2024-08-20 08:32:38
New Delhi: Assembly elections are going to be held in Jammu and Kashmir after 10 years. The security situation is tense before the elections. Pakistan and its close friend China will definitely try to stop this democratic process. However, the recent Lok Sabha elections in Jammu and Kashmir will definitely be a big message for both the countries. Pakistan is preparing an army of terrorists and it is also getting a lot of help from China. India also knows that it has not one but two challenges from across the border. In such a situation, conducting assembly elections peacefully will also be a challenge.Increase in the number of terrorists
In terms of the number of Pakistani terrorists belonging to the Pakistan Army’s Special Service Group (SSG), the situation is much better than during the assembly elections held in the 1990s and the turn of the century. The number of terrorists then was estimated to be between 2,000 and 3,000. According to the latest assessment of Jammu and Kashmir DGP RR Swain, the number of local terrorists is 20 and the number of Pakistani terrorists is five to six times that. A benchmark for the Indian state is the 1996 assembly elections, when the situation was brought under control by a joint effort of security agencies led by the Indian Army. An analysis of terrorist attacks in the Jammu division, especially in Pir Panjal, shows that terrorists prefer to target the army when it is careless and in areas where the alert level is very low.
We are ready to answer
The situation before the assembly elections is not conducive for such terror attacks which are planned by professionals from organisations like Pakistan’s ISI and SSG. The recent crackdown on overground workers (TOGW) of terrorists among the nomadic shepherds in the high altitudes, sacking of five policemen involved in drug trade, formation of 19 special anti-terrorism teams of police in eight districts of Jammu etc. have curbed terrorist activities.
At the same time, the challenge for India is to battle the narratives amplified by social and mainstream media. Having declared a goal of ‘zero terrorism’ in Jammu and Kashmir, even a relatively low number of violent incidents is tantamount to punching a hole in the ‘big picture’ narrative. Militants have skilfully created narratives around multiple actions, the cumulative impact of which pales in comparison to the massive numbers of the 1990s and early 2000s.
Chinese footprints on LoC
There is a certain degree of reluctance to accept and prepare for the emerging synergy between Pakistan and Chinese forces in the fields of conventional and guerrilla warfare. Lest India again face such an attack that comes out of nowhere (Kargil 1999 and Eastern Ladakh April-May 2020), the Chinese hand in terror attacks in Jammu and Kashmir and the strategic situation along the LoC must be taken with all seriousness. It is known that the Chinese are helping Pakistan with their powerful Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities.
Guerrilla warfare is going on
Chinese encrypted communication equipment meant for the Pakistan Army has been recovered from terrorists in Jammu division. Chinese and Turkish drones are operating across the LoC to smuggle weapons and drugs. The continuous supply of Chinese steel-core armour-piercing assault rifle shells, defensive hand grenades, etc. to terrorists shows that a well-planned, coordinated and battle-ready guerrilla war is going on in Jammu and Kashmir.
The PLA has increased its influence on the LoC by helping strengthen Pakistani defences. The Chinese have laid optical fibres and strengthened defensive constructions across the LoC and also provided 155 mm howitzers to bring parity in artillery strength. The Chinese arms industry takes care of Pakistan’s needs for depleted war reserves. Not only this, the PLA’s incursion into eastern Ladakh in 2020 has fundamentally changed the regional strategic calculation in Pakistan’s favour. The LoC environment has become inherently linked to the LAC.
India has had to move military resources from Jammu and the hinterland to the LAC as the LAC has been seen as the more potent of the two strategic challenges. In the process, Pakistan has found a strategic shield for its proxy war in Jammu and Kashmir. Therefore, the issue of India’s restraint on the LoC and its quiet observance of the February 2021 ceasefire despite the deaths of 48 and 10 Rashtriya Rifles soldiers and two video-captured beheadings in the hinterland of Jammu is troubling. In the traditional domain, the two enemy armies are conducting exercises together and adopting common weapon systems. Officers are seconded to each other’s military commands. The 2.5 war front, in which even a single-front uninterrupted war effort by Pakistan and China can be imagined, is rapidly evolving.
Weaknesses in Jammu
The intelligence system is a matter of concern with regard to the Jammu division. In my analysis of 14 terror ambushes, traps and booby traps that took place in Pir Panjal and interior areas of Jammu since October 2021, the Army suffered heavy casualties as the terrorists had accurate information regarding potential ambush points, vehicle movement and number of troops. Providing food, cave shelters and guidance to the terrorists by TOGWs (terrorist overground workers) was a key element. The Army, on the other hand, always fell prey to surprise attacks and killed only a few terrorists in retaliation. Inaccurate intelligence and inaccurate information further complicated the operational environment for the Army in Jammu.
The terrorists are using highly encrypted communication equipment or resorting to the state-of-the-art Alpine Quest navigation and route-mapping device which is offline. Thus, signal interception has also become less of an important source of intelligence. In the above scenario, human intelligence becomes crucial. This is where the terrorists again have the upper hand as the flow of information from the locals is in their favour. This is one factor that explains the disproportionate killing rate of the army compared to the terrorists in the Jammu division.
The lack of intelligence sharing in Jammu between various branches of the security establishment has been a matter of concern. A troubling question is why the militants have not attacked police personnel, who are relatively easy targets in the remote hilly areas of Jammu? What does the large number of dismissals of policemen – for supporting militants and smuggling drugs for the drug trade – indicate?