Already yesterday morning (Sunday) after the assassination of the commander of the southern sector in the Gaza Strip of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (GAF) Khaled Mansour, there was a consensus at the security and political level in Israel that the goals and purpose of the operation had been fully met, and that efforts should be made to end it.
This, before it unfolds into a more extensive operation, which is not what Israel asked for when defining the objectives for the operation. Israel is not interested in allowing the Islamic Jihad to establish a new reality in which it tries to impose an equation linking Israel’s routine operational activity against the organization’s terrorist operatives in IOS and damage to the routine of life of the residents of the south.
Operation “Dawn” – special coverage:
Between massive shooting and ceasefire negotiations | The third day of the operation
“There are children here, cancel the event”: the drama before the assassination of the senior jihadist
“The more violent and murderous”: the senior Islamic Jihad who was eliminated
After the two assassinations of the two senior members of the Palestinian Authority, the commanders of the sectors in the north and south of the Gaza Strip, Taysir Jabari and Khaled Mansour, the removal of the threats of the attack in the south and the delivery of a clear message that the achievements of the operation, which were very measurable from a military point of view, had been achieved – the decision to strive for a ceasefire was quick.
Even in a few days, the price charged by the GAP was high, and it suffered significant operational and cognitive damage. The damage to the terrorists was very focused and precise, with very few casualties not involved by IDF fire. And all this in a very short time, in an elegant manner and with quality intelligence, when Hamas – at least at this stage – remained out of the picture, and the initiative this time was in the hands of Israel. This is a figure of great importance.
Israel did not pretend to go to war to solve the complex problem of the Gaza Strip, and the current operation is not close to solving the complex problems that the terrorist organizations, led by Hamas, pose time and time again to Israel in the Gaza Strip. But within the framework of the modest goals that were set, the quality of the execution, the intelligence, the accuracy, the dialogue between the professional levels, the army, the Shin Bet and the political level, were conducted up to this stage in a qualitative and professional manner worthy of appreciation.
Along with this, there is also an obligation to maintain the right measure and not to exaggerate by overestimating. The GAP’s military capabilities are not those of Hamas, and certainly not of Hezbollah. The achievements from the operation that are worthy of appreciation should be put in the right context and remember that Hamas adopts a policy that is very careful not to enter into a conflict with Israel, not only due to the deterrence from last year’s Operation Wall Guard and Israel’s brilliant policy of differentiation, But also out of an internal interest that a confrontation with Israel does not serve him at this stage. He used the peace that prevailed in the Gaza Strip for the past year to restore his military capabilities and strengthen until the next confrontation with Israel.
Hamas, of course, also suffers from a distinct inferiority in military capabilities compared to the IDF. However, the ability to manage its fire array, the command and control that allow it to effectively manage the shooting in volumes and volleys much larger than the capabilities of the GAP, pose another challenge to Israel in dealing with the threat of rockets Gaza confirms the operation in which only the Islamic Jihad carries out the shooting. From this we also have to remember that in the campaign against Hamas the percentage of success of the Iron Dome will be lower than the unprecedented figure of its quality in the current operation.