2023-12-04 09:09:44
The next steps after the Supreme Council of Cooperation of December 7 and the Prime Minister’s meeting Kyriakou Mitsotakis and the president of Turkey Recep Tayyip Erdogan preoccupy both sides, which so far appear satisfied with the results of the ten-month recession in Aegean. According to well-informed sources, in addition to the meeting between Mr. Mitsotakis and Mr. Erdogan (with the participation of the foreign ministers Giorgos Gerapetritis and Hakan Fidan and diplomatic advisors Annas-Marias Bura and Chagatai Kilic), another four-four meeting will take place, where the next steps will be discussed.
The specific four-fourth will be held between the Deputy Ministers of Foreign Affairs Alexandra Papadopoulou and Burak Aksapar, with the aim of a first discussion on the mapping of the movements that will be made within 2024. In this context, the Turkish side has already raised the question of reviving, possibly in some other form, the exploratory contacts. In practice, the two sides are looking for a way to restart contacts for their core Greek-Turkish disputes in the Aegean, which revolve around aeronautical issues (national territorial waters, national airspace). It is recalled that the last two rounds of exploratory contacts were held in October 2021 in Ankara (63rd) and in February 2022 in Athens (64th), in a period of extreme tension between Greece and Turkey. The exploratory contacts then had not gone to the core of the issues but had turned into a forum for exchange of views between the two sides. They were more like parallel monologues and less like the exploratory contacts that had come so close to convergence in 2002-2003 and then 2010-11.
Discussions about winds
Essentially, that atmosphere had led Athens and Ankara to the typology of the political dialogue held last October with the delegations headed by Mrs. Papadopoulou and Mr. Aksapar. However, the discussions were general (Ukraine, Middle East, Caucasus, Balkans, international situation). In Athens, the feeling is that Ankara wants to continue the process of contacts that was timidly opened last February and accelerated after the Mitsotakis-Erdogan meeting in Vilnius in July, without necessarily their substantial conclusion to any result. In any case, the next steps will be discussed and decided over time, with the duo of Deputy Foreign Ministers holding responsibility for the pace at which this will take place, subject, of course, to continued support from the leaderships. In short, at the present stage, the will of Mr. Erdogan to keep the relations with Greece at a good level, is the main measure of the ups and downs of the tension in the Aegean. For Mr. Erdoğan’s good decision, at this stage messages have arrived from many partners of Athens throughout Europe.
Of course, no one can rule out a comment from Mr. Erdogan, although at the current moment the Turkish president’s target is the Israel and its prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu. The presence of Mr. Erdogan, without a parallel visit to minority villages in Thrace (in the previous weeks, local minority actors discounted a visit by the president of Turkey), it is considered a positive sign, without any other connotations.
The duo of Deputy Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Papadopoulou – Aksapar, are responsible for the pace at which Greek-Turkish contacts will unfold.
In this sense, there is optimism in Athens that on Thursday the two delegations will reach a joint communiqué, which in a measured and without exaggeration will reflect the will of Greece and Turkey to continue on the path of normalizing their relations.
The ASS itself will be small in number and will concern matters of substance as well as of the positive agenda (national defense, foreign affairs, immigration, culture, tourism, shipping). Well-informed sources said the positive agenda should be treated with some restraint, as most of it will not result in an agreement.
Some of the regional issues are also first European and then bilateral. In short, it is impossible for Athens and Ankara to reach an agreement on the refugee issue, as the EU declaration is considered superior. – of Turkey, which is an “umbrella” for the “27”.
For the visa
In the same context, the discussion on the provision of short-term visas from Greece to Turkish citizens (72 hours) is included in order to enhance visits to the islands of Eastern Aegean for recreation and tourism. Since Greece is part of it Schengen zonethis discussion takes place more between the Turkish authorities and the Home Affairs Commissioner Ylva Johansson and less between Athens and Ankara.
