Palestinian arena. The speech was sharply criticized by the right-wing elements in the coalition, but its stability and size allowed for this room for maneuver. Also the fact that the social-religious parties did not have a veto in the government allowed relatively responsible management in the economic field.
Flexibility and consensus, the key to national leadership, are the secret of Netanyahu’s successes in the previous years.
A narrow right-wing government, the so-called “full right-wing”, is seen by many as necessary and good for promoting reforms and changes – in the second layer of the government’s functioning – but this will have a high price when it comes to the first layer. A government in which every faction and sub-faction has de facto veto power is an inflexible government that is deprived of political maneuverability and attachment to the Israeli consensus.
Since the right’s responsibility upon returning to power is first and foremost to manage the country, one of the urgent tasks is to create a broad and stable coalition, incorporating certain elements from the center parties. This can have different aspects – and I am one of those who believe that at least in the first stage it is better to establish a homogeneous right-wing government, both to establish the political achievement and to charge the left a price for its loss. But further down the road, and perhaps after developments that will lead to the disintegration of the leftist parties, it is appropriate to strive for the expansion of the government.
The price will be a certain concession on the reform plans of the right-wing parties. This does not mean a complete renunciation, but it is possible to find room for compromise and flexibility. As part of such a compromise, it is possible, for example, to agree to promote moves that increase transparency in the judicial system – such as broadcasting hearings at the High Court, hearings on the appointment of judges or at least a list of protocols of the committee’s hearings, and so on – and for now to put aside more controversial issues such as the overreach clause or the French law.
It is possible to form a consensus for certain changes in the conduct of clerkships – such as reducing the institution of tenure, or increasing the quota of trust positions in government offices (what are called political appointments). Instead of firing the ombudsman, for example, it is possible to formulate an outline to split the position or at least to increase the independence of ministers vis-à-vis the central legal advisory system, for example in representation in petitions against the state at the High Court. And so on. The details are many and the options are many. And there is a lot to do even without starting the D-9 and without creating provocations and riots.
In the bottom line, it is possible to produce an outline for the promotion of a series of less controversial reforms, based on agreement in a broad Zionist government. In any case, reforms that pass in such a format will gain more public support and there is a greater chance that they will survive even in the event of a change of government. Israel needs a broad right-wing government. Security needs it. The state owes it, and the economy demands it. The intra-Goshi battle in recent days proves this well.
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