It should be noted, finally, that in Athens they are following with particular interest the debate, which is held to a large extent in public, regarding the interest of the Turks in acquiring aircraft Eurofighter. Although the UK-Turkey defense cooperation agreement is important for the further development of the Turkish defense industry, it is believed that Ankara is not really interested in the (much inferior) Eurofighters, but is publicly over-promoting the issue in order to exert pressure on the USA for market unbundling F-16 and their upgrading, which also constitute the operational backbone of the Turkish Air Force.
The 22.5 million and the benefits of the moratorium
Greek-Turkish relations are going through a long de-escalation phase, especially if we take into account some key figures that are indicative of both the tension at the military level and refugee. The reduction in tension over the Aegean has led to a steep drop in its operating costs Air Force (P.A.), which before February 6, 2023 was carrying the burden of daily interceptions.
The “K” compares today the ten months of 2023 up to November 30, starting in February and the period after earthquakes in Turkey, with the equivalent of 2022 and the reduction is huge. In the ten months of February – November 2022, it is estimated that the interceptions cost the P.A. approximately 23 million euros. In the corresponding period of 2023, the corresponding expenditure was reduced to less than half a million euros.
It is worth noting that the tenth month of 2022 they violated him National Airspace (EEC) 2,296 Turkish fighter jets. While from the February earthquake until November 30, 2023, only 47 airplanes violated the EEC, most of which in the first days after the disasters in Southeast Turkey.
These numbers indicate, of course, the political decision of Ankara to “freeze” the violation tactics, as well as the absolute success of the moratorium in the Aegean. To the fuel savings from essentially ceasing interceptor missions must be added the maintenance benefits, as aircraft wear is avoided (F-16s “lift” 90% of the operational weight).
The saving of resources is extremely useful at a time when all armament programs have been ordered to be “frozen” and re-examined, based on their cost and usefulness. Every euro counts, too Ministry of Defense and General Accounting Office they know it very well. For this reason, the issue of Corvettes (which have now reached 2.1 billion euros and not 1.7 billion) is referred to Greek calendars and the four American modified ones become attractive alternatives again LCS which may serve his practical needs Navy (P.N.) without the need to disburse large sums.
The disasters caused by floods in Thessaly led to adjustments to the 2024 budget and it is a given that in the event of escalating tension with Turkey in 2023 as well, decisions for a leaner management of the budgetary space for defense would be almost impossible. Of course, given the widespread destruction in Southeast Turkey due to the February earthquakes, fiscal space must also be found by the decision-makers for economic policy planning in Ankara.
To the fuel savings from essentially ceasing intercept missions must be added the maintenance benefits.
The pressures from the migratory and refugee flows that had increased in the summer. The analysis of the data available to the Ministry of Migration and Asylum shows that between October and November there is a 37% decrease in the flows of refugees and migrants. If this comparison is made between September and November, then the reduction is even greater and reaches 62%. In percentage points, the biggest decrease has been recorded in Samos (over 80%). In the other islands of the Eastern Aegean (Lesvos, Chios and Kos) the reduction exceeds 30%.
The general assessment of experts is that the flows will continue to decrease during the coming months. The decrease in flows is also connected to a certain extent with the deterioration of weather conditions in winter.
In Athens, of course, there are no illusions. The cost containment caused by the tension in the field is a direct function of the political decisions of Recep Tayyip Erdogan. The reduction in tension is the most visible statement from the Turkish side about the need to extend the period of “calm waters” in the Aegean.
On the contrary, the case of the immigrant is much more complicated as it is influenced by factors that are not under the absolute control of the Turkish state. When the Turkish Coast Guard does its job properly, it is a given that the flows are reduced, although the slave-trafficking networks find ways to operate despite the safeguards.
At the same time, the basic tool for managing migration in the Aegean, the EU joint statement. – Turkey of 2016, it needs to be upgraded in a way that it will not be a simple funding tool for Ankara to keep refugees (which the Turks don’t want) on its soil, but something more sophisticated based on longer term policies.
This particular dimension passes more through Berlin and Ankara and less through Athens, regardless of whether the Greek and Turkish migration ministers will renew in a few days an agreement for better cooperation between the decision-makers on the Greek islands and the Turkish coasts.
